
TJ^Z/^^O^ 



Making Woodrow Wilson 
President 



WILLIAM r. McCOMBS 

Chairman, Democratic National Committee 



Edited by 

Louis Jay Lang 

Editor, Autobiography of Thomas Collier Platt 



NEW YORK 

FAIRVIEW PUBLISHING COMPANY 

1921 






6P(P 



COPYRIGHT, 1921, BT 
CORINNE HARDY 



All rights reserved 



Printed in tht United States of America 



DtG 2bi:jyi 



^)GU6o3286 



FOREWORD 

William Frank McCombs was born at Hamburg, 
Ashlej^ County, Arkansas, December 26, 1876. His 
father, William Faulloier McCombs, was a native of 
Kentucky. His mother was Mrs. Frances Pugh 
IMcCombs, a native of Alabama. There were three 
sisters, Corinne, Ethel and Addie, and two brothers, 
Robert and Ashton. 

While the father tilled a 17,000 acre rice plantation, 
yoimg McCombs learned his A B C's at his mother's 
knee and from a private tutor. As a mere child he 
suffered a fracture of the hip through a fall. As a 
result of this accident, he was permanently lame. 

His preliminary training for college was obtained 
in the Webb Preparatory School at Belle Buckle, 
Tennessee. He entered Princeton University in 1894, 
graduating with the class of '98. 

ISIr. McCombs was of medium height, while leaning 
upon his ever present cane. He shot up to six feet 
when provoked. In youth his hair was auburn. It 
was tinged with gray when he attained the age of two 
score years. The hair was brushed back from a higli 
forehead. His eyes were gray, the nose was long, the 
nostrils frequently dilated. The mouth was firm; 
the lips thin; the jaw square; the ears small; the face 
clean cut and of an intellectual type. 

Mr. McCombs, throughout his career, avoided pyro- 

[ 5 ] 



FOREWORD 

technics. He was dogged in his determination and 
cool in a crisis. He was no compromiser, but fought 
to a finish. His life's achievements were embraced in 
the brief span of 44 years, his death occurring on 
February 22, 1921. 

The genesis of this book v/as in a visit of the editor 
to William F. McCombs, nearly three years ago. At 
that time, JMr. JMcCombs, prostrated by illness, recited 
many incidents which appear in this volume. The 
editor was so impressed that he begged the privilege 
of writing them. 

Mr. McCombs answered, "Not now. The story 
would be misunderstood. Let's get together after I 
recover and map it out". A few weeks later, it was 
agreed that we should collect all available material and 
prepare it in book form. Death intervened before the 
task could be completed. 

Mr. McCombs wrote about one hundred thousand 
words, terminating at a point in the Democratic Con- 
vention when Champ Clark needed only a few votes to 
become the Presidential nominee. There was, in addi- 
tion, much detached material. Because of ^Ir. 
McCombs' illness and death, he was unable to finish 
the work he had undertaken. 

The editor has been compelled to supply many 
details with which he became familiar through an inti- 
mate friendship of nearly seventeen years. An effort 
has been made throughout this book to utilize all the 
material that Mr. McCombs had prepared, and to 
distinguish this from the material supplied by the 
editor. 

[ 6] 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Tnteoduction IT 

CHAPTEB 

I. Princeton Episodes 23 

The Author Enters Princeton — Finds Wilson "Cold, 
Distant, Intellectual" — McCombs Prevents Univer- 
sity President's Enforced Deposition by Grooming 
Him for Governor of New Jersey — "To Let Him 
Down Easy" — Elected, Wilson Repudiates Bargain 
to Make James Smith, Jr., United States Senator — 
McCombs Predicts Wilson Will Be President of the 
United States. 

II. Genesis of Wilson's Presidential Campaign . S4i 

Wilson Asks McCombs to Manage His Presidential 
Primary — "Let the Prophet Fulfill the Prophecy" 
— McCombs Embarks with Meager Funds — Wil- 
son's First Speech Shocks Him — McCombs Intro- 
duces McAdoo to Wilson — "Everybody is Against 
Wilson"! Said McAdoo — State Chairman Nugent's 
"Wilson — Liar — Ingrate" Speech Causes His Oust- 
ing. 

III. McCombs in Command 45 

Begs Wilson to Help Himself — Wilson Replies: 

"See Hudspeth" ! — Hudspeth "Too Busy" — Har- 
mon "Logical" Nominee — McCombs Aims to Defeat 
Him, Clark, Underwood and Bryan — Wilson Peevish 
About Speaking When Revolt Faces Him in His Own 
State — Pennsylvania and West Virginia Among 
First States Captured — But Pennsylvania Wavers 
Because of Wilson's "Radicalism". 

in 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB PAe« 

IV. Wilson Goes His Own Way 54 

Disowns Colonel Harvey, Editor of Harper's Weekly 

— The Colonel Ceases to Support Governor's Candi- 
dacy — McCombs Fails to Patch Up Wilson's Quarrel 
with Harvey and Colonel Watterson — Watterson 
Denounces Wilson as Ingrate and Autocrat — He 
Befriends Harvey — McCombs Defends Wilson, but 
Regards the Dispute as Very Injurious to the Wilson 
Candidacy — Wilson Scoffs at This. 

V. Enter Colonel, House 67 

"Wilson Impossible: Name Bryan or Culberson and 
You and I will Control the United States", Says the 
Colonel to McCombs — Colonel Shies at Request for 
Money — Views Wilson Nomination from London — 
Watterson Calls for "A Court of Honor" — Penfield's 
$10,000 — Senator Gore Proves to be a Friend. 

VI. Launching of the 1912 Campaign .... 81 
Wilson's Letter to Joline, "Knocking Bryan Into a 
Cocked Hat", Alarms His Manager — A Race of 

Writers to Answer It — Bryan Mollified and "Shakes" 
with Wilson — McCombs Wins Big Advantage for 
Wilson in Selection of Baltimore for Convention City 

— McAdoo, Morgenthau and Elkus "Drop In". 

VII. Publicity and Strategy 90 > 

How McCombs Apprised the Voters Wlio and What 
Wilson Was — Second Choice Chances in the Conven- 
tion Enhanced by Keeping Out of "Favorite-Son 
States" — Bryan's Ohio Tour Financed — Nineteen 
Wilson Delegates Elected in Buckeye State — Even 
Break in Oklahoma — Campaign Fund Lacks $36,000 

— McCombs Borrows More Money — Charles R. 
Crane Makes His First Donation, $5,000. 

VIII. Preparations for Convention 99 

Only 327 of the 1088 National Delegates for Wilson 
as the Net Result of Presidential Primaries — Mc- 
Combs Tours South and West to Gain Veto Power in 

[ 8] 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

Convention — "Only a Miracle Can Save Wilson", 
Says Davies — Wilson Conference at Washington 
Gloomy — Newton, Publicity Man, Discharged. 

IX. McCoMBs' Organization 112 

Battle for Convention Control — Bryan Bitterly 
Attacks Parker as "Predatory Interests Candidate" 

— Parker Defeats Bryan for Temporary Chairman 
of the Convention — The Wilson Group Supports 
Bryan to Eliminate Clark — Clark's Manoeuvres 
Against Bryan to Prevent His Fourth Presidential 
Nomination. 

X. The Baltimore Convention 128 

McCombs Secures Abrogation of the Unit Rule — 
Murphy, Taggart, Sullivan, et al. Ignore the Injunc- 
tion — Bryan Demands Withdrawal of Ryan and 
Belmont as Delegates — Calls Them "Money-Trust 
Despots" — Clark Receives a Majority Vote on 
Tenth Ballot, but Not the Necessary Two-thirds — 
Chairman James is Accused of Trying to Stampede 
the Convention for Clark. 

XI. Wilson Hoists the White Flag 143 

Begs McCombs to Withdraw His Name as a Presi- 
dential Candidate — McCombs Replies: "You Bet 
Your Life, I Won't" ! — Other Instances of Wilson's 
Trying to Quit When He Feared Defeat — Bryan 
Excoriates Murphy and "Subtlety" — Swings to 
Wilson. 

XII. Bryan Unmasks 160 

In Deshabille, He Beseeches McCombs to Desert 
Wilson and Nominate Him — The Petition Spurned 
Indignantly — Mitchell Palmer's Plan Thwarted — 
Mayor Gaynor Bowled Out — Murphy Says "Let 
Caucus Decide" — Wilson Leads Clark for the First 
Time — James Orders Anti-Unit Rule Enforced — 
Almost a Death-Blow to Clark. 

[9] 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB PAOI 

XIII. Wilson Wins Nomination 173 

Victorious on Forty-Sixth Ballot — Sullivan Clinches 

It — Murphy Capitulates — McCombs Warned: "Re- 
member Jim Smith" ! — McAdoo Picks Palmer for 
Vice President — McCombs Selects Marshall — Sum- 
mary of the Unprecedented Ballots for the Presi- 
dency. 

XIV. "Providence Did It" 180 

Wilson So Exclaims to McCombs, Who is Chilled by 
Absence of Gratitude from the Presidential Nominee 

— McCombs, in Collapse, Beats McAdoo to "His 
Presence" — Messrs. Kern, Palmer, Daniels, Taggart 
and Hudspeth Urge McCombs for National Chairman 

— Wilson Prefers McAdoo, but Makes Him Vice 
Chairman and Chooses All Campaign Committee. 

XV. McCombs and McAdoo Quarrel, 190 

At Bitter Odds as Campaign Begins — McAdoo 
Ignores His Chief in Selecting Headquarters Force 

— "Beat Roosevelt", Directs McCombs as He Falls 
111 — McAdoo Levies on McCombs' Political Assets 
and is Put Out of His Pre-empted Post — Nominee 
Fails as a Peace-Maker. 

XVI. "I Owe You Nothing — " 204 

Wilson Elected by an Unprecedented Plurality — 
O'Gorman Proclaims "This Boy, McCombs, Did It" 

— President-Elect Wires His "Thanks" — "It Was 
Ordained of God That I Should be President" ! Said 
Wilson to McCombs When Actually Elected — Wil- 
son Ignores All National Committee Recommendations 
for Appointments — Names Bryan, McAdoo, 
Tumulty, et al., Despite Protests of Those Who Won 
for Him — McCombs' Slate Thrown Into the Waste 
Basket — House Picks Cabinet Ministers. 

XVII. Insiders and Outsiders 219 

McCombs Declines All Offers of Place Under Wilson 

— Treated as a "Rank Outsider" at Inauguration — 

[ 10] 






CONTENTS 

CHAFTEB PACK 

Cannot Pass Bryan-McAdoo-Tumulty Trocha — 
Republican Manager Frank H. Hitchcock, "Down 
and Out", Commiserates with McCombs — White 
House Announcement That McCombs is "Patronage 
Distributor" — McAdoo is Real Dispenser. 

XVIII. Colonel House — Thk "Intriguer" . . S29 
Tries to Bargain with McCombs to Discard Wilson 

for Bryan and "We'll Control the United States" — 
Offer Furiously Rejected — Though Opposed to Wil- 
son's Nomination, the "Colonel" Names Whom He 
Pleases for Office — "Fed on Wilson's Passion for 
Greatness and Said 'No'! or 'Yes'! as Required — 
How He Muddled Things for the President — Mor- 
genthau, Baruch and Elkus Portrayed. 

XIX. The Cost of Vanity 243 

"Stand-Patter" Aldrich Provoked the 1912 Republi- 
can Revolt — "Roosevelt Lost Through Bad Tactics 

— Wilson Won Because Sick Parties Clutched Each 
Other's Throats — Wilson Lost Through Lust for 
Power, Which Made Him the Joke of the Vforld 
Powers — Meddling, Muddling and Colossal Vanity 

— Brutal in Victory — Cowardly in Defeat". 

XX. McCombs a "Social Lion" 258 

Gets Appendicitis and a Bride — Feted in London 

and Paris — Refuses Public Service Commissioner- 
ship and State Chairmanship — Frames Party Plat- 
forms and is Nominated for Constitutional Conven- 
tion Delegate — Attacks Roosevelt as a Bolter — 
Offers Services as Party Peace-Maker — Backs 
Glynn for Governor and Gerard for United States 
Senator. 

XXI. McCombs Retires as Chairman 264} 

Quits National Committee — Defeats All McAdoo- 
Burleson-Tumulty Plots to Oust Him — Wilson 
Coterie Conspires Four Years to Supplant the Presi- 
dent-Maker — McCombs Wins Fight for 1916 Con- 

[ n ] 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

vention City and Voluntarily Steps Out in Formal 
Notice to the President — Wilson's "Greatest 
Regrets". 

XXII. "War Saved Wilson in 1916"! .... 272 
McCombs Refuses to be a Party to the President's 
Violation of His One-Term Pledge — "You Know I 

Do Not Oppose a Third Term", Says Wilson to 
McCombs, When Asked to Fulfil His Paramount Pre- 
Election Promise — How McCombs Saved Vice 
President Marshall His Renomination — Balks 
Palmer and Baker, Who Seek to Supplant the 
Hoosier. 

XXIII. Drafted for the Senate 282 

Wilson Runs Conway Against McCombs, but Mc- 
Combs Sweeps the Primaries — Wilson's "Congratu- 
lations" — McCombs' Reply — Wrath of "Crown 
Prince" — McAdoo-Wilson Handicap So Great That 
Calder Wins at the General Election — McCombs 
Assails "Pap Hunters" and "Blank-Check Profiteers". 

XXIV. Retribution 293 

Wilson's Greeting on Return from Paris — Mc- 
Combs Foils Baruch and Chadbourne in Their Efforts 

to Make McAdoo President — Uses Edwards to Con- 
solidate Eastern States — Solidifies Anti-Third Term 
Forces — Destroys Wilson Dynasty at San Fran- 
cisco. 

XXV. Wilson's Attitude Towards McCombs . . 300 
McCombs Made No Promises of OfSce — Sullivan, 
Wood, Reed and Others Suffer from President's 111- 

Will — McCombs' Suggestions for Cabinet Appoint- 
ments Ignored Because Made by Him — Denied a 
Seat Because "You Are a Politician". 



[12] 



vN 



PREFACE 

This book depicts a double tragedy. The chief 
actors were Princeton University men. One was an 
instructor; the other was his pupil. Enthralled by 
the artful intellectuality of the instructor, the pupil 
conceived and executed the idea of making him Presi- 
dent of the United States. 

The President not only spumed his political maker, 
but treated as outcasts, many others who sacrificed 
their near-all to elevate him to the office of America's 
chief executive. The President-Maker went to an 
early grave. The President was repudiated by the 
American people. Retribution came but a few 
months before the President-Maker gave up his life. 

**Whoso diggeth a pit, shall fall therein. And he 
that rolleth a stone, it will return upon him." 

— Proverbs 26: 27. 

Louis Jay Lang 
Princeton '81 



INTRODUCTION 

I would have little reason for writing this book 
were it not more than a mere discussion of a man's 
life. I have no desire to be Woodrow Wilson's 
biographer. I have been urged to wTite, because of 
my personal contact with his political career, and 
because of my knowledge of the events connected 
therewith. 

I knew Mr. Wilson twenty-six years. I sat under 
him at Princeton University. I know how he became 
Governor and twice President. I was manager by 
personal appouitment of Mr. Wilson's prenomination 
Presidental campaign. I was Chairman of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee of 1912 which conducted 
the campaign that resulted in his election. I was 
intimate with his conduct for his entire official career. 
I Avi'ite, not as an enemy of Woodrow Wilson, but as 
an opponent of the subversion of the American con- 
stitution and the destruction of our system of Govern- 
ment, through vanity and greed for individual power. 

I consider Woodrow Wilson one of the most re- 
markable developments of modern times. Brilliant 
in mind, and a master of history and rhetoric, I would 
not call him learned. He was actuated always by 
the purpose of the moment. He was an opportunist. 
Suave of manner, he constantly strove to advance 
himself. He saw only himself — and only his personal 

[ in 



INTRODUCTION 

individual exaltation. He played the game as an 
expert whist player — always to win — never to lose. 
Winning was his passion. 

He was brutal in victory. He was the first to run 
when threatened with defeat, There is evidence of 
this in his begging me to withdraw his name as a 
Presidential candidate at the Baltimore convention 
of 1912, when Champ Clark was leading him slightly. 

Had I yielded to his panic at that time, there would 
have been no President Wilson. 

Mr. Wilson was insensible of political obligations. 
He recognized no debt to the giver. He was adroit 
in conduct, and skilled in the use of language. His 
English was a model of classicism. His strength lay 
in his cleverness of expression. His oratorical out- 
bursts were at times dazzling. One became intoxi- 
cated with the veneer of his intellectuality. 

The Wilson ideal was Alexander Hamilton, the 
Federalist — not Thomas Jefferson, the Democrat. 
Like Hamilton, he believed in a limited monarchy — 
a life tenure for the President. He was an advocate 
of the British Government system. He taught it at 
Princeton University. Wliile President, he regarded 
himself not only as President, but Premier. Had he 
dared, he would have prorogued Congress as the King 
of England prorogues Parliament. 

It was during the Paris Peace Conference that he 
proclaimed himself Premier of the United States. 
His was the most audacious proclamation ever emitted 
by an American President. He overrode Congress 
and made it a creature of his whims. His juggernaut 

[ 18] 



^ 



INTRODUCTION 

crushed those who dared oppose hmi. He imperiously 
strode a world-wide stage. He was fortunate in that 
there is no American constitutional provision for the 
retirement of the President from office during the 
term for which he is elected when repudiated by popu- 
lar vote. This alone saved him from earlier oblivion. 
Mr. Wilson absorbed a great and i)owerful party, — 
the Democratic Party. It has been more often out 
of, than in, power, but it always set a continuity of 
principle. Long before his first inauguration for 
President, I found that the Democratic Party must 
cease to exist except as a vehicle for his will. No man 
in history ever survived who had the boldness and the 
audacity to employ his practices and probably no one 
ever will. 



ir^urtL^ 



[ 19] 



PART I 



\ 



WOODROW WILSON 



PRINCETON EPISODES 

The Author Enters Princeton — Finds Wilson "Cold, 
Distant, Intellectual" — McCombs Prevents Univer- 
sity President's Enforced Deposition by Grooming Him 
FOR Governor of New Jersey — "To Let Him Down 
Easy" — Elected, Wilson Repudiates Bargain to Make 
James Smith, Jr., United States Senator — McCombs 
Predicts Wilson Will, be President of the United States. 

IN THE fall of 1894, 1 went to Princeton Univer- 
sity. Never having been in the East, I had a 
great feeling of loneliness. In addition, I was 
not satisfied that Princeton was the place for me, my 
first choice being Harvard. My family, however, 
having more prescience than I did, preferred Prince- 
ton. I acceded to their wishes. 

Some time in October of that year, I became a 
member of the Southern Club, an organization of 
about a hundred. Shortly thereafter the Club held a 
meeting. Woodrow Wilson, but recently called to a 
professorship, was invited to speak. After the meet- 
ing, as we came out of the door, I happened to fall in 
with him. We walked across the campus together. 

[ 23 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

I accompanied him to his home. The point of contact 
between us was, that we were both from the South. 

I made inquiries about Princeton. We discussed 
the relative merits of various institutions. He told me 
that if he ever became a professor anywhere else than 
Princeton, he would go South. Being fresh from the 
South myself and somewhat provincial, the idea im- 
pressed me greatly. 

For the next two years I came in contact with Pro- 
fessor Wilson occasionally. ]My admiration for his 
intellect grew, although he always impressed me as a 
cold and distant person, with a sort of affected 
warmth. 

During the last two years of my course at college 
I elected to take all Professor Wilson's courses, which 
included Jurisprudence, Politics, and English Com- 
mon Law. His lectures on Jurispi*udence and Poli- 
tics, to my mind, far excelled any courses given in the 
University. Jurisprudence and Politics involved the 
theoretical side of the law. The course in English 
Common Law involved concrete and definite princi- 
ples. It is not surprising that Professor Wilson, 
when he was admitted to the Bar, did not continue in 
the practice. His disposition would be against the 
detail of preparation and the turmoil and struggle of 
actual litigation in Court. 

On the whole, I think I got more from Professor 
Wilson's courses than from any others, with the pos- 
sible exception of Professor Bliss Perry's courses in 
English and Aesthetics. 

After leaving Princeton, I went to the Law School 
[ 24 ] 



PRINCETON EPISODES 

at Harvard, and later to New York to practice. I 
saw little more of Professor Wilson until he was 
elected President of the University, — chiefly by those 
in the Board of Trustees, including INIoses Taylor 
Pyne, James W. Alexander and others, with all of 
whom he later differed. 

The burden of the original complaint in the Board 
of Trustees at Princeton against University President 
Wilson was that he announced policies and pro- 
grammes totally irrespective of the Board of Trustees, 
which was contrary to all of the traditions of the 
University. 

Mr. Pyne and others had been largely responsible 
for the later development of the University and had 
contributed vast sums for its support. Mr. Pyne 
lived in Princeton. He actually gave much of his 
time to the personal supervision of its activities. 
Theretofore, as in the majority of the educational 
institutions of the country, the Board of Trustees had 
laid down the policies and programmes of the Univer- 
sity and had arranged its financial resources. The 
President was presumed merely to co-operate as the 
chief administrative officer of the University. Thus 
the schism began, and this a little over a year after 
Professor Wilson became President of the University. 
In 1908 ]Mr. Wilson, unkno^vn to the Board of 
Trustees, announced a programme which involved the 
abolition of the student clubs of Princeton and the 
division of the University into a group of units called 
Quads, after the English fashion. To each Quad was 
to be assigned a certain number of students without 

[ 25] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

reference to their preference in the matter. They 
were to dine together and necessarily to be thrown 
together. This was Mr. Wilson's idea of the estab- 
lishment of a more complete democracy. 

The objections to the plan, naturally, were the 
destruction of property values of several hundreds of 
thousands of dollars invested in the Student Eating 
Clubs, and the enormous expense in connection with 
the establishment of Quads. A further objection was 
that the Quad system must fail, because men who are 
uncongenial will not accept association. Compulsion 
would result in the attendance at meals only of persons 
who might possibly be socially congenial. 

Nevertheless, the plan had its elements of strength. 
Wliile I did not agree with Mr. Wilson's idea of the 
Quad system, I did agree with the general idea of fur- 
ther democratizing Princeton and of breaking up the 
cliques. 

The fundamental difficulty in the matter, however, 
was that Mr. Wilson had elaborated and published 
an entire plan without consultation with the consti- 
tuted authorities — the Board of Trustees. 

I was in Princeton when the matter reached a fever 
point. I called on the President. I suggested that 
he might work out his plan if he called his Board of 
Trustees more into consultation. This he agreed to 
do. But, in some way or other, at the time, his nature 
rebelled against it. 

Later on, and after the discussion of the Quad Sys- 
tem had been taken up among the Alumni, the ques- 
tion of a Graduate School arose. Everyone favored a 

[ 26 ] 



PRINCETON EPISODES 

Graduate School. Colonel William Cooper Procter, 
of Cincinnati, offered to provide the funds. The 
question arose as to its location. A majority of the 
members of the Board of Trustees and Dean West 
were in favor of its location at some distance from the 
campus, in order that the graduate students might not 
be disturbed by the enthusiasm of the under-graduates. 
IMr. Wilson favored the idea of erecting the Graduate 
School on the campus. To my mind the location was 
totally immaterial so long as we were able to avail our- 
selves of the gift of IMr. Procter. 

Over the location of the Graduate School, however 
immaterial as it may seem to the average reader, — and 
indeed it has never seemed anything else to me, — the 
discussion grew to such proportions and the feeling of 
hostility against Mr. Wilson became so great, that it 
was only a question of time until he would be forced by 
the majority of the Board of Trustees to surrender the 
Presidency. I had kept in close touch with Princeton 
affairs since graduation. I had, as an officer of the 
Princeton Club of New York, advised Mr. Wilson 
thoroughly as to the situation, and had stood in the 
position of acting, at least in New York, as the link 
between him and the Alumni. 

In 1909, IMr. Wilson, as President of the Univer- 
sity, was invited to make a speech at the Princeton 
Club of New York. The President of the Club, who 
had been opposed to him, was on that evening, fate- 
fully or otherwise, not present. When Mr. Wilson 
came into the clubhouse, he received an exceedinp;!}^ 
cold reception, esi^ecially from the older men. Being 

[ 27 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

an officer of the Club, I met him at the door and took 
him in. Noticing that he was not to receive a very 
cordial reception, and that the attitude was one of 
patent hostility, I took him through a narrow hall, so 
that he would not have to pass through the main body 
of the audience, and conducted him to the platform 
from which he was to speak. The Vice President of 
the Club in his introduction said, merely : 

*'We have with us this evening, the President of the 
University, Mr. Wilson". 

The Vice President and I were the only other per- 
sons on the platform. 

After the speech I went up and shook hands with 
the President. We paused for a moment to see if 
others would follow. The older men, among whom 
were several trustees, did not come up. The younger 
men disliked to volunteer. I conducted Mr. Wilson 
out by the same secret passage, and into the open lobby 
of the Club as the members were filing out. Not over 
twenty from the gathering of two hundred shook 
hands with him. 

I suggested to IVIr. Wilson that we go up to the grill 
room of the Club, where a buffet supper was being 
served, — including liquid refreshments. I was sure 
that this supper would attract the younger men, and 
that a better opportunity could be had there to make 
things a bit more comfortable for him. I left him in 
the hands of a group of half a dozen younger Alumni. 
He appeared painfully conscious of his position. 

Then I went to the officers of the Club, and various 
members of the Board of Governors, all of whom were 

[ 28 ] 



PRINCETON EPISODES 

on the Anti- Wilson side of the issue, and stated that 
he was the guest of the Club, invited by action of the 
Board of Trustees; that whatever they thought of 
him, they owed him the courtesy of cordial treatment 
so long as he was in the Club ; that when he departed, 
they were at liberty to act as they pleased. I further 
said, that, unless this was done, I would resign as an 
officer of the Club. 

Whereupon, most of the officers and Governors went 
up and greeted him formally. I think it was the cold- 
est meeting of any sort that I ever attended. 

In April, 1910, it became apparent that Mr. Wilson 
was to be deposed from the Presidency of Princeton 
University. I thought such action would produce a 
serious split in the body of the Alumni and cut off a 
tremendous support from the University itself. In 
the second place, I did not see anything in the situation 
at that time to warrant such action. 

I remember one night, at the Princeton Club, saying 
to two friends on the Board of Trustees, that in Wilson 
we had one of the intellectual giants of the continent. 
Even if he lacked amiability to the suggestions of the 
Board of Directors, and had acted arbitrarily at times, 
I thought much should be ^vritten off against genius 
and that an entente could still be established. 

^ly suggestion met with no response whatever. 
The Board of Trustees was thoroughly committed, 
pro and con. The only man who had been in the 
situation who could have brought about peace was 
Cornelius C. Cuyler, a banker in New York, a mem- 
ber of Mr. Wilson's class and friendly with all fac- 

[ 29 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

tions. Mr. Cuyler died the summer previous. I have 
always thought that had he lived he could have laughed 
the matter out of existence, as it should have been. 

In May, 1910, it became more obvious than ever 
that Mr. Wilson was to be dismissed at the June com- 
mencement, I happened to be in Princeton during 
that month. I suggested to two members of the Board 
of Trustees, hostile to him, that it would be a good 
thing if Mr. Wilson were nominated for Governor of 
New Jersey on the Democratic ticket. 

Former United States Senator James Smith, Jr,, 
of New Jersey, was casting about for a candidate out- 
side the organization, who could win. Colonel George 
Harvey was very enthusiastic about Professor Wilson. 
He enjoyed the confidence of Senator Smith. 

In my conversation with the two Princeton trustees 
referred to above, I said, "Why not let Wilson down 
easy by getting him the nomination for the Governor- 
ship of New Jersey on the Democratic ticket"? 

These trustees were very powerful men. They took 
the suggestion very heartily. I said no more. 

The next I knew, it was common gossip of New 
Jersey that Wilson would be the candidate. A hun- 
dred times newspaper men have inquired of me 
whether these two Princeton trustees and others did 
not actually put up the $75,000 required by Senator 
Smith for the Wilson campaign fund, and whether, 
as a matter of fact, Cleveland Dodge and others did not 
refund the $75,000 w^hen Wilson broke with Smith. 

In any event, at the commencement in 1910, there 
was an underground rumor that Mr. Wilson might be 

[30] 



PRINCETON EPISODES 

relieved of his duties in another way than by formal 
action of the Board at that time. 

I went to Europe. Returnmg in September, on 
making inquiries, I found that the idea of the nomina- 
tion of JNIr. Wilson had gained great headway, espe- 
cially among what were termed the Reactionaries in 
New Jersey. Subsequently, a meeting was held at 
the Lawyers' Club in New York at which his nomina- 
tion was virtually agreed upon. This meeting was 
attended by Mr. Wilson, George Harvey, James R. 
Nugent, Robert S. Hudspeth, representing Senator 
Smith, Robert J. Thompson, former Congressman 
Eugene Ivinkead, Robert Lindabury and JMilan Ross. 

JNIr. Wilson agreed to run for Governor. Senator 
Smith controlled a majority of the delegates to the 
convention which met at Trenton October 10, 1911. 

The Progressive element in New Jersey violently 
opposed the nomination of ]Mr. Wilson. Among them 
were William Hughes and Mayor Gregory of Orange. 
Some gentlemen from Newark, where Senator Smith 
resided, were at the doorway of the Convention Hall. 
They refused admission to Progressive delegates. A 
number of personal encounters ensued. 

Mr. Wilson was nominated easily. He made his 
speech of acceptance. He embarked upon his cam- 
paign under the management of Senator Smith, James 
R. Nugent and Colonel Harvey. 

The Progressive candidate for Governor was George 
L. Record. The Republican candidate was Vivian 
Lewis. 

Ample funds were provided for the campaign, 
[31 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

$75,000 being raised by Senator Smith and his friends. 
Mr. Wilson made a magnificent stumping tour and 
was elected by a plurality of over forty-nine thousand. 

After his nomination, on October 10th, I sent the 
Governor-Elect the following telegram: 

"The People of New Jersey are to be congratulated 
on your nomination for Governor, and Princeton has 
produced the next President of the United States." 

In writing that telegram, I had in mind the very 
great probability of Democratic success through the 
country, of a Democratic lower House in Congress, 
and the general feeling that the Taft Administration 
was falling into a state of collapse. I had also in 
mind the fact that Mr. Wilson would prove intellectu- 
ally superior to any candidate who might be elected as 
Governor from any of the states, and that his tours of 
campaigning could be turned to such an account that 
he would attract the attention of the entire country. 

His election was so impressive that it received very 
general notice; but the vast majority of people 
throughout the country viewed it as an experiment in 
higher education. Tersely, their general sentiment 
might have been expressed in the phrase: 

"Watch the Professor"! 

After his inauguration, Mr. Wilson immediately 
proceeded to his programme. 

Evervthinsr went alonc^ very amiably until the ques- 
tion of the election of a United States Senator came 
up. Under the then very effective primary law an 
informal primary had been held a year before. Only 
two men participated, both of whom were relatively 

[ 32] 



PRINCETON EPISODES 

unknown, — James E. Martine and Frank M. Mc- 
Dermitt. Very few voters paid any attention to the 
law at all, considering it practically a dead letter. It 
did not provide that it should be binding on the 
Legislature. 

Soon after Governor Wilson took office, there were 
rumors that Senator Smith desired to be elected Sen- 
ator. It was understood, also, that Colonel Harvey 
would stand. No mention was made of James E. 
Martine, who had received a majority of the votes in 
the informal primary. 

]Mr. Wilson came out squarely against Senator 
Smith, but expressed no preference as to candidates. 
The Smith legislative forces were gathering. It 
seemed that he would be elected under ordinary 
circumstances. 

Then Governor Wilson took the position that the 
primary candidate, even though the election was in- 
formal, should be the choice of the party. At the 
same time, he saw the necessity of winning away from 
Senator Smith the organization that was behind him. 
He thereupon brought leaders into consultation and 
made appointments that were satisfactory to them. 
Gradually Smith's pow^r was withdrawn from him, 
and in a short time he had lost control of his organiza- 
tion, his influence being practically limited to Essex 
County. IMr. IMartine was elected. 



[33 ] 



II 



GENESIS OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGNS 

Wilson Asks McCombs to Manage His Presidential Primary — 
"Let the Prophet Fulfil the Prophecy" — McCombs 
Embarks with Meagre Funds — V/ilson's First Speech 
Shocks Him — McCombs Introduces McAdoo to Wilson — 
"Everybody is Against Wilson"! Said McAdoo — State 
Chairman Nugent's "Wilson — Liar — Ingrate" Speech 
Causes His Ousting. 

TOWARD the latter part of February, 1911, 1 
saw Governor Wilson, I discussed with him 
the proposed Employers' Liability Act. In 
New York, I had been very keenly interested in the 
subject and had studied it very thoroughly. He re- 
quested that I give him a brief and any suggestions 
that I had to make. I went to Trenton and took the 
matter up with him. 

On his desk, I noticed huge piles of unanswered 
letters. I said to him : "You must be getting a lot of 
mail". He said: "Yes, those are invitations from 
various places to speak, and I don't know what to do 
with them". I then reminded him of the telegram 
concerning his probable chance of being President 
which I had sent to him in the previous October. He 
said: "Yes, I remember it well, but I think that the 

[ 34] 



GENESIS OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 

Smith incident has put me out of commission with 
organized politics in this country. My course in the 
Legislature has been such as to make people afraid 
of me". 

I told him that the first was a serious obstacle, but 
if I gauged the temper of the time correctly, the latter 
could be overcome. Then I said: "I should like the 
prophecy of my telegram fulfilled". His reply was: 
"The prophet should fulfil his prophecy". I said: "If 
you desire, I should be quite willing to do so". The 
Governor assented. 

I looked at a number of his letters. They were 
mainly from Civic organizations in the East. I said: 
"These will never do. The movement to make a man 
President of the United States must start in the West, 
and come East". 

I returned to New York and laid do-vvn a plan of 
campaign. My first move was to organize a speaking 
tour for the Governor through the middle and far 
West. It did not seem desirable that he appear to be 
canvassing for the office. I selected the following 
cities for his speech-making: Kansas City, Denver, 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle and Portland. I 
laid the plan before him. He assented. I then had 
suggestions made to Princeton alumni, or friends, in 
these various cities, that he be invited to speak before 
civic and commercial bodies, and that no speeches be 
made before political bodies. 

Invitations were readily extended. It was planned 
that the Governor should go west immediately after 
the adjournment of the Legislature. Meanwhile, I 

[35] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

got in touch with various friends throughout the 
country, chiefly Princeton men, and made inquiry as 
to whether they would be willing to support, finan- 
cially, a Wilson campaign for the Presidency. I got 
many responses, but little money. In the end, I was 
compelled to underwrite the trip to the West myself. 
Later I received some donations to offset my advances. 

I was busy in Court the day Mr. Wilson left. I did 
not have a chance to confer with him. But I told the 
publicity man to say to Mr. Wilson that on his western 
tour I did not think it advisable to incori)orate in his 
speech anything about the Initiative, Referendum and 
Recall. I did not know his views on the subject, but 
I thought that either position he took would be a great 
political injury. Furthermore, I thought that it was 
not necessary to bring it into a Presidential campaign. 
These issues were local and state matters. 

The publicity man, either fearing to make sugges- 
tions to the Governor or forgetting it, did not give him 
the message. In any event, in Kansas City, during a 
speech before the Knife and Fork Club, he came out 
for the Initiative, Referendum and Recall, but not the 
recall of judges. His position was very sweeping and 
applicable to all states and all conditions, according to 
the text of the speech. l^Hien I read the speech I was 
very much alarmed. I knew that the views expressed 
therein were contrary to that which he had taught in 
college. I knew, also, that such doctrine would set 
the more or less conservative states against him. This 
included the great and popular states in the East and 
in the South. As I anticipated, the speech immedi- 

[ 36 ] 



GENESIS OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 

ately aroused the greatest hostility. That and the 
Smith incident became powerful weapons in the hands 
of our opponents. So far as Smith was concerned, it 
was contended that, having accepted the Gubernatorial 
nomination largely at Smith's hands, the Governor 
should at least have kept his hands off the United 
States Senatorship, the more so in view of the fact that 
the primary had been an informal and innocuous affair. 

From Kansas City, Governor Wilson went to 
Denver. There the meeting had been arranged largely 
by Mr. S. H. Thompson, of the class of 1897 at Prince- 
ton, — now Deputy Attorney General. I did not 
know what Mr. Thompson's i)olitics were, but I knew 
he was my friend, and that I could trust him to arrange 
a proper meeting. This he did. At the time of the 
visit to Denver, Governor Wilson was invited to 
address a meeting there at the celebration of the Ter- 
centenary of the Bible. His speech was magnificent. I 
immediately had thousands of copies of it printed and 
sent to every clergyman in the United States. My 
idea was, that, from thousands of pulpits, this address 
would be commented on and that Mr. Wilson's name 
would be heard all over the United States. Prior to 
the time of his election as Governor, knowledge of Mr. 
Wilson's existence was confined, in a large measure, 
to academic circles and to the few who heard him as an 
after dinner speaker on a limited number of occasions, 
chiefly in the East. 

In the main, the tour turned out to be a great suc- 
cess, with the exception of the unfortunate declaration 
for the Initiative, Referendum and Recall. This 

[ 37 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

declaration produced a distinct setback in the East. 
It did not help very much in the West. 

Up to this time only three persons had taken part 
in the financial campaign, — Walter L. JNIcCorkle, of 
New York, who donated a small amount; Walter 
Hines Page, afterward Ambassador to England, who 
found my press agent for me and contributed, I think, 
$100, and myself. Upon a further call, Mr. Page told 
me he felt that he could not respond. Nevertheless, 
I felt that the campaign should go on. 

I concluded that, inasmuch as the political organiza- 
tions throughout the country, in the main, would be 
hostile to Mr. Wilson, and inasmuch as those Demo- 
crats who were possessed of means would not support 
organized politics in supporting him, I must lay down 
a campaign that differed materially and fundamen- 
tally from any Presidential campaign ever previously 
conducted. 

It seemed necessary that public sentiment should be 
built from the ground up, so that in the end states 
would be compelled to choose delegates who would be 
instructed for Mr. Wilson. If uninstructed, they 
would support him at some time in the convention, 
or, if hostile, would at some juncture be compelled, by 
popular uprising, to vote for him. The theory of such 
a campaign had, as its basis, a continuous publicity 
reaching the individual himself, irrespective of his 
putative power in politics. With this in mind, I estab- 
lished the Wilson Headquarters at 42 Broadway, Nev/ 
York City, with experienced publicity men in charge. 

A majority of the newspapers throughout the 
[38] 



GENESIS OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 

country had become very hostile and seemed to print 
as little about him as they possibly could. This plan 
was then inaugurated. We took a list of every Demo- 
cratic newspaper in the United States and printed a 
large page. We called it a clipping sheet. It was a 
statement of excerpts from the best things said about 
Mr. Wilson in the various papers. These sheets went 
on for a long time daily. Extracts from these clipping 
sheets began to be taken by the various small paj^ers 
throughout the country. 

People became aware of the existence of Wilson 
Headquarters at 42 Broadway. Then letters began 
to come in floods asking for more information about 
Mr. Wilson. These letters were answered individu- 
ally. The name of the inquirer was put in an index. 
The western speeches of the Governor were published 
with the exception, I must admit, of the Referendum 
speech, and were circulated broadcast to all inquirers. 
This publicity also went to the various political leaders 
in every county throughout the country. 

During the summer of 1911, while the initial stages 
of the publicity were going on, I took a motor trip 
through New England. I visited, personally, many 
Democratic leaders. At the Waumbeck Hotel, Jef- 
ferson, New Hampshire, I met Louis Wiley, business 
manager of the New York Times. I also met there 
Andrew Freedman, of New York, and William L. 
Ward, the Republican leader of Westchester County, 
New York. At the risk of boring them, I did not per- 
mit them to talk about anything except Mr. Wilson. 
Mr. Ward, who seemed to take a friendly interest in 

[ 39] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

me personally, but who did not like the Wilson idea 
at all, made many valuable suggestions out of his long 
experience. Of Mr. Wiley I made a complete convert, 
and later on, throughout the entire prenomination 
fight, he rendered valiant and valuable suggestions. I 
say valiant, because Mr. Wiley's paper never declared 
itself for Mr. Wilson until a very critical moment in 
the Convention itself. 

Wliile in IMaine, I went to see Mayor Fitzgerald, of 
Boston. My idea was not so much that I would get 
him committed, as that I would plant the Wilson germ 
in him for future purposes. Upon meeting Mr. Fitz- 
gerald, I told him that I had come to talk about 
Governor Wilson to bim and began to lead him to a 
secluded spot. Not for Fitzgerald! He stood in the 
middle of the hotel lobby. I commenced on him with 
quiet tones. He responded in such a way that every- 
body in the hotel could hear. Presently, at least two 
hundred people were standing around, listening to the 
merits of Governor Wilson's candidacy. His final 
statement was: "The time is not ripe. We must look 
over all the candidates carefully". Meanwhile, news- 
paper men were attracted and Mr. Fitzgerald paid me 
the compliment in public of saying that I was a very 
live wire. 

I returned to New York. The day following I went 
to luncheon with William Gibbs McAdoo, afterward 
Secretary of the Treasury. I had known JNIr. IMcAdoo 
for five or six years. Three years previous to the 
luncheon I was on the Nominating Committee of the 
Southern Society to recommend to the Society a Pres- 

[ 40 ] 



GENESIS OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 

ident. Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer. I 
personally esjpoused Mr. McAdoo for the office of 
President. In doing so I went counter to the prece- 
dent of the Society of many years' standing, that the 
Vice President should succeed the President. Walter 
L. McCorkle was then Vice President. I thought 
under the circumstances that Mr. McAdoo would be 
preferable. I personally secured a bare majority of 
the Nominating Committee and JNIr. McAdoo's name 
for President went before the Societj^ A rather bitter 
fight was made on him, but he was elected. It being 
the custom to have the President succeed himself, Mr. 
McAdoo was elected a second year. The third year 
I was again on the Nominating Committee and re- 
versed another precedent of the Society. I urged Mr. 
IMcAdoo for the Presidency for a third term. The 
Nominating Committee again nominated him by a 
majority. There was another fight on the nomination, 
but he was elected. I am afraid that this action caused 
me the temporary loss of some very old friendships in 
the Society. Happily, I have regained them. 

At the luncheon at the La^^yers' Club, that I have 
referred to, INIr. INIcAdoo brought up the question of 
an application to the Public Service Commission of 
New Jersey, to regulate the traffic of the railroads 
terminating at points in Jersey City, Weehawken and 
Hoboken. Mr. McAdoo feared that the ferry service 
would be unprofitable and that the Hudson tubes 
would fall heir to the ferry receipts. He requested 
a conference with the Governor. I had previously in- 
troduced Mr. McAdoo to Governor Wilson. In 

[ 41 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

September I asked Mr. McAdoo if he could not 
espouse jSIr. Wilson's candidacy and assist in raising 
some funds. He said everybody that he knew was 
against Governor Wilson, and that the financial con- 
dition of the Hudson tunnels was such that he did not 
feel he could do much. 

Meanwhile, I had sent out letters to all of the Prince- 
ton Alumni that I thought would contribute, and had 
received a fairly satisfactory return. Cleveland H. 
Dodge, a classmate of Mr. Wilson's at Princeton, had 
up to September contributed about ten thousand dol- 
lars. Edward Sheldon, also a classmate of the Gover- 
nor, gave one thousand dollars. There were a few 
scattering contributions. 

During the summer, knowing that Governor Wilson 
had a small political acquaintance, I motored doA\Ti to 
Sea Girt, the Summer Cajiital of New Jersey. I took 
as many men as I could with me. From these visits 
I learned a valuable lesson, to wit : That Mr. Wilson 
appealed only to those men who were keenly and 
actively interested in the discussion of public ques- 
tions. Those who took a deep interest in party politics 
and party success came away disappointed. The latter 
type of man I never took to see Mr. Wilson up to the 
day of his nomination. 

I had been told that early in the summer of 1911 
Senator Smith had made a quite extensive trip, visit- 
ing his political friends and presenting his grievances 
against Mr. Wilson. He had been in politics for many 
years ; he had vast political and business connections ; 
his influence was great. From the average point of 

[ 42 ] 



GENESIS OF WILSON'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 

view it would seem that this oi3position would make 
Mr. Wilson's nomination impossible. 

A fortunate incident occurred. James R. Nugent, 
leader of Essex County, and supposed to be Senator 
Smith's alter ego, was chairman of the State Demo- 
cratic Committee of New Jersey. One Saturday 
evening, on the Jersey coast. My. Nugent gave violent 
expression of his feelings toward the Governor. He 
called him a liar and an ingrate, with elaborate orator- 
ical and vituperative trimmings. I was at Sea Girt 
the following Sunday. It occurred to me that the 
extreme indignity offered to the Governor of New 
Jersey was ample reason for the deposition of Mv. 
Nugent. Furthermore, it would demonstrate to the 
country the character, at least, of that i)art of the 
opposition to My. Wilson. The Governor, his Secre- 
tary, Joseph P. Tumulty, and I, went into conference 
in the library and laid out a plan by which we could 
get sufficient votes from the State Committee to depose 
Nugent. The key to the situation seemed to be 
Edward E. Grosscup, who up to that time had Smith- 
Nugent leanings. We succeeded in capturing Mr. 
Grosscup and had the votes. A meeting was called 
and Mr. Nugent was deposed. It is not necessary to 
state that due publicity was given to this incident, not 
only through the newspapers, but by very wide circu- 
lation through our clipping sheets in New York. In a 
very large degree I have always considered that those 
unhappy remarks of Mr. Nugent nullified the previous 
Smith incident. In addition to the impropriety of the 
matter, the political desirability of it was patent. 

[ 43 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Up to the time of this incident there was no Wilson 
organization for the Presidency in New Jersey or out- 
side of it, except what was being done from 42 Broad- 
way, and what I was doing myself. The Jersey Demo- 
cratic organization, having fasted for many years 
under Republican rule, was very busy getting accus- 
tomed to a Democratic Governor and a Democratic 
regime, and the proper distribution of Democratic 
patronage. 



[ 44 ] 



Ill 

McCOMBS IN COMMAND 

Begs Wilson to Help Himself — Wilson Replies: "See 
Hudspeth"! — Hudspeth "Too Busy" — Harmon "Logi- 
cal" Nominee — McCombs Aims to Defeat Him, Clark, 
Underwood, and Bryan — Wilson Peevish About Speak- 
ing When Revolt Faces Him in His Own State — Penn- 
sylvania AND West Virginia Among First States Captured 
— But Pennsylvania Wavers Because of Wilson's 
"Ralicalism". 

'N SEPTEMBER of 1911, feeling that the dram 
on my time and my resources was too great, I 
went to see Governor Wilson. I asked him if he 
could not suggest a group of New Jersey men to 
handle his campaign in conjunction with myself. ^ly 
contention was, that handling a campaign, and financ- 
ing it at the same time, was too much of a drain for 
any man to stand. He made the suggestion that 
Robert S. Hudspeth, National Committeeman from 
New Jersey, whom he had weaned away from the 
Smith forces by a very adroit letter, mi^ht be of 
assistance. 

I invited Judge Hudspeth to come to luncheon with 
me. He expressed great admiration for the Governor, 
but told me that he had a large practice and clients 
who drew on his time so steadily that he could not give 

[ 45 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

any continuous effort to it. I went again to Governor 
Wilson and asked him for other suggestions, but could 
get none. As a matter of fact, the New Jersey Democ- 
racy was then coming out of a state of atrophy and 
was not the virile, wide-awake organization that it 
subsequently became. 

About this time, through Judge Ball of Delaware, 
I was able to make the acquaintance and friendship of 
a man who turned out to be one of the ablest and most 
consistent supporters of the Wilson propoganda — 
Willard Saulsbury, afterward United States Senator. 
Mr. Saulsbury had a very large experience in Dela- 
ware politics, chiefly in fighting the dominant organ- 
ization down there, led by Andrew Gray. Mr. 
Saulsbury had been ambitious for office, but, as he 
contended, his aspirations as a Democrat had been 
impossible for a long time, because Delaware had 
become a pocket borough of the Republican Party. 
I knew Mr. Saulsbury to be a lawyer of very great 
ability, who through his many years of political 
struggle had become a resourceful and indomitable 
fighter. 

Upon meeting Mr. Saulsbury I suggested that he 
and Judge Ball, who was a Princeton man, go to 
Princeton, and meet Governor Wilson, whose resi- 
dence was there during his entire term as Governor. 
]Mr. Saulsburj^ at once, saw possibilities in IMr. Wil- 
son. Upon his return to Wilmington, he wrote me to 
the effect that, in his judgment, IMr. Wilson was the 
man for President, and enclosed an exceedingly wel- 
come contribution. The resources of the campaign at 

[ 46 ] 



Mc COMBS IN COMMAND 

that time, as they had been before and subsequently^ 
were always exceedingly in doubt. 

About the same time I met Jerry B. Sullivan of 
Iowa, one of the Democratic leaders of the state, but 
a member of the minority wing of his party. I had 
previously found out that Judge Martin J. Wade and 
the State Chairman were not inclined to favor ]Mr. 
Wilson's cause for the standard reasons that had been 
alleged against him. It became apparent to me, there- 
fore, that I must take the minority wing of the party 
and do the best I could with it. ]\Ir. Sullivan put me 
in touch with the leaders of his wing of the party, and 
I won a very valuable ally in Louis Murphy, the editor 
of an influential Democratic paper. 

The usual process of taking 'Mr. Sullivan to see the 
Governor was carried through. ]^»Ir. Sullivan was very 
much attracted to ]Mr. Wilson and promised his sup- 
port. I did not know then, as I knew later, the very 
great advantage which the dominant organization in 
the state had, regardless of its character. However, 
had I lvno^vn it, I should have been compelled to take 
up the minority cause, if for no other reason than that 
I could not get the majority. The minority would, 
at least, be most helpful in the circulation of literature 
concerning Mr. Wilson and creating popular sentiment 
in his behalf. 

No headquarters had hitherto been opened by either 
of the respective candidates for the Presidency, except 
for Governor Wilson and Governor Harmon. Up to 
the time that headquarters were opened for Governor 
Wilson, except for sporadic statements here and there, 

[ *7] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

it was generally admitted that Governor Harmon was 
the logical nominee for the Presidency. Governor 
Harmon had a long and distinguished public career. 
He had been a member of Mr. Cleveland's Cabinet ; 
he had won two successive contests for the Governor- 
ship of Ohio ; he was respected throughout the country. 
The feeling was, that ]Mr. Bryan should not receive 
the nomination in 1912 at least. 

Governor Harmon had the conservative strength of 
the country behind him. But for the entry of Mr. 
Wilson, I have no doubt that Harmon would have been 
nominated in Baltimore in 1912, practically by 
default, with the possible opposition of the Bryan 
wing of the party. No doubt this would have proved 
ineffectual because of the steady opposition of the 
great states of the East and the Middle West to 
Bryan's candidacy. The nomination, at least, would 
have been similar to that of ^Ir. Parker at St. Louis 
in 1904, with a more united and inspirited party behind 
him, consequent upon the success of the party in 1910 
in the lower House and its necessary strengthening. 

The first victory for Mr. Wilson was in Pennsyl- 
vania. There were two factions, — the Philadelphia 
and Pittsburgh factions. The Philadelphia faction 
was supposed to be affiliated with Joseph M. Guffey. 
A. Mitchell Palmer, of Stroudsburg, and Vance IMc- 
Cormick were the leaders of that branch of the party 
in the rest of the state. Their branch was in the 
ascendancy. 

Mr. Wilson's achievements had been spread in 
Pennsylvania very carefully. Each faction of the 

[ 48 ] 




WooDHow Wilson 



McCOMBS IN COMMAND 

party became anxious to steal a march on the other. 
By a fortunate chance, both factions endorsed him. 
If any doubt had existed on either side, and if the 
tactical play of the situation had varied in the slightest 
degree, I seriously question whether either of them 
would have given the endorsement. However, it 
stood, and it gave us a splendid leverage for the rest 
of the country. 

The October primaries for the nomination of the 
members of the Senate and Assembly in New Jersey 
were rapidly approaching. The Smith-Nugent forces 
in Essex County began operations for the control of 
both branches of the Legislature or to secure for their 
leaders a veto power in these two bodies. Essex 
Coimty alone, if Smith and Nugent prevailed there, 
could bring about this chance and compel a recognition 
of their power. 

The County of Essex is the second largest county in 
the State of New Jersey and is entitled to eleven mem- 
bers of the lower House. Of the Senators it has one. 
Mr. Wilson's prestige was in the balance. The ques- 
tion arose as to whether opposition nominees should 
run in the primaries and whether the Governor should 
speak in Essex County. I was strongly of the opinion 
that opposition nominations should be made for the 
effect upon the rest of the state, and that the Governor 
should speak at the same time in Newark. 

The nominations were made. At the last moment 
Governor Wilson refused to speak in Essex County, 
although he spoke in the rest of the state — so deep 
was his disgust with Senator Smith. The refusal 

[ 49 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

struck me as very bad j)olicy and exhibited a certain 
degree of pettishness. 

At this time, also, New York and other places were 
called upon for speakers. It was most difficult to get 
Democratic speakers for New Jersej^ because the 
average speaker from other states occupied a potential 
position in his party, and he did not feel like going 
into New Jersey because of an implied endorsement 
of Governor Wilson. Some member of the organiza- 
tion, in Hudson County, suggested Dudley Field 
IMalone for an Irish meeting. I had never met ]Mr. 
IMalone. I called him up. He was a young, likeable 
sort of chap, who had a good amount of rhetoric and 
could stir a crowd. After I had talked to him he 
expressed his willingness to go. I sent him over. He 
made a number of speeches, meeting Governor Wilson 
on several occasions. Senator James E. IMartine came 
back to the state and campaigned. 

The result of the primary was wliat might have been 
logically expected. Had Governor Wilson gone into 
Essex County, he might have saved tv/o or three nom- 
inations there. It was further clear that, whatever the 
result of the elections might be, IMr. Wilson had lost 
absolute mastery of the Senate and House and that 
his programme must consequently be shortened. This, 
however, was not an unmixed misfortune. The really 
constructive measures that were necessary for the wel- 
fare of the state had been passed in the previous 
session. Only bills of minor importance were necessary 
in the subsequent session. 

The primary incident was used with some effect over 
[SO] 



McCOMBS IN COMMAND 

the country, as an argument that the Democracj'' had 
repudiated Governor Wilson. But the edge of it had 
been turned and its influence was more or less trans- 
itory. We kept the press bureau very busy sending 
out the clipping sheets and explanations. 

By this time letters from individuals all over the 
country came in torrents. By January 1, 1912, we 
had two hmidred and forty thousand personal corre- 
spondents. 

About the fourth of NTovember, 1911, an event of 
passing importance arose which compelled me to shift 
my forces considerably. The leading publicity man 
had been following a policy of self-exploitation. He 
was in comnmnication with people in various states 
who not only could not do our cause any good, but did 
it positive harm. Funds which I intrusted to him for 
Headquarters' purposes had been so mixed up that 
his milk bills became confused with our printing bills. 
In casting about for a new head of publicity, I asked 
the recommendation of ^Ir. JMcAdoo, knowing that 
he was an artist of artists in procuring publicity. He 
recommended to me his confidential publicity man, 
Byron R. Newton. I looked up ^Ir. Newton's record 
and had some slight misgivings. However, I took him 
on. IMean while, I increased the publicity force at 42 
Broadway very largely, in order to meet the increased 
requirements of the circulation of publicity. The 
demands were so great that we increased the frequency 
of the publicity sheet and began a correspondence 
upon a more wholesale principle. I, myself, was in 
constant conference with people from all over the 

[51 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

country. I usually dictated political correspondence 
from eight at night until two in the morning. 

During November, I first met Colonel John T. 
McGraw, of Grafton, West Virginia, a member of 
the National Committee and well seasoned in Demo- 
cratic politics. Like Mr. Saulsbury, Mr. McGraw 
had distinctly had his ups and downs in politics. He 
was an able, alert, and ambitious man with an unusual 
knowledge of current events. IMcGraw w^as of the 
poetic, temperamental class of Irishmen, always ready 
for a fight. 

His business brought him frequently to New York, 
and I always took occasion to have breakfast with him 
at the Holland House and talk Wilson. Mr. Mc- 
Graw, as a result of the Watson-Chilton election to 
the Senatorship, to one of the places for which he was 
an aspirant, had rather fallen into the minority in 
West Virginia. But his influence in the National 
Committee was large. That was a body in which Mr. 
Wilson was very notably weak. He knew no one in it. 
None of his friends had any association with them. 
Finally, I brought Mr. McGraw in contact with Mr. 
Wilson. They discussed issues delightfully, and never 
party politics. Subsequently, Mr. IMcGraw agreed to 
join me. A warm friendship sprang up between us 
and I acquired a charming and effective associate. 

During the latter part of 1911, two other names 
began to be mentioned for Ihe Presidency, — Champ 
Clark, of INIissouri, Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and Osc^r Underwood, of Alabama, Leader 
of the Democratic majoritj^ in the House. Mr. Clark's 

[52] 



McCOMBS IN COMMAND 

candidacy was not regarded very seriously at this time. 
Mr. Underwood's strength was greater. He had been 
a leader in enacting the Democratic Tariff Bill in the 
lower House, was regarded as a remarkably sane man 
and an efficient general in commanding the forces of 
that House. Both had had long experience in Con- 
gress, were thoroughly familiar with the problems 
before the country, and had a very broad political 
acquaintance. In the East and in the conservative 
states of the South, ^Ir. Underwood was particularly 
strong. 

Before January, it may be said that as far as the 
East was concerned Mr. Underwood was decidedly 
the favorite, second to Mr. Harmon. Mr. Wilson's 
strength was concentrated in New Jersey and Penn- 
sylvania. The leaders of the latter state were becoming 
somewhat uncomfortable, and were beginning to 
regret their endorsement because of the general charge 
of radicalism against INIr. Wilson, and what I have 
called the standard reasons which had been set forth 
a2:ainst him. 



[ 53] 



IV 
WILSON GOES HIS OWN WAY 

Disowns Colonel Harvev, Editor of Harper's Weekly — 
The Colonel Ceases to Support Governor's Candidacy — 
McCoMBS Fails to Patch Up Wilson's Quarrel with 
Harvey AND Colonel Watterson — Watterson Denounces 
Wilson as Ingrate and Autocrat — He Befriends Harvey 
— McCoMBs Defends Wilson, but Regards the Dispute as 
Very Injurious to the Wilson Candidacy — Wilson 
Scoffs at This. 

IN OCTOBER, 1911, I learned that Colonel 
Henry Watterson, of Louisville, was in New 
York and called on him personally at the 
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. Colonel Watterson had 
been supporting Mr. Wilson's candidacy. In addition 
to his political feeling in the matter, he had a sort of 
family connection. I found Colonel Watterson very 
delightful, as usual, and simply overflowing with 
political information. Then it was that I told him of 
the nature of contributions which I was getting, and 
the fact that the amount of money coming in was very 
limited. 

Colonel Watterson suggested that his friend, 
Thomas F. Kyan, migiit take a financial interest in 
the campaign. He told me that Mr. Ryan was prac- 
tically retired from public life; that he had no inter- 

[ 54 ] 



WILSON GOES HIS OWN WAY 

ests to conserve, and that one of the wishes of his life 
was to see a Democrat elected. He argued, earnestly, 
the necessity of considerable sums of money for the 
campaign, and offered to go to Mr. Ryan and talk to 
him about it. 

I replied that everything he said about INIr. Ryan 
was probably true; indeed, that I believed it to be 
true ; but that some time the question of the contribu- 
tion might come up and that, regardless of Mr. Ryan's 
personal character, I believed that the public had 
formed an unfavorable opinion, and that Mr. Ryan's 
contribution would be of injury to our cause. Colonel 
Watterson was undoubtedly a little irritated with me, 
and at what he considered my amateurish attitude. 
Nevertheless, I deemed it expedient to stand by my 
judgment. 

All of this time, Colonel George Harvey, who had 
been of such tremendous assistance in procuring the 
nomination and furthering the election of Mr. Wilson 
for Governor, had been supporting him consistently 
and ably for the Democratic Presidential nomination. 
Of all the men in public life or semi-public life in 
America, I have regarded Colonel Harvey in the front 
rank. His power of analysis and of expression is not 
exceeded by any writer in America. He had gone 
through one or two Presidential campaigns, being at 
one time William C. Whitney's chief lieutenant. I 
thought the support of Harper's Weekly, which he 
was editing, of great value. In any event, it was to 
my mind not in the least injurious. I was glad to have 
its support. But Colonel Harvey's paper was sup- 

[ 55 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

posed to be dominated by the Morgan interests, — a 
fact which I did not and do not believe, because the 
financial interests of New York were unquestionably 
opposed to Mr. Wilson. Notwithstanding that fact, 
Colonel Harvey's support was consistent and 
continuous. 

On December 18, 1911, Governor Wilson came to 
New York. He met Colonel Watterson, then editor 
of the Louisville Courier- Journal, and Colonel Harvey 
at the Manhattan Club. Much has been written and 
said of the Harvey- Watterson-Wilson episode. I 
think this is the correct gist of it all: 

Mr. Wilson was coming to see me. On his way, he 
dropped into Colonel Watterson' s apartment at the 
Manhattan Club. There he found Colonel Harvey. 

Harvey had, for a long time, written articles and 
printed letters from various people supporting Mr. 
Wilson for the nomination. The purpose of the meet- 
ing was a discussion of the general situation. It did 
not go along smoothly. The Governor had evidently 
conceived the idea that the support of Harper's 
Weekly, the bonds of which were supposed to be owned 
by Mr. J. P. Morgan, was not helping him. 

Colonel Harvey had heard of this. He said toward 
the close of the meeting: "Governor Wilson, I want to 
know whether you consider that the support of 
Harper's Weekly is injurious to you." 

The Governor bluntly answered: "I think it is", 
and immediately left the room. 

That set Colonel Watterson on fire. Colonel Harvey, 
naturally, was indignant. 

[ 56 ] 



WILSON GOES HIS OWN WAY 

Governor Wilson came immediately to my apart- 
ment, and at the end of the discussion casually said: 
"I think I may have offended George Harvey a little 
to-day, when I told him that the support of his paper 
was injurious to me". He was about to dismiss the 
subject, when I said: 

"Governor, I am amazed! Our strings already are 
pretty weak. We need help in all directions. While 
Harvey's paper, itself, may not be especially helpful 
to you because of its limited circulation, I do not think 
that it is injuring you a bit. And it is now highly 
important that we keep every friend we have". 

"Oh"! he said, "I don't think it makes much differ- 
ence". 

Within a few days I was informed from Chai'lotte, 
N. C, that Colonel Watterson had, in a conference, 
violently commented on the event and the dismissal of 
George Harvey, his friend. 

The Colonel intended, through the Courier- Journal, 
to set out his opinions of Wilson and renounce Wilson 
forever. Meanwhile, I had heard that Colonel Harvey 
intended to take down the flag from the foremast of 
the Wilson campaign. 

I immediately went over to Princeton and told 
Governor Wilson what Harvey intended to do. The 
late Mrs. Wilson, a very sweet and emotional woman, 
burst into tears. The Governor was ashen pale. He 
finally asked me if I could get hold of Harvey and 
straighten it out. There was deep snow on the ground. 
It was impossible to travel that night. Therefore, I 

[ 57 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

used the telephone to Deal, N. J., where Colonel 
Harvey resided. 

I told Colonel Harvey's secretary that I wanted to 
see the Colonel at once to make a complete explanation 
and retraction in the case of his controversy with 
Governor Wilson. I told him I wanted to talk on the 
telephone with Colonel Harvey, and that Governor 
Wilson also wanted to talk. 

I was informed Colonel Harvey was very hoarse 
and out of voice. The next day I made the same 
attempt. I was told by the secretary that Colonel 
Harvey was still hoarser, and was not permitted to 
speak to anyone. I knew the game was up. 

I was astounded at Governor Wilson's attitude. 
From a political point of view, I thought he had made 
a mistake. He had certainly committed an error from 
a personal point of view, for I could see, in the inci- 
dent, all of the indications of a tremendous cry of 
ingratitude, especially so far as Colonel Harvey was 
concerned. For, be it remembered, that as far back as 
1906 Colonel Harvey had spoken in impassioned 
terms of the availability of IMr. Wilson for the Presi- 
dency. This was four years before he was even 
nominated for Governor of New Jerse}^ 

The impelling reason for Governor Wilson making 
this statement to Colonel Harvey and Colonel Wat- 
terson was, that some letters had been received from 
the AVest making pointed inquiry as to whether 
Colonel Harvey's support was not Wall Street sup- 
port. Statements were made in some Western news- 
papers that this meant Wall Street support. I saw 

[ 58 ] 



WILSON GOES HIS OWN WAY 

the letters and the clipx)ings, and they did not impress 
me very much. They made Governor Wilson, how- 
ever, very restive and very nervous. It was impossible 
to tell what would come out of the situation. I 
trusted to Colonel Harvey's reticence and discretion. 
I felt, however, that Colonel Watterson was likely to 
feel the matter very deeply and that it would not be 
long before we would hear from him, as we did. 

I got hold of what Harvej'' was going to print in 
Harper s Weekly about the afl'air. It was very digni- 
fied and very conclusive. Here it is under date of 
January 17, 1912: 

"To Our Readers: 

"We make the following reply to many inquiries 
from the readers of Harper's Weekly: 

"The name of Woodrow Wilson, as our candidate 
for President, was taken do^m from the head of these 
columns in response to a statement made to us directly 
by Governor Wilson, to the effect that our support 
was affectmg his candidacy injuriously. 

"The only course left open to us, in simple fairness 
to IMr. Wilson, no less than in consideration of our 
own self-respect, was to cease to advocate his 
nomination. 

"We make this explanation with great reluctance 
and the deepest regret. But we cannot escape the 
conclusion that the very considerable number of our 
readers, who have co-operated earnestly and loyally in 
advancing a movement which was inaugurated solely 

[ 59 ] 



IVIAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

in the hope of rendering a high public service, are 
clearly entitled to this information". 

This incident produced a distinct shock all over the 
country. I went to Washington at once and conferred 
with Senator Gore, Representative Hughes and 
Thomas J. Pence. 

January 18, 1912, the expected statement from 
Colonel Watterson appeared in all the papers. It was 
peculiarly Wattersonian. Its sentiment was most 
difficult to overcome. The only way to answer it was 
to analyze it. This my confreres and I did. 

Colonel Watterson wrote : 

"Regretting that I must appear either as a witness 
or a party to the misunderstanding that has arisen 
between Colonel George Harvey and Governor Wood- 
row Wilson, I shall have to speak with some particu- 
larity in order to be just, alike to the public and the 
principals. 

"The conference between us, in our apartment at 
the INIanhattan Club, was held to consider certain 
practical measures relating to Governor Wilson's 
candidacy. Colonel Harvey stood toward Governor 
Wilson much as I had stood five and thirty years ago 
toward Mr. Tilden. This appealed to me. Colonel 
Harvey had brought the Governor and myself together 
in his New Jersey home eighteen months ago, and as 
time passed, had interested me in his ambitions. 

"I was hoping that I might find in Governor Wilson 
another Tilden, In point of intellect and availability. 
I yet think that Colonel Harvey made no mistake in 

[ 60 ] 



WILSON GOES HIS OWN WAY 

his choice ; but the circumstances leading to the unfor- 
tunate parting of the ways between them leads me to 
doubt whether in character or temperament, — it may 
be merely in the habits of a life time, — Governor 
Wilson is rather a schoolmaster than a statesman. 

"I have from Colonel Harvey and Governor Wilson 
statements according to the memory of each, touching 
what did actually happen, and what was spoken on 
the occasion named. These do not materially differ. 
They coincide with my own recollection. Nothing of 
a discourteous kind, even of an unfriendly kind, passed 
during the interview of over an hour. 

"From the first, however, there was a certain con- 
straint in Governor Wilson's manner, the absence of 
the cordiality and candor which should mark heartj% 
confidential intercourse, intimating the existence of 
some adverse influence. His manner was autocratic, 
if not tyrannous. 

"I did not take this to myself, but thought it related 
to Colonel Harvey; and when Colonel Harve5% 
apparently overcome by Governor Wilson's austerity, 
put the direct question to Governor Wilson, whether 
the support of Harper's Weekly was doing him an 
injury, and received from Governor Wilson the cold 
rejoinder that it was, I was both surprised and 
shocked. 

"I had myself, as far back as last October, suggested 
to Governor Wilson, that in view of his supposed 
environment, it might be well for Colonel Harvey to 
moderate somewhat of the rather aggressive character 
of Harper's Weekly in the Wilson leadership. I am 

[ 61 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

not sure that I had not said as much to Colonel Harvey. 
But that Governor Wilson, without the least show of 
compunction, should express or yield to such an 
opinion, and permit Colonel Harvey to consider him- 
self discharged from the position of trusted intimacy 
he had up to this moment held, left me little room to 
doubt that Governor Wilson is not a man who makes 
common cause with his political associates or is deej)ly 
sensible of his political obligations. Because, it is but 
true and fair to say, that, exceT)t for Colonel Harvey, 
he would not be in the running at all. 

"Colonel Harvey was grievously wounded. He had 
been fighting Governor Wilson's battles for many 
years, and had idealized his chief. Although I was 
given no reason to suppose myself included in the dis- 
favor which had fallen upon Colonel Harvey, I experi- 
enced a sense of something very much like indigna- 
tion. But on reflection, I could not rid myself of the 
impression that Governor Wilson had been receiving 
letters from Kentucky written by enemies of mine, 
who seek to use his name and fame to gain some ends 
of their own, warning him against me and that to all 
intents, I sat in the same boat with Colonel Harvey. 

"I am in receipt of Governor Wilson's averment to 
the contrary. I wish this had reached me earlier. I 
have, during three weeks of newspaper importunity, 
refused to print a word upon the subject, in the hope 
that no ]3ublicity might be required, and that some 
understanding could be reached. I have reason to 
believe that Colonel Harvey withheld his statement 
for the same cause, and with the same hope. It being 

[ 62 ] 



WILSON GOES HIS OWN WAY 

no longer possible to supx^ress the matters at issue, this 
full statement which I i^iiake most reluctantly, seems 
needful to a full and imj)artial knowledge b}?- the gen- 
eral public, but more especially by the mass and body 
of Democrats Avho are so earnestly seeking a leader in 
this coming contest." 

On the 19th day of January, I made the following 
reply to Colonel Watterson : 

"With reference to the alleged Wilson-Harvey 
incident, it seems to me, that Colonel Watterson has 
said, in a statement, all that needs to be said. It 
appears, therefore, that as far back as last October, he 
himself suggested to Governor Wilson that Colonel 
Harvey's support through Harper's Weehly might be 
injurious, and that he probably told Colonel Harvey 
himself the same thing. It would seem that Colonel 
Watterson had convinced the Governor of the truth 
of his opinion, and liad at least impressed Colonel 
Harvey with the probability of its truth. Else, Colonel 
Harvey would not have propounded the question". 

"It is passing strange that Colonel Watterson 
should feel concerned that the Governor, in private 
conversation with himself and Colonel Harvey, should, 
in answer to a pointed question, give frank expression 
to the very views that Colonel Watterson himself 
entertained, and which he communicated to the Gover- 
nor, and probably to Colonel Harvej^. In October 
last, also the very month in which he made these sug- 
gestions to Governor Wilson, Colonel Watterson said 
in the Louisville C ourier-J ournal, editorially: 

" 'Two things seem tolerably sure to the surmise of 
r 63 ] 



^ 



^ 



> 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

the Courier- Journal — if Woodrow Wilson is nom- 
inated for President, it will be through the force of an 
irresistible pressure of public opinion. And if he is 
defeated for the nomination, it will be by some organ- 
ized agency well backed with money. No Democrat 
of modern times has come into the running — Samuel 
J. Tilden alone excepted — with half at once of the 
equipment and the claim of the New Jersey Governor. 

^*The tears that are being shed over the passing 

incident are wrung from those who have hitherto been 
the most conspicuous opponents of Governor Wilson. 
Witness the frequent quoted statement of Mayor 
Dahlmann of Omaha, Nebraska, who has for months, 
not only been openly opposed to Governor Wilson, 
but who has been the aggressive champion of another 
candidate (Bryan). The same applies to others who 
have indulged in lachrymose expressions. This, of 
course, is to be expected, whenever any man develops 
a decided lead for the nomination. 
^ " 'The gist of the issue, as I see it, is whether one 
friend, in private conversation with another, should, in 
answer to a plain question, resort to flattery or dis- 
simulation, or whether he should state the truth as he 
sees it.' " 

The Governor had asked me to answer the effusions 
as they came out, and I did, as stated. The statements 
were given out to the newspapers. I immediately 
went down in the lobby of the hotel, at Washington, 
and to my surprise saw Colonel Watterson reading 
the statements. In order to show that there was no 
personal animosity in the matter I extended my hand. 

[ 64 ] 




Hknky Wattekson 



WILSON GOES HIS OWN WAY 

He shifted the statements from his right hand to his 
left and we both shook hands, I must say, rather 
grimly, but politely, and I left him. The next day, as 
I recall, Colonel Watterson said he had nothing more 
to say until he was challenged by some responsible 
person. 

In the latter part of August, 1913, upon my arrival 
in Paris, I learned that Colonel Watterson was there. 
I went to his hotel. I sent up my card. The Colonel 
came down stairs. Instead of shaking hands, he 
embraced me and said: "There is no feeling between 
us, my boy, is there"? "No, Colonel. There never 
was", I replied. We spent two very delightful daj'^s 
together. I remember the Colonel saying to me: "My 
bo)'", don't stay here in France. You will be too far 
from your friends". 

Let me say something here also about George 
Harvey. His whims may lead him into many exag- 
gerated positions, but he is a man's kind of a fighter, 
and not afraid of his convictions. 

When I got back to the campaign after a brief 
illness in September, 1912, 1 called up George Harvey, 
and I told him that I wanted him to draw a curtain 
before that part of his mind that related to any acri- 
mony or bitterness toward Wilson, and to come in and 
help me make the first Democratic President of the 
United States in twenty years. This was not a time 
for any man who had ever been any kind of a Demo- 
crat not to "come up into the color", as they say in 
the West. Harvey, immediately, and at his own cost, 
took a suite of rooms at the Waldorf, and devised much 

[ 65 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

helpful publicity, or suggestions for publicity, which 
I would pass along to Josephus Daniels. He was 
incognito, but effective. 

I cannot write this book without an adversion to the 
facts in the case of Harvey. Afterwards, he went 
many waj^^s and expressed in his journal most ably 
written, intense opi^osition to the President's views. 
I disagreed with many of them. I told him often that 
he chased rabbits on occasions, and made them look 
like lions. But on the whole, his helpful criticism of 
Mr. Wilson's two administrations was the boldest, the 
most trenchant, the most direct of any expressions 
printed or oral, even including the opposition in the 
Senate and the House. 

But ]Mr. Wilson, by nature, cannot brook opposi- 
tion. He has a fear of strong men. He would rather 
let himself be reflected in weak men who would do his 
bidding, and flatterers who were about him for per- 
sonal gain. So overboard went George Harvey. He 
might as well have made up his mind the day of the 
election of Mr. Wilson, as Governor, that he was 
through. 

If George Harvey had \^ashed to be United States 
Senator from New Jersey (and I am told there was 
some little feeling between him and James Smith, Jr., 
on that point), he would have been more brutally 
treated than Smith, because Smith had still the control 
of the organized Democracy of the state. 



[66] 



y 

ENTER COLONEL HOUSE 

"Wilson Impossible; Name Bryan or Culberson and You 
AND I Will Control the United States", Says the 
Colonel to McCombs — Colonel Shies at Request for 
Money — Views Wilson Nomination from London — 
Watterson Calls for "A Court of Honor" — Penfield's 
$10,000 — Senator Gore Proves to be a Friend. 

SENATOR BENJAIMIN TILLMAN and 
Colonel Watterson later took up the cudgels 
in the Wilson-Harvey quarrel. Colonel Wat- 
terson offered to refer the whole of the facts in the 
matter to a Court of Honor, especially the financial 
side of it. 

I had a perfectly definite idea to what Colonel Wat- 
terson was referring. 

In December, 1911, Mr. Josiah Quincy, of Boston, 
who had been a warm admirer and consistent supporter 
of Governor Wilson, told me that his friend, Frederic 
C. Penfield, afterward Ambassador to Austria, might 
become actively interested in Mr. Wilson. ]\Ir. Pen- 
field had received an honorary degree from Princeton, 
had had diplomatic experience in Egypt, had been an 
author on various diplomatic subjects, was a gentle- 
man of leisure, except for occasional writing, and was 
a man of means. Mr. Penfield also had experience in 

[ 67] 




r^ •:<-•> 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

one of the Cleveland campaigns, in the Publicity 
Department. 

Mr. Quincy suggested that I should meet Mr. Pen- 
field. I was very glad to do so. Later we had a very 
pleasant luncheon at the New York Yacht Club. At 
that time I argued the merits and political potentiali- 
ties of our candidate. It was evident that Mr. Pen- 
field was impressed. At this luncheon the question of 
contributions was in no way mentioned nor the 
rev/ards for any support that might be given. 

On January 6, 1912, a mass meeting was to be held 
in Carnegie Hall for the purpose of advocating the 
abrogation of the Russian Treaty. Before that time 
I met Mr. Penfield again. He suggested that he 
would like to renew his acquaintance \^^th Mr. Wilson. 
He also suggested the propriety of inviting the Gov- 
ernor to dine with him prior to going to the meeting. 
He asked if I would call up Mr. Wilson to inquire if 
it would be agreeable before Mr. Penfield extended 
the invitation. 

I communicated with the Governor. I told him of 
Mr. Penfield's potentialities. He acce^Dted Mr. Pen- 
field's invitation to dine. 

The dinner was most successful. Mr. Penfield 
proved an excellent host and Mrs. Penfield a charming 
hostess. Those present at the dinner were Governor 
Wilson, Colonel Watterson, Commodore E. C. Bene- 
dict, one of the closest personal friends of former 
President Grover Cleveland, Mr. Quincy, and myself. 
Governor Wilson was in high fettle and delighted the 
whole dinner party with his admirable stories. 

[ 68] 



ENTER COLONEL HOUSE 

We proceeded to Carnegie HalL I had labored 
with him exceedingly to go there at all. Governor 
Wilson made a remarkable speech, but when he got 
on his feet I could see that he was glad he was there, 
and, being familiar with his moods, I could tell that 
he was going to make a tremendous impression. 

After the speaking was over, Mr. Penfield took me 
aside and handed me an envelope, telling me nothing 
of what was in it. I took it quite casually, thinking 
that it mig'ht be a note of some sort. He suggested 
that I might be tired and that it would be best to open 
it next morning. As I was having breakfast in my 
apartment, I opened the innocent-looking envelope 
and found two checks of $5,000 eadi. He called me 
up that day and said : 

"I should like to help actively, but I must go to 
Europe. I gave you the envelope last night to employ 
as good a man as I am to assist you". 

This was indeed a tremendous relief, as my finances 
were becoming very slim. I had no assurance that I 
would be able to meet even my weekly payroll. 

Colonel Watterson and Mr. Quincy, I found, had 
talked over the matter of the contribution with Mr. 
Penfield. Colonel Watterson, with some reason, 
thought that he induced the giving of the subscription. 
Upon Colonel Watterson suggesting the Court of 
Honor, I would have at once made a public statement 
demanding it. But I knew that Mr. Quincy had been 
actively interested. My reason for not demanding it 
was this : 

Shortly after the Penfield dinner, Mr. Quincy, who 

[ 69 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

was of counsel to some mining companies, was indicted 
for fraudulent use of the mails. As soon as the indict- 
ment was handed down, Mr. Quincy immediately came 
to me and went over the whole matter. I was per- 
fectly assured of his innocence. Nevertheless, the 
indictment stood. Unfortunately, an indictment 
against a man often has as much effect, so far as repu- 
tation and standing in the community are concerned, 
as if he were actually convicted. 

Mr. Quincy was subsequently thoroughly vindicated 
in the Courts. 

This incident, in itself, should be the most conspicu- 
ous warning to district attorneys not to recommend 
indictments to grand juries unless they are more than 
morally certain of a conviction. Rej^utations of inno- 
cent and honest men have been blasted wholesale by 
the overzeal of prosecuting officers who, under the 
law, are distinctly quasi- judicial officials. But under 
the circumstances, we could not embrace the oppor- 
tunity of going before the Court of Honor. 

I have a very deep affection for Colonel Watterson, 
and I could not but think that this was one of the 
lapses which any man of thorough integrity and sound 
judgment is likely to fall into on occasions of stress. 

But let me revert to an interesting and very difficult 
event of December. 

As is well known, Mr. Carnegie created a trust 
some years ago, among the provisions of which was, 
that any teacher in our American colleges wiio had 
performed a service of twenty-five years, automati- 
cally, upon retirement, should receive from the fimd a 

[ 70] 



ENTER COLONEL HOUSE 

certain fixed sum. Mr. Wilson had retired from his 
Professorship at Princeton in the autumn of 1910 and 
had completed twenty-five years of service. Almost 
immediately upon his retirement he applied for the 
pension allowance, which was $3,000 a year. 

The papers first exploited this matter about the 
10th of December, 1911, and also the fact that it had 
been disallowed by the Trustees of the fund. An 
explanation of the matter was very difficult to make. 
It could only be upon the grounds that Mr. Wilson 
was not a man of large means ; that he had a family to 
support, and that his salary as Governor would hardly 
meet the ordinary requirements of living in his new 
position. 

But the fact remained that the pension was to be 
granted by INIr. Carnegie; that Mr. Carnegie was a 
man of great wealth, derived from the manufacture of 
steel, and presented elements of the great play upon 
the Homestead strikes, and upon Mr. Wilson's con- 
nection with capital. It was indeed a blow. The only 
thing to do with it was to let it rest where it was, with 
the probability that it would blow over. The inspira- 
tion of the attack was well known to me. But an 
attack is never overbalanced by fact. The circulation 
of the incident became nation-wide and drove many 
people from the Wilson cause. 

Along in December, 1911, the psychological time 
seemed to have arrived for a public appearance of 
Governor Wilson upon one of the issues brought out 
before the people. The Pa\Tie-Aldrich Bill was a 
piece of patchwork and had aroused the resentment of 

[ 71 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

a large part of the American people. The back of 
the Taft Administration had been broken by the pas- 
sage of that Act. Mr. Taft's political future was 
ruined by his signature to the Bill. At that time I was 
a Governor of the National Democratic Club, so I got 
in touch with my friend, John R. Dunlaj), who was 
also a Governor of the Club, and arranged that an 
invitation be extended to Mr. Wilson to speak on the 
Payne- Aldrich Act on January 3, 1912. I urged him 
to prepare his speech in advance and get it out several 
days before the event so that I might give it to the 
Associated Press. Governor Wilson always had a 
horror of preparing formal speeches to be sent to the 
press associations far enough in advance to get 
country- wide circulation. This objection was the con- 
tinual exasperation of our headquarters. I knew that 
compliance with the idea meant a large publicity, free 
of charge; and that non-compliance meant a slight 
publicity and an added expense to our Bureau to get 
publicity bj'' private circulation. 

On this occasion he prepared a very scholarly 
address and gave it to the Publicity Department in 
ample time. My secretary'' went to the meeting to see 
what changes should be made if he altered the speech. 
To our surprise, Governor Wilson delivered a speech 
totally different from the one he had prepared, but on 
the whole far more masterly. After its delivery, there 
was no doubt on the soundness of his attitude on the 
tariff from the point of view of the Democratic Party. 
I instructed our headquarters that a large number of 

[72] 



/ 



ENTER COLONEL HOUSE 

the speeches be printed for circulation throughout the 
countr3^ 

Shortly before this meeting I was, as usual, casting 
about for contributions to the campaign, a matter that 
constantly worried me, because I had no fixed source 
or sources of supply. 

I had gotten in touch through corresiDondence with 
Thomas Love, of Texas, and had broached the ques- 
tion to him of his getting some funds in Texas to carry 
on the w^ork. Pie wrote to me that they would prob- 
ably have difficulty in Texas itself in financing the 
campaign for Governor Wilson, but that a Texan 
resided in New York at the Gotham Hotel who might 
espouse our cause. At that time the Texan was sup- 
posed to be for Mayor Gaynor. If I could bring him 
around to the Wilson support. Love thought I would 
undoubtedly get a contribution. 

This man was Colonel E. ]M. House. Because 
Colonel House became so prominent in the Wilson 
Administration, I shall digress and tell a little about 
him. Next to the President of the United States, I 
doubt if anyone has been more inquired about as to 
who he was, and ^^'hen he was, and where he was, than 
Colonel E. M. House, of Texas. 

Colonel House was the son of an Englishman who 
went to Texas to reside. He took out citizenship 
papers and made his children citizens of the United 
States. House's activities seem to have been in bank- 
ing in Austin and in the purchase of various tracts of 
land in Texas. Colonel House was always a weak 
man physically and never engaged in any apparent 

[ 73 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

occupation. He went to Cornell, but did not finish 
with his class, which would have been the class of '91. 

He had few associates and was very reticent, taking 
very little interest in the social life of his city. He 
did, however, invite the Governors and other officials 
to his home and the more important professors of the 
University. Nobody ever knew him as being active 
in anything in Austin, although he looked after his 
farm and his tenants. After he returned from Cornell 
he spent part of the year in Austin, most of the year 
in New York, and the rest of the year along the New 
England coast. In New York he spent a quiet, 
studious kind of life, almost alone. 

After we had made arrangements for the Texas 
campaign in the primaries, I was told by Colonel 
T. H. Ball to see a Colonel House, at the Gotham 
Hotel, New York City. The Texas people who were 
for INIr. Wilson, and who had charge of the organiza- 
tion down there, said, when I asked if they could not 
produce further funds to move into some of the other 
primary states, such as Kansas, Iowa, Wisconsin and 
Nebraska, that they had reached the limit of their con- 
tributive power. They stated, however, that there was 
a Colonel House living at the Gotham who had a sub- 
stantial income. If I could enlist him in the Wilson 
cause he might give me some money. 

At that time I did not know where to turn for 
funds, and as we were in dire need, on Colonel Ball's 
information I called House up, addressing him as 
Colonel and asked for an interview. The meeting 
was arranged. 

[74] 



ENTER COLONEL HOUSE 

I dropped into the Gotham Hotel one afternoon in 
November, 1911, and made myself kno^vn as the man- 
ager of Mr. Wilson's campaign. 

I found a quiet little man with strange cat-like eyes, 
a broad forehead and a thin face. 

He spoke in particularly low manner, almost as one 
would speak to another in a cathedral. A number of 
books lay upon his table. There were novels, books on 
current events, books on essays and books on psychol- 
ogy. Colonel House presented the appearance of a 
dilletante, passing his life in the calmness of his apart- 
ment, not caring anything about matters of particular 
importance. When he saluted me he had a novel in 
his hand. 

We sat down and looked at each other rather quizzi- 
cally. He seemed to be timidity itself. He almost 
obsequiously offered me a cigar. He took a cigarette. 
His appearance was that of a poor debtor who was 
trying to think up some impossible excuse for not 
paying a bill long overdue. Somehow, it ran through 
my mind, tliat he knew I was coming after money. I 
also thought that his excuse would be that he was too 
poor. I tried to set the little man at ease in the best 
way I could. 

We had discussed mutual acquaintances in Texas 
for awhile. And only after about twenty minutes of 
desultory conversation, we got on the Presidential 
matter. He said he had not thought much about that, 
but that from the papers it seemed that !Mayor William 
J. Gaynor, of New York, and Jesse I. Grant, of Cali- 
fornia, might well turn out to be the candidates for 

[ 75 ] 



IVIAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

President and Vice President, respectively. He 
claimed no particular enthusiasm about either. I, 
however, having a very practical purpose in mind, 
continued to hold House to Woodrow Wilson and the 
reasons why he should be nominated and could be 
elected. 

I told him of his friends in Texas who had avowed 
themselves for Governor Wilson and repeated my oft- 
spoken argument as to Governor Wilson's availability. 
After about an hour I realized that I had another 
engagement and told him I would drop in some other 
time. 

The conversation passed off in less than half an 
hour. I went away Math the impression that I had met 
a little man of ill health who spent most of his time 
trying to cling to life and some of its pleasures, and 
who was quite willing to subordinate everything to this. 
He did not im.press me as a man having any particular 
notions, and certainly no executive ability. He seemed 
to take his grasp of things merely from current read- 
ing. His views of men were such as one gained as they 
passed by on Fifth Avenue. I certainly concluded 
that there was not much in House, but I still had in 
my mind that the Wilson campaign was bankrupt. 

In two or three days I went back. I said to him that 
I would very much like to have him meet Governor 
Wilson. He gladly assented. Meanwhile, I made 
inquiries about him in Texas. My reports were that 
he was a man worth something m.ore than a million 
dollars; that he had virtually retired from business; 
that he had taken a silent part in politics in Texas for 

[ 76] 



ENTER COLONEL HOUSE 

many years, and that he was usually to be found with 
the winner. 

I have said that I called him Colonel. He protested 
and told me that he had never liked the title inasmuch 
as he had merely been on the staff of one of the Gover- 
nors of Texas. But I must confess that my mind was 
on Mr. House's contribution rather than on Mr. House 
as a political factor. 

Soon after that, Governor Wilson was in town. I 
volunteered to take him to call on Mr. House. The 
conversation on this visit was very pleasant. Later on 
I dined with Mr. House and told him of the proposed 
meeting of January 3d. He suggested that Mr. David 
Houston, afterward Secretary of Agriculture, be 
brought into conference with Mr. Wilson on the sub- 
ject of the Tariff. This was arranged at the meeting 
at which Mr. House and myself were present, in 
addition to Mr. Houston and Governor Wilson. 

Inasmuch as Texas had forty votes at the Conven- 
tion and its psychological influence would be great on 
the states bordering uj)on it, I had decided to make a 
very determined set for the delegates there. Mr. 
House was spending the winter in New York and I 
frequently conferred with him upon that situation. 
The actual leaders in the movement in Texas were 
Cato Sells, now Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Mr. 
Love and Mr. Thomas Ball. It appealed to me that 
Mr. House keep me thoroughly advised as to the per- 
sonnel of Texas politics and rather guide me in making 
suggestions. This was his participation in the Pre- 
nomination Campaign. 

[ 77 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Early in I\Iay, 1912, I motored with Mr. House to 
his country place at Beverly, Mass. He was going to 
Europe within a week. I remained with him two or 
three days and discussed the situation. As I was about 
to depart, he said to me: 

"If I am any judge of political events. Governor 
Wilson's candidacy is impossible. When you get to 
Baltimore, however, you will have a very great influ- 
ence in the selection of candidates. At the psycholog- 
ical moment, bring Senator Culberson foi-ward. He 
may have the support of Mr. Bryan". 

I told him that I still had faith in Governor Wil- 
son's nomination, and that my position was such that 
I could not at any time abandon him. I felt it would 
be considered an act of treachery if I should trade his 
delegates off at the Convention in the interest of any 
other man. 

Mr. House remained in Europe until the latter part 
of August. Soon after his return, he addressed a 
letter to me in which he said that Governor Wilson had 
not sent for him and that Mr. IMcAdoo, who was in 
charge of the campaign during my illness, would pay 
no attention to him, although he had personally gone 
to headquarters. I wrote to Governor Wilson and 
suggested that Mr. House was back from Europe and 
that he might be of distinct service. I also suggested 
that he send for Mr. House. In the rush of things, 
apparently. Governor Wilson overlooked the sugges- 
tion. A few days later, Mr. House appealed to me 
again. I sent word both to Mr. McAdoo and to 

[ 78 ] 



ENTER COLONEL HOUSE 

Governor Wilson that ]Mr. House be called into 
consultation. 

Wlien I returned to the campaign, Mr. House had 
secured his consultation and appeared every day at 
headquarters. I was told that the President was lay- 
ing considerable store by him and that he had been and 
was a sort of "observer" of headquarters, whatever 
that means. JNIr. House never contribut-ed. 

Early in January, 1912, it became evident that we 
must move on Washington and get as much Congres- 
sional support as possible. I could see that we were 
not getting adequate publicity in the newspapers and 
decided to go to Washington and look into that matter. 

Upon arriving at the Willard, I called up William 
H. Hughes, then in the lower House, and asked him 
to come and see me. I asked him to recommend to me 
the very best newspaper correspondent in Washing- 
ton. He said : 

*'I can recommend a man to you, but you may not 
like him. He is a big, easy-going, strapping South- 
erner, and you may not want too much of the South in 
this matter". I could see no objection to the South as 
long as it had the force behind it. Then he remarked: 
"I have in mind a man v.dio can go and kick a Senator 
in the shin and shake the truth out of liim. He is liked 
by every member of Congress, regardless of party". 

This was Thomas J. Pence. 

Pence opened our Publicity Bureau. The New 
York Headquarters became devoted to conferences 
and to sending out the ordinary publicity; the Wash- 

[79]" 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

ington Headquarters was largely devoted to sending 
out Congressional publicity. 

We oibtained the most valuable acquisition that I 
knovv^ of in the entire campaign in Senator Thomas P. 
Gore. Senator Gore, as everyone knows, is blind, but 
he thinks, lives and sleeps with politics and public 
questions. His very infirmity gives an added ability 
for certain sides of politics. He never forgets a name 
or a voice. There is no man on this continent who is 
more accurately familiar with the personnel of politics. 
If he has ever heard the name of a political leader, 
state, county or precinct, in the entire country, he 
remembers it forever. I found him a perfect encyclo- 
pedia of political information. He was a genius for 
political organization do\Mi to the finest detail. He 
was the most affectionately loyal person with whom it 
has ever been my pleasure to come in contact. Senator 
Gore worked incessantly to the end. He was opti- 
mistic always. It was to him, more than any other 
person, that I turned in the most difficult moments. 



[ 80] 




VI 

LAUNCHING OF THE 1912 CAMPAIGN 

Wilson's Letter to Joline, "Knocking Bryan Into a Cocked 
Hat", Alarms His Manager — A Race of Writers to 
Answer It — Bryan Mollified and "Shakes" with Wil- 
son — McCoMBs Wins Big Advantage for Wilson in 
Selection of Baltimore for Convention City — McAdoo, 
Morgenthau and Elkus "Drop In". 

URING 1910 and 1911, in addition to the 
gi'eat Congressional triumph, Democratic 
Governors had been elected in the normally 
Republican states. Things looked well for the De- 
mocracy. It was decided, in celebration of the glori- 
ous victories, to have a great dinner at Washington on 
Jackson Day, January 8, 1912. I learned that the 
prospective candidates for the Presidency, together 
with other distinguished men, were to be invited to 
speak. It was apparent to me that it was INIr. 
Wilson's great opportunity to compare himself with 
his rivals. 

I had heard all the men speak who were mentioned. 
I loiew that Mr. Wilson was vastly superior in ora- 
tory. The gathering was to be the most notable that 
the Democratic Party could produce. Members of 
the National Committee from all the states were to be 

[81 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

there. In fact, the leaders of the Democracy from 
everywhere were to be present. 

Mr. Wilson received an invitation, of course. He 
was on the point of declining, on the ground that it 
would seem obvious that he was a candidate for the 
Presidency. I saw no reason for disguising the fact, 
but it was most difficult to make him see my point 
of view. 

Finally I told Representative Hughes of the Gov- 
ernor's state of mind. He was amazed beyond words. 
He got in touch with ^Ir. Wilson and finally convinced 
him. It was most fortunate that he did, for Governor 
Wilson's oration was a tremendous success, as he far 
outranked any person who spoke. When he sat down 
there was a great ovation. After the applause was 
over, Roger C. Sullivan, of Illinois, lifted his glass to 
Governor Wilson and said: "He'll do" ! 

Mr. Sullivan at the time was committed to no one. 
I regarded his action as a great portent. I felt in my 
heart that he would ultimately be for Governor Wil- 
son, though he had to thread his way through the maze 
of practical politics. 

The forty-eight hours prior to the dinner were very 
depressing indeed, from the point of view of the Wil- 
son campaign. I received an intimation early on the 
morning of the 7th that the newspapers had a letter 
from Governor Wilson to Mr. Adrian H. Joline that 
would be of the most serious consequence to his cam- 
paign. Through confidential sources I got a copy of 
it, which read: 

[ S2 ] 



LAUNCHING OF THE 1912 CAMPAIGN 

"Princeton University, 

president's room. 

Princeton, N. J. 

April 29, 1907 
"My dear Mr. Joline: 

Thank you very much for sending me your address 
at Parsons, Kansas, before the Board of Directors, of the 
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company. I have 
read it with relish, and am in entire agreement. Would 
that we could do something, at once, dignified and effec- 
tive, to knock Mr. Bryan, once for all, into a cocked hat. 
Cordially and sincerely yours, 

WooDROw Wilson" 
Mr. Adrian H. Joline 



An immediate call over the telejDhone was made for 
the Gk)vernor. He could not remember writing the 
letter. He could not vouch for its authenticity. I 
knew that it was to be published. Its seriousness, from 
a political point of view, was obvious. 

]Mr. Brj'^an had, up to that time, not frowned upon 
our candidate. This letter, if true, would unquestion- 
ably offend him. It would indicate an alliance or 
sympathy on the part of Governor Wilson with IMr. 
Joline and his associates, who were identified with 
large banks and other financial interests. 

Governor Wilson and I conferred. We discussed a 
reply and how it should be made. The nature of the 
reply was momentous. It might mean the buckling 
up of the entire Wilson campaign or it might cause a 
general deflection of the Progressive wing of the 
Democratic Party from him, for at that time the 

[83] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Governor had no standing with the so-called Conser- 
vative wing. 

Mr. Wilson wrote in longhand a tentative statement 
to be incorporated in his speech. In effect, the defense 
was that he had done what he thought was proper at 
the time. There he stopped. I knew that this would 
not do. I got in touch with Senator James A. O' Gor- 
man, of New York. After we had argued, Governor 
Wilson asked my secretary, IMaurice Lyons, to read 
his reply aloud. After it was read, the Governor was 
silent for about five minutes. He requested ]Mr. Lj^ons 
to typewrite it. When in form and again read, I dis- 
approved of it. Finally the Governor and I sepa- 
rately wrote what we considered amended adequate 
replies. He read mine. I read his. Neither suited. 
We then set ourselves to more writing. After an hour 
and a half, Mr. Wilson wrote out a statement in w4iich 
he attempted to justify his change of mind: 

"A man may even change his mind. It is nothing 
to be ashamed of, to change j^our mind about some 
conclusion j^ou may have reached on insufiicient 
information. 

"A man may even ^Tite a letter, just so it is a frank 
expression, and you have nothing to be ashamed of. 
The letter may even be printed. It may sometimes 
prove inconvenient. But if it is a frank expression, 
there is nothing to be ashamed of. 

"The man who refuses to change his mind, when he 
finds he is wrong, ought to be blown apart by dyna- 
mite, so that his parts can be properly and normally 
readjusted". 

[84] 



LAUNCHING OF THE 1912 CAMPAIGN 

Meantime, Mr. Pence and I fully discussed the 
seriousness of the situation. INIy first thought was of 
Bryan. Reaching him before he got to Washington 
was highly important. Mr. Pence found that ]Mr. 
Bryan was in Raleigh, N. C. We concluded that we 
\\'ould get in touch with Josephus Daniels, who like- 
wise was there. 

It seemed best to inform ]Mr. Daniels, frankly, that 
the attacks on Governor Wilson always ap^jeared in 
reactionary papers when Mr. Wilson was about to 
speak, wdth the purpose of blanketing his utterances. 
Such attacks were a serious blow to progressive democ- 
racy, of which both Governor Wilson and ]Mr. Bryan 
were exponents. It w^ould be impossible to express 
the relief that I felt when assured that IMr. Daniels 
would take this position with Mr. Bryan. "When the 
happy reply to Mr. Bryan was worked out, I requested 
j\Ir. Pence to go to the station and meet Mr. Daniels 
and Mr. Bryan. ^Mr. Daniels was his friend. I 
wanted to know, at least, how Mr. Bryan looked, if I 
could not get w^Iiat he said. Not until ]Mr. Pence 
reported that ^Ir. Bryan looked sunny and cheerful 
did the high tension disajipear. 

Mr. Wilson's reference to ^Ir. Bryan at the Jackson 
Day dinner was in a most happy vein. Mr. Bryan's 
was in a vein equally happy. ^Ir. Brj^an took a big 
man's point of view. He grew in my estimation 
tremendously. 

The Jackson Day dinner was the occasion for a 
meeting of the National Committee in order to select 
a place for the National Convention. Three cities 

[ 85 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

desired it, — Chicago, St. Louis and Baltimore. 
National Committeemen who supported Mr. Wilson 
were few, but we held the balance of power. Eastern 
and Southern states preferred Baltimore. Middle 
states, which leaned toward ^ir. Clark, preferred St. 
Louis or Chicago. Western states had no iireference. 

I decided that Baltimore vvould be the best place 
from a Wilson point of view. We could move a large 
number of supporters from New Jersey, Delaware, 
and Maryland into Baltimore, and that would have a 
psychological influence on delegates. We also had 
the very strong support of the Baltimore Sun. It was 
clear that these influences might be of great value in 
a close contest in the convention. 

I could not afford, publicly, to express my prefer- 
ence. Wliat the Wilson people wanted was likely to 
provoke an adverse majority in the National Com- 
mittee. I spread word to our friends in the Committee 
that I thought Baltimore preferable. I pledged them 
to secrecy as to their intentions. 

The National Committeeman from Maryland, Fred 
Talbott, exceedingly anxious to have Baltimore 
selected, came to me early in the morning of the Com- 
mittee meeting. He solicited my support and demon- 
strated the advantages from a Wilson viewpoint. 
Mr. Talbott was for Wilson's nomination. But the 
case was of such great delicacy that I told Mr. Talbott 
I was not ready to express a preference. 

However, Baltimore easily prevailed. Chicago and 
St. I^ouis appeared to be very dangerous from the 
Wilson aspect. St. Louis was in INIr. Clark's logical 

[ 86 ] 



LAUNCHING OF THE 1912 CAMPAIGN 

territory. His supporters would be there in great 
numbers. This likewise aj)plied to Chicago, and there 
Mr. Wilson had practically no newspaper support. 
Mr. Hearst, who w^as for Clark, o^\^led a paper that 
might have very great influence on the delegates. 

A certain psychology of every national convention 
is produced from the outside. Delegates are perhaps 
unaware of it. This was notably true of the Demo- 
cratic convention of 1896, at Chicago, wliich I attended. 
Mr. Bryan was nominated. I had attended six or 
seven national conventions, both Republican and 
Democratic. I had a fixed impression that the atmos- 
phere of the place in which the convention is held is of 
tremendous importance in the selection of the nominee. 

Another interesting occurrence took place at the 
National Committee meeting. A. IMitchell Palmer, 
one of our ardent supporters, contested the seat of 
James M. Guffey, of Pittsburgh. Guffey had long 
been a member of the National Committee. He had 
been a very important factor in Democratic councils. 
Mr. Palmer and Vance McCormick came to me with 
their briefs. Naturally, I was greatly predisposed in 
]Mr. Palmer's favor. I was sure that Mr. Guffey 
would never be with us. I was also sure that Mr. 
Guffey had a legal right to the seat. I could only say 
I was with him in spirit. I, therefore, thought I 
should make no recommendations to our friends in 
the Committee. They were about equally divided. 
Mr. Bryan took a proxy. He made a very severe 
attack on Mr. Guffey. It was without avail. 

Before the Jackson Day dinner I had established 
[ 87 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

headquarters at Washington and had communicated 
with our friends throughout the country to meet me 
there. They came in large numbers. We analyzed 
conditions, laid plans and selected leaders. Among 
others with me was Henry Morgenthau, afterward 
Ambassador to Turkey. 

Rabbi Wise, a very brilliant orator and influential 
man among the Hebrews in New York, had been 
attracted to Governor Wilson. He wrote to our head- 
quarters for literature that he might prepare an article 
about him. I subsequently met Mr. Wise. I raised 
the question of securing prominent Hebrews who 
might be of financial as well as political assistance 
to us. He selected his friend, Henry Morgenthau, 
who had been very prominent in Hebrew circles in 
'New York. He had practically retired from busi- 
ness, was a man of high ideals, and was quite willing 
to devote large sums from his private fortune in fur- 
therance of them. 

Mr. Morgenthau was very much impressed with 
Mr. Wilson's speech of January Gtli on the Jewish 
Passport Question, and likewise with his speech at 
Washington. He gave me a pledge to contribute 
$5,000 a month to the Wilson campaign. This was 
indeed a gTcat relief. It was a great gratification 
to have his support in New York. He proved to 
be an indefatigable worker. Later another Hebrew 
of high ideals joined me, Abram I. Elkus. He not 
only contributed largely from his private mainte- 
nance, but was exceedingly active in every direction 

[ 88] 



LAUNCHING OF THE 1912 CA.AIPA1GN 

up to the day of the nomination and throughout the 
summer campaign. 

Governor Wilson had no more genuine and enthu- 
siastic supporters than Mr. Morgenthau and Mr. 
Elkus. Mr. Elkus was always willing to lay aside 
his private business for a public ideal. His very 
large experience in public affairs made him a valu- 
able associate. 

With the Jackson Day dinner over, we perfected 
an organization. I had been able to confer, person- 
ally, with leaders from- almost every state. Flesh- 
and-blood contact enabled us to work with a better 
understanding. The Wilson campaign was then 
launched in a very concrete manner. It had received 
a great impetus. Its largest asset, however, still was 
the Governor's popularity. 

At this period Mr. McAdoo had appeared on the 
scene for the first time. We had not made any great 
headv/ay then among the Democratic organizations, 
but we had made headway among the newspapers. 

The question of monej^ was still a very trouble- 
some one. The selection of delegates to the National 
Convention by primaries was rapidly approaching, 
but before discussing this I will return to phases of 
our publicity. 



[ 89 ] 




VII 
PUBLICITY AND STRATEGY 

How McCoMBS Apprised the Voters Who and What Wilson 
Was — Second Choice Chances in the Convention En- 
hanced BY Keeping Out of "Favorite-Son States" — 
Bryan's Ohio Tour Financed — Nineteen Wilson Dele- 
gates Elected in Buckeye State — Even Break in 
Oklahoma — Campaign Fund Lacks $36,000 — McCombs 
Borrows More Money — Charles R. Crane Makes His 
First Donation, $6,000. 

[HE Rural Free Delivery had changed the 
general methods of politics. The United 
States had become more of a reading public. 
People in remote districts read monthly and weekly 
magazines. Daily newspapers were delivered at 
doors quickly. I thoug'ht that we should have sup- 
port among monthly and weekly magazines. Mr. 
McClure, of McClure's Magazine, was approached 
for an article on Woodrow Wilson. He assigned 
Burton J. Kendrick to prepare it. This article was 
reproduced in pamphlet form. We sent more than 
half a million copies throughout the United States. 
Walter H. Page, editor of the World's Work, 
and I arranged that Bayard Hale write four articles 
on Mr. Wilson. The Governor was consulted. I 
read proofs. The last article dealt with the Prince- 

[ 90] 



i 



PUBLICITY AND STRATEGY 

ton University controversy. Mr. Hale handled oppo- 
nents of ]\Ir. Wilson very viciously. When I saw 
the proofs, I protested that the article be toned down. 
I was receiving contributions from Princeton alumni. 
]Many had not favored the Governor's side. This 
article, as originally drafted, would renew the Prince- 
ton schism and cut ofr our contributions. It would 
also make many violent opi3onents for Wilson. After 
much controversy the article was toned down. I pur- 
chased large quantities of magazines from ]Mr. Page. 

IMark Sullivan, of Collier's Weekly, rendered valu- 
able services until he heard the call of the Bull ^ioose. 

In the fall of 1911 I bought the Trenton True 
American. Cleveland H. Dodge and (be it said in 
whispers) Mr. George W. Perkins, Bull Moose 
leader, held the dominating interest. We got out a 
Woodrow Wilson issue. The True American was 
sent largely to Democratic papers for clipping pur- 
poses. We sent the paper to every fifth Democratic 
voter in a state. This was in furtherance of my gen- 
eral plan to build the Woodrow Wilson cam]3aign 
from the bottom up rather than from the top down. 

I determined that it was inadvisable and imprac- 
ticable to make a fight for delegates in states in which 
there were prospective candidates. These were Ala- 
bama (Mr. Underwood) ; Indiana (Mr. IMarshall) ; 
Missouri (Mr. Clark) ; Ohio (Governor Plannon) ; 
Massachusetts (I\Ir. Foss) ; Connecticut (Governor 
Baldwin), and North Dakota (Mr. Burke, if he 
decided to run). I conceived that it would be better 
to abandon these states out of courtesy, as resentment 

[ 91 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

might be created among the followers of the Presi- 
dential candidates in those states. It might spread 
to other states. At Baltimore the great struggle 
would begin and I knew we must have friends on 
second choice. However, I sent confidential messen- 
gers into states to find out our friends and prepare 
for second choice at Baltimore. 

I had a personal agreement vv^ith the Harmon man- 
ager in Ohio that I would not come into the state, 
but, of course, w^ould keep in touch with our friends 
there. 

Governor Harmon, during the course of his term, 
had provoked decided hostility. It came mainly 
through the Bryan-Baker factions. It also included 
people who sought office and did not get it. 

Baker and the followers of the late Tom Johnson 
opposed Governor Harmon, perhaps, on the principle 
that they did not consider him radical enough. Rep- 
resentative Lentz, Harvey Garber, ex-National Com- 
mitteeman, and former State Chairman Finley were 
ardent Bryanites. 

The Bryan people asked me if I would assist in 
financing a sj)eaking trip of Mr. Bryan through Ohio. 
That involved the possibility that ]Mr. Bryan was to 
campaign for himself. But there was a distinct anti- 
Harmon feeling in Ohio. While I refused to organize 
it, I concluded that I would aid the Bryan excursion. 
I gave ^Ir. Garber $4,000. It helped to consolidate 
opposition to Mr. Harmon. 

I did not stipulate that the assistance of Mr. Bryan 
should result in assistance to !Mr. Wilson. I knew 

[ 92 ] 



PUBLICITY AND STRATEGY 

the sentiment in Ohio was stronger for him than it 
was for any candidate. If the opposition got together, 
as I calculated it would, Mr. Wilson would come to 
Baltimore with considerable strength. The Ohio 
primaries develoiied the fact. Nineteen Wilson dele- 
gates were selected out of a total of forty. 

The Clark campaign developed aggi'essively early 
in January. Mr. Clark was a " native son ". His 
managers determined that the first state to select their 
delegates should be Missouri, their candidate's home. 
Many IMissourians advised, strongly, that Governor 
Wilson become a candidate in that state. I declined 
to consent. Mr. Clark's supporters controlled the 
state organization. Mr. Clark became practically 
the unanimous choice. Mr. Folk, who, rumor had it, 
was looking toward the Presidency with the implied 
support of Mr. Bryan, agreed to support IMr. Clark. 

The next contest was in Oklahoma. Mr. Clark 
was exceedingly well and favorably laiown in that 
state. There was some Harmon support. It readily 
disappeared. The contest narrowed to one between 
Mr. Clark and Mr. Wilson. The Wilson contest 
was led by Senator Gore. The Clark contest was led 
by Senator Robert L. Owen and Charles W. Haskell, 
former Governor and former Treasurer of the 
National Committee. The Oklahoma contest was not 
a state-wide primary; it was a contest for delegates 
selected in each county. 

The battle was a draw. We were fortunate that it 
so resulted. The Clark forces were exceedingly well 
organized. Mr. Clark had the advantage of living 

[93] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

in a neighboring state. He had the advantage, also, 
of a tremendous acquaintance. Governor Wilson 
knew less than half a dozen people in the entire state. 

Kansas was the next state in order. It was neces- 
sary that we make a determined stand there. Diffi- 
culties were more obvious than those of Oklahoma; 
the state bordered on Missouri, and ]Mr, Clark had 
many justly valued friendships there. He had been 
speaking in the state for years. He had come in their 
hour of need ; indeed, in their hour of hopelessness. 

A decided handicap was to be overcome. Never- 
theless, some of the strongest men in the state were 
with us. These were Homer S. Martin, State Chair- 
man; George H. Hodges, Governor; Frank Watson, 
William Orr, Hugh P. Farrelly and Frank Comisky. 
Martin, who afterward became Vice Governor of the 
Philippines, and I planned the campaign. 

Senator Gore and I advised Governor Wilson to 
speak at Topeka on Washington's Birthday, taking 
his hazards on a defeat. 

Opi)osition to Governor Wilson had become highly 
concentrated. It was rumored that to prevent his 
sweeping the country in the primaries, an arrange- 
ment had been made that the country should be 
divided among the other three leading candidates in 
their respective strongholds, — Mr. Underwood in the 
South, Mr. Harmon in the East, and ^Ir. Clark in the 
West. I shall not comment on the truth of this 
" Triple Alliance ". It has never been demonstrated 
to me. I do not believe the gentlemen had the slightest 
knowledge of the existence of any such entente. 

[ 94 ] 



PUBLICITY AND STRATEGY 

In Kansas we were met with a most vehement attack 
on Governor Wilson. It was based ujion his History 
of ihe American People and his alleged slight to 
Southern Europeans who came to America. This was 
given the widest circulation and it was harmful. 

Kansas having gone against us, and Wisconsin 
being the next state, it was necessary to make a deter- 
mined effort there. 

In the previous fall, I had met Joseph E. Davies, 
National Committeeman, on his return from Europe. 
He did not laiow much about the situation. After a 
protracted talk he decided to es]3ouse the Wilson 
cause. He put me in personal touch with his partner, 
George Aylward, now District Attorney at Madison, 
and Frank B. Shutze, now Postmaster at Milwaukee. 
These were the Wisconsin pioneers. 

I determined that everything possible should be 
done in Wisconsin to stem what I considered the rising- 
tide for Speaker Clark. From headquarters we sent 
tons of literature to the Democrats in Wisconsin. 

We covered the state thoroughly with the Trenton 
True American. I also gave ^Ir. Davies $15,000 — 
a mighty sum for us in those times — to carry on the 
campaign. It was more than a mighty sum in view 
of my personal situation. I had incurred a personal 
indebtedness on behalf of the campaign of more than 
$36,000. At this juncture, Thomas J. Pence said to 
me at Washington: 

" You need not worry about the Wisconsin pub- 
licity, *The Old Man of the Sea' (Senator Gore) 
and I will mix the poison ". 

[ 95 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Senator Gore organized a campaign down to the 
precincts in Wisconsin. The LaFollette Campaign 
Committee, composed largely of former President 
Theodore Roosevelt's friends, had concluded that 
Senator Robert M. LaFollette, of Wisconsin, was 
impossible as a candidate for the Republican or Pro- 
gi-essive Presidential nomination, and had plainly 
told him so. This was a few days prior to the Pub- 
lishers' dinner in Philadelphia, at which Senator 
LaFollette utterly collapsed physically and nervously. 

The one man on the LaFollette Committee who 
protested against the abandonment of the Senator 
was Charles R. Crane, of Chicago. President Wilson 
later offered Crane the post of Ambassador to Russia. 
Mr. Crane had been confimied as IMinister to China 
under Mr. Taft. He was recalled in the process of 
his journey. At the break-up of the LaFollette Com- 
mittee, ^Ir. Crane asserted that he would continue in 
his financial support of Mr. LaFollette. 

I went to Chicago to confer on the Wisconsin situa- 
tion, and also to see Roger C. Sullivan again. The 
deficit hanging over me and the great expense that 
was to follow were quite depressing. I had found 
out that primaries are the most expensive form of 
political campaigning. The odds are all in favor of 
the man with the money and the man who has the 
organization behind him. 

As I sat in the Blackstone Hotel, alone, on a foggy 
morning, I was raking my mind on how to discover 
some new person to contribute to the Wilson cam- 
paign. I thought of Charles R. Crane, and deter- 

[96] 



PUBLICITY AND STRATEGY 

mined at once to see him. It was a short journey to 
his office. 

Mr. Crane received me with great politeness. I 
told him that I admired his courage in continuing to 
support Mr. LaFollette, but that, of course, Mr. 
LaFollette's nomination was impossible. I argued 
to Mr. Crane that Governor Wilson stood for pro- 
gressive ideals, and that there was no inconsistency 
in supporting both Wilson and Mr. LaFollette. 

After twenty minutes Mr. Crane gave me a check 
for $5,000, and said that he would give me $5,000 
more later. This $5,000 went into the maw of the 
Wisconsin primaries. 

Mr. Crane had influence, and, indeed, a substan- 
tial interest in the Milwaukee Journal. He promised 
the support of the Journal for Governor Wilson. He 
also enjoyed intimate acquaintanceship with the 
Scripps-McRae papers. He volunteered to argue 
for the support of that chain of great dailies for Gov- 
ernor Wilson, and it was largely accomplished. 

If I ever had an inspiration it was certainly the 
inspiration of seeing ^Ir. Crane. I left his office still 
$36,000 in debt, but feeling vastly more hopeful of 
the general result. His face and his first-spoken 
word convince one that he is a man of high ideals and 
fidelity of purpose. 

From Mr. Crane's office I went into conference — 
the third one — with Roger C. Sullivan, the National 
Committeeman from Illinois. It was plain that 
although a chronic bitter fight was being made on IMr. 
Sullivan he would control the delegation at Baltimore. 

[ 97 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

The first time I saw him was on the twelfth of Feb- 
ruary — Lincohi's Birthday — when Governor Wil- 
son spoke at the Lincoln Day dinner in the Hotel 
LaSalle. It was a rather soggy occasion. The busi- 
nessmen of Chicago, as elsewhere, viewed Wilson with 
suspicion and alarm. Outside of a very cordial talk, 
we got nowhere. Mr. Sullivan, very properly, was 
looking after his own political position. The very 
mixed condition of Illinois would not permit him to 
make a statement. I loiew that if Roger Sullivan 
ever committed himself to us, his word would be as 
good as his bond. 

The net result of the first conference was that he 
expressed a very high regard for Mr. Wilson. 

On the second occasion. Senator Saulsbury and I 
were on a Western tour, terminating in Topeka, where 
Governor Wilson was to speak. Mr. Sullivan again 
took the position that his own. leadership was involved, 
and that he was compelled to protect that. He would 
not commit himself to anyone. We both knew his 
underlying political judgment was that Governor 
Wilson should be nominated. 

On the third occasion, we had a very long conver- 
sation. Mr. Sullivan was even more enthusiastic about 
Governor Wilson, but less hopeful of his nomination. 
Nevertheless, I thought that the conference would at 
least develop a cordiality between us and cement 
mutual confidence. That it did was demonstrated 
when in the Baltimore Convention Mr. Sullivan 
finally swung the 58 votes from Illinois to Wilson, and 
made his nomination certain. 

[ 98 ] 



VIII 
PREPARATIONS FOR CONVENTION 

Only 327 of the 1088 National Delegates for Wilson as 
THE Net Result of Presidential Primaries — McCombs 
Tours South and West to Gain Veto Power in Conven- 
tion — "Only a Miracle Can Save Wilson", Says 
Davies — Wilson Conference at Washington Gloomy — 
Newton, Publicity Man, Discharged. 

THE CONTEST in Wisconsin involved the 
vote of a very large Southern European 
element, especially in Milwaukee. A very 
bitter pamphlet prepared by George Fred Williams 
against Governor Wilson was the chief weapon of the 
opposition. It appealed very strongly to the foreign 
vote. 

Wisconsin had been so thoroughly organized that 
the primary came out quite to our satisfaction. We 
won twenty out of the twentj^-four delegates. We 
had, at least, checked the Clark tide. We tripled our 
circulation of publicity, but we were still short of 
money. Contributions were given in a spirit of great 
trepidation, and the campaign was not underwritten 
at all, except by ^Ir. Morgcnthau. 

The time for the selection of delegates in Illinois 
was coming apace. The state was absolutely rent with 
factionalism. Mr. Clark's supporters had organized 

[ ^0 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

the state most thoroughly and with great skill. INIr. 
Hearst's papers were pounding the Wilson candidacy 
with great effect. Governor Dunne's forces were 
working for the nomination of the IMissourian with the 
support of Mayor Harrison and of Mr. Hearst's 
newspapers. 

Mr. Sullivan w^as working to maintain control of 
the state organization. It was impossible for us 
under such circumstances, to have an adequate organi- 
zation in the state. It would have required a vast 
sum of monej'^ to obtain it. We did not have the 
funds. 

Accordingly, I organized a faithful group, mainly 
composed of young men outside of any organization. 
They included William BroA\Ti, Jr., later Naval 
Officer of the Port ; River McNeill, later Collector of 
Customs; William C. Niblac, a prominent banker; 
Dixon Williams, a manufacturer; Irving Shuman, 
later Assistant United States Treasurer at Chicago; 
Lawrence Stringer, later Congressman-at-large, and 
the Jones brothers, Thomas D. and Frank. Thomas 
D. was afterward nominated by the President for the 
Federal Reserve Board. This group had the very 
greatest difficulty in raising funds. Just before the 
selection of delegates, I gave the organization $250, 
every cent that I could afford, for the payment of a 
deficit on printing. 

Ten days before the selection of delegates, a primary 
law was passed in Illinois. "\^nien the news came to 
me, I told our organization that Illinois was hopeless 
and that it must go to Mr. Clark, I recommended the 

[ 100 ] 



PREPARATIONS FOR CONVENTION 

expenditure of no further money, but upon their 
insistence for funds I gave them $3,000. It was more 
of a reward for the loyalty of their services than 
anything else. 

jVIr. Clark won by a tremendous plurality, — over 
140,000. I received the news at my New York hotel. 
I was $57,000 personally committed to the campaign. 
The morning was foggy, and, of course, to me was 
blacker than usual. I had breakfast and walked down 
Fifth Avenue, not knowing where any further funds 
were coming from. I puffed vigorously at a black 
cigar. I was of course not willing to give up. Indeed, 
it was a matter of pride not to surrender until thor- 
oughly beaten at Baltimore, and I still thought we 
would not be beaten. 

The success of the Wisconsin primaries was not 
long-lived. The Clark movement got a tremendous 
and thoroughlj^ organized swing. Nebraska, Iowa, 
California, Washington, Colorado, Nevada, New 
Mexico, ^lassachusetts, Rhode Island, Maryland, 
went for ^Ir. Clark almost in succession. Alabama, 
Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, a part of Tennessee, a 
part of North Carolina, went sweepingly in turn for 
Mr. Underwood. 

While these events were occurring, Mr. Joseph E. 
Davies said that Governor Wilson could only be 
nominated by a political miracle. 

I knew it was necessary for us to buttress ourselves 
in a few states to check the almost overAvhelming tide. 
I selected IMinnesota, South Dakota, North Carolina, 
and South Carolina in which to concentrate the fight. 

[ 101 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

We liad made a formal fight in xdassachusetts. It 
consisted mainly of speakers. Vv^e had the able ser- 
vices of Robert L. Henrj^ who had transferred him- 
self from Wisconsin, where we had retrieved ourselves 
with nine delegates. 

The "Old Man of the Sea" (Senator Gore) and I 
were much in conference. Pence w^as pounding away 
with publicity in every direction. The New York 
Headquarters, so far as its resources would allow it, 
was consistently sending out \¥ilson publicity. 

In Minnesota we had some very able men. They 
included Fred B. Lynch, E. L. Wise, editor of the 
Dulutli Herald, which was a power with its editorials ; 
Mr. Jacques, jMr. Hudson, and others. We secured 
a handsome, but belated victor}^ in oMinnesota. 

Under the able leadership of E. S. Johnson, opposed 
violently by Senator Pettigrew and George Fred 
Williams, we took South Dakota. 

Under the leadership of William H. Osborne, and 
other strong men, we took twenty out of the twenty- 
four North Carolina delegates. 

With Senator Tilhiian and Mr. Gonzales, now 
Minister to Cuba, we took South Carolina. 

On the 28th of Maj'' the New Jersey'' primaries came 
on. As was to be expected. Senator Smith held his 
own in Essex. The result was 24 Wilson out of the 28 
state delegates. 

By the 1st of June all of the state ccaiventions and 
primaries were over. 

Early in April the strain was beginning to become 
too much for me. During the period I had not taken 

[ 102 ] 



PREPARATIONS FOR CONVENTION 

a Sunday or a holiday off. I had worked from twelve 
to eighteen hours a day. I frequently felt that I must 
give up. 

While Mr. Clark was sweeping the country, the 
Governor had become very much discouraged. He 
thought it was too much to call on his friends to do. 
He more than once intimated that he desired to with- 
draw. My argument was, that it would be unfair to 
his friends who had so vigorously supported him, and 
who, I was sure, would rather go to defeat than to quit 
in the midst of a conflict. 

After June 1st the tactics for the Convention had 
to be worked out. I sent into all of the states. I took 
a list of the delegates selected, sent to me from an 
inquiry made as to their first and second choice. This 
I carefully noted in a book. 

In New York, I had declined to make a fight for 
two reasons: I knew that the sentiment of the state 
was decidedly against Governor Wilson. I knew that 
the organization which controlled the selection of the 
delegates was against him. IMy only hope was to fur- 
ther the amicable and cordial terms with the delegates 
selected, in the hope that at some juncture in the 
Convention they might see fit to vote with us. 

It was apparent that the only effort that could be 
made there was to turn the edge of animosity. This 
position I took counter to many suggestions and the 
violent protestations of Governor Wilson's friends. I 
knew a fight would result only in creating bitter state 
animosities which would prejudice success in the state 
of any Democrat nominated in the Convention, and 

[ 103 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

could by no chance be of any value to Governor 
Wilson. The only thing done in the state was the 
circulation of a large amount of publicity. 

Some of the delegates, notably Abram I. Elkus, 
Henry Morgenthau, Martin H. Glynn, Samuel 
Untermeyer, and others, v^ere loyal Wilson men. 
The suggestion was made that a contesting delegation 
go to Baltimore, following the precedent of the Anti- 
Snap movement in the Democratic convention of 1892. 
The Anti-Snap was all right. But the facts were not 
the same. I was sure that no convention would pay 
any attention to such a movement. 

The net result of the selection of delegates prior to 
the Baltimore convention showed Mr. Wilson to be in 
possession of 327 out of the 1088 delegates, — less than 
a third. 

Within a few days after the 1st of June, I went 
up into the country with my list of delegates and all 
of the information that I had acquired during the 
•/ fifteen months of campaigning, to lay out a plan of 
battle for submission to my associates. I was quite 
alone. First I studied and learned by heart the per- 
sonnel of the 1088 delegates. I found that many 
Clark delegates held Wilson as their second choice, 
and that some were very sympathetic with Harmon. 

I determined that if we could, in the process of the 
convention, muster a veto power, — that is, more than 
one-third, and hold it in compact order for four or five 
days, we had an excellent chance to secure many more 
delegates and perhaps the nomination. As to the 
Underwood delegates, who were entirely from the 

[ 104 ] 



PREPARATIONS FOR CONVENTION 

South, it seemed clear that, at the convention, they 
should be left entirely alone in order to strengthen 
them. Their great value at the first part of the con- 
vention would be in blockading the Clark movement 
and preventing his nomination. 

I was aware that the Underwood people hoped to be 
the residuary legatees of either the Wilson or Clark 
strength. I resolved that during the first two daj^s of 
the convention we should merely do sharp-shooting at 
the Clark delegates, — that is to say, draw off indi- 
vidual delegates to get the coveted one-third. 

I thought I could see where we would get more 
than one-third of the delegates in this mamier and hold 
them together. 

As to the floor organization, I determined upon a 
committee composed of vigorous, active men, that 
could do continuous manoeuvering, and who were 
phj^sically vigorous enough to work day and night. 

Governor Burke, of North Dakota, now Treasurer 
of the United States, wrote that if we needed the 
North Dakota delegates we could have them at any 
time. 

I returned from my seclusion and laid the plan of 
organization before Governor Wilson, Senator Gore, 
^Ir. Pence, and one or two others. It was accepted. 

About Jime 10, I went to Washington and took up 
the matter of our Congressional support. We worked 
out the personnel of the floor leaders and called a 
secret meeting at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, 
Philadelphia. There were present Governor Wilson, 
Senator Gore, Senator Saulsbury, Mr. Burleson, and, 

[ 105 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

I think, Mr. Palmer, Mr. McGillicuddy, Robert S. 
Hudspeth and Rex^resentative Hughes. I proposed 
a plan for carrying off the delegates of the various 
states, one from Pennsylvania and one from Texas, 
who were not on the Floor Committee, to work among 
the various delegations between sessions. 

Mr. Pence evolved the idea of having a complete 
press bureau in Baltimore so as to get immediate 
favorable publicity directly into the hands of the dele- 
gates. The publicity here was done by clippings. I 
determined to put Colonel Thomas R. Burch in charge 
of the convention hall galleries and to be Commissioner 
and "Chief of Enthusiasm". I arranged to have 
brought down to Baltimore, Princeton, Yale and 
Harvard Woodrow Wilson Clubs, which numbered 
some 1500 young men with strong lungs and stronger 
enthusiasm. 

The plans for Baltimore were complete; but to 
return to some other incidents. 

About January 15, Byron R. Newton, later Assist- 
ant Secretary of the Treasury and Collector of the 
Port of New York, then publicity agent, taken from 
Mr. McAdoo's office, became exceedingly unsatisfac- 
tory. His enthusiasm had fallen away. I attributed 
it at first to nervousness. They told me that he was 
doing absolutely nothing at headquarters, and became 
exceedingly quarrelsome. This happened at the time 
of the Watterson interview, when for the first time I 
came forward with continuous publicity which neces- 
sarily involved my name. 

Newton secretly represented Mr. McAdoo. He 
[ 106 ] 



PREPARATIONS FOR CONVENTION 

was jealous because I was directing the movement, 
and because of his greater age. Finally, with great 
reluctance, I was compelled to discharge him to bring 
order into the headquarters. He left grudgingly. 
He wrote a vitriolic letter to Governor Wilson con- 
cerning the condition of the campaign. That was the 
last I heard of Newton, until at Baltimore, I am reli- 
ably informed, he publicly appeared on the floor of 
the convention exploiting alleged injurious letters. 

At the instance of Dan Fellow Piatt, of New Jer- 
sey, I engaged Walker W. Vick as an assistant at 
headquarters. He seemed to have a large acquaint- 
ance in the South. As a try-out, I sent him down 
there to look over the situation. He came back with 
valuable information. Mr. Vick proved himself to be 
a valuable executive. Upon letting Mr. Newton go, 
I put jMr. Vick in charge of headquarters, associating 
with him Mr. Parker, a i^ublicity man, and others. 

Soon afterwards I asked Senator Gore to recom- 
mend a man who was familiar with INIiddle West con- 
ditions. He suggested Judge Thomas H. Owen of 
Oklahoma. Judge Owen, at Senator Gore's instance, 
volunteered to come without salary to headquarters 
and spend a month. He proved himself of very gTcat 
value in organization and in his familiarity with 
IMiddle Western conditions. 

To go back a little, I determined on March 14th 
that it would be of advantage to go into the South and 
confer with some of our friends in the various states. 
My particular aim was toward New Orleans. I went 
to Augusta, to the Bon Air Hotel, for a few days' 

[ 107 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

rest, occupying the time, however, in receiving Wilson 
leaders from the surrounding states, including J. T. G. 
Crawford, National Committeeman from Florida; 
Mr. Gonzales, of South Carolina, and Bowdrie Phinzy, 
of Augusta. ^Ir. Saulsbury was there. The vacation 
consisted of planning for the future and sending out 
of telegrams to various leaders in the primaries. 

From Augusta I went to Atlanta and conferred 
with the Wilson leaders in Georgia, especially Colonel 
Gray, editor and proprietor of the Atlanta Journal, 
who was rendering us valiant service. The trip con- 
vinced me that Mr. Underwood must have Alabama, 
Georgia and Florida. 

Lieutenant Governor Bilbo met me at New 
Orleans. He was not entirely committed to Under- 
wood. 

An analysis of the situation in Mississippi showed 
that the state was largely dominated by Senator Var- 
daman and Governor Brewer. I was sure that no 
success could be had there for us. 

According to our plan of not abandoning any state 
completely, excepting New York and the Presidential 
candidate states, we made fights in all of the others, 
with the anticipated result. 

My object in going to New Orleans was specific. 
The southern half of Louisiana was disrupted over the 
Underwood Bill of 1911, because it had a provision for 
free sugar. Louisiana people contended that it was 
confiscatory. Mr. Wilson, in his speech of January 3, 
1912, had pronounced himself against any tariff that 
would prove confiscatory. At that time I did not 

[ 108 ] 



PREPARATIONS FOR CONVENTION 

dream that he would be for free sugar. Indeed, he 
had told me that he had not made up his mind, but 
that if it were confiscatory, he would be against it. 

In New Orleans I met Colonel Ewing, National 
Committeeman of Louisiana and editor of a prominent 
daily paper, and editors of several other papers. They 
were satisfied that as among Clark, Underwood, and 
Wilson, Wilson was the better choice for Louisiana. 
The delegation was about evenly divided between 
Wilson and Clark. The southern, or sugar, half of the 
state was for Wilson. 

I then made a trip into my native state, Arkansas. 
I had had considerable hopes, or rather profound long- 
ing. Upon my arrival at Little Rock I foimd that 
the effective work of Jeny C. South had entirely pre- 
cluded our having it, and I left in chagrin. 

I proceeded to St. Louis; then to Chicago, to renew 
my friendship with Roger Sullivan, and then to New 
York. 

The day following my arrival I took a trip to 
Atlantic City for sea air, conferences, and contribu- 
tions. INIr. Pence came up from Washington to 
report. Judge Owen to confer with us all, and Vick 
to pave the way for contributions. 

Through the editor of an Atlantic City paper, we 
were able to raise about $5,000. This was a great help 
because we were bankrupt again, and there were con- 
tinued demands for money. 

Referring to the trip to Topeka, which I have men- 
tioned in a previous chapter, Mr. Saulsbury and I 
took it together. The dinner on this occasion was for 

[ 109 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

both men and women. The ceiling was low, the Gov- 
ernor was out of voice, Homer S. Martin implored us 
for funds we did not have. We came into contact with 
the vicious George Fred Williams' letter, which was 
being circulated tremendously. It was not a bridge 
of comforts. But our leaders were enthusiastic. On 
the return I invited as many of them as were going in 
that direction to dine with me at Kansas City. I took 
Mr. Martin across into St. Louis, where I could draw 
some money and appease him slightly. We then went 
to Louisville and enjoyed the hospitality of the Pen- 
dennis Club and the companionship of Urey Wood- 
son, — and learned that Kentucky was for Clark. We 
journeyed thence to Frankfort, met Governor Mc- 
Creary, Desha Breckenridge, and ex-Governor Beck- 
ham, and found that Kentucky was for Clark more 
than ever. 

The "hog's eye was sot". The leaders were nearly 
all against us. We left a thin line, mainly composed 
of very young men, as a rear giiard, and departed for 
Washington. There I stopped to check up events with 
the "Old Man of the Sea", and then on to New York 
to continue the work. 

June 20, 1912, the entire staff of New York and 
Washington Headquarters was moved to Baltimore. 
We had most of the tenth floor of the Emerson Hotel 
and the main room do\Mistairs. I was urged to take 
the big room do\\iistairs for $10,000, for the conven- 
tion, at what might be called a prodigious sum from 
the Wilson standpoint. I was urged on by my good 
friend Colonel McGraw, of West Virginia, who was 

[ 110 ] 



PREPARATIONS FOR CONVENTION 

accustomed to the old days of conventions, and who 
made great merriment over my objection to paying 
such an extraordinary price. The days between the 
20th and 25th were spent in conference with the Wil- 
son leaders and in laying further plans for the 
convention. 

Mr. jNIcAdoo, during this time, was at the Repub- 
lican convention in Chicago. However, he had 
reserved a suite at the Emerson. 



[ in ] 



IX 

McCOMBS' ORGANIZATION 

Battle for Convention Control — Bryan Bitterly Attacks 
Parker as "Predatory Interests Candidate" — Parker 
Defeats Bryan for Temporary Chairman of the Con- 
vention — The Wilson Group Supports Bryan to Elim- 
inate Clark — Clark's Manoeuvres Against Bryan to 
Prevent His Fourth Presidential Nomination. 

[Editor's Note — The following is compiled by the editor.] 

THE SKELETON organization with which 
Mr. McCombs entered the Baltimore con- 
vention consisted in the main of young 
college graduates of Princeton, Harvard, Yale, 
Columbia, Cornell, University of Pennsylvania and 
other universities. In addition, Mr. McCombs had 
succeeded in enlisting these more or less influential 
leaders in these subjoined states: 

Alabama: Frank P. Glass, Judge Peter J. Ham- 
ilton, former Governor W. D. Jelks, General Bibb 
Graves, Judge W. E. Thomas, ex-Governor Senator 
B. B. Comer. 

California: James D. Phelan, United States 
Senator. 

Delaware: Willard Saulsbury, afterward United 
States Senator. 

[ 112 ] 



McCOMBS' ORGANIZATION 

Florida: Frank L. Mayes, J. T. G. Crawford, 
J. W. Appleyard. 

Illinois: Edwin Hurley, after\vard United States 
Shipping Commissioner; Irving B. Shuman. 

Iowa: Jerry B. Sullivan. 

Kansas: Homer S. Martin, Governor George H. 
Hodges. 

Louisiana: Senator Robert E. Broussard. 

INIaine: l^obadiah Gardner, recenth^ member of the 
Inter-Boundary Commission; Daniel McGillicuddy, 
former Governor Plaisted. 

Massaehusetts : E. E. Filene, Charles H. Grasty. 

Missouri: Edward F. Goltra. 

New Jersey: Colonel George Harvey, William 
Hughes, Dan Fellows Piatt, Judge R. S. Hudspeth, 
Colonel T. H. Birch, Congressman Robert Brenner, 
John Hinchcliffe. 

New Hampshire: Eugene E. Reed. 

New JNIexico: United States Senator A. A. Jones. 

New York: Henry Morgenthau, George Foster 
Peabody, Franklin D. Roosevelt, William Church 
Osborn, Thomas ^lott Osborne, Fred S. Penfield, 
Cleveland H. Dodge, Walter H. Page. 

North Carolina: Hugh MacRae, "The Three 
Sprunts", A. H. Gouverneur, H. C. McQueen, 
Thomas H. Wright, former Governor Robert Glenn, 
A. H. Eller, Colonel W. H. Osborne, E. J. Justice, 
Captain S. J. Williams, J. R. Preston, INIajor W. F. 
Robertson, General J. O. Carr, Josephus Daniels, 
just retired as Secretary of the Navy. 

North Dakota: Governor John Burke. 
[ "3 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Ohio: W. W. Durbin, Hai^ey Garber. 

Oklahoma: United States Senator Thomas P. Gore, 
Judge Thomas H. Owen. 

Oregon: W. B. King. 

Pennsylvania: Joseph M. Guffey, A. ^Mitchell 
Palmer, W. W. Roper, Vance McCormick, Roland 
Morris, Ambassador to Japan. 

South Carolina: R. S. \^%aley, W. E. Gonzales, 
W. W. Ball, J. Willard Ragsdale, John Gary Evans. 

Rhode Island: Congressman O'Shaughnessey. 

South Dakota: Senator Edward S. Johnson. 

Texas: R. L. Henry, A. S. Burleson, Colonel T. H. 
Ball. 

Tennessee: Hobart F. Fischer. 

VeiTnont: J. Walter Lyons, Thomas H. Browne. 

Virginia: Stuart G. Gibboney, ex-Governor Elly- 
son. 

West Virginia: Colonel Jolm T. McGraw. 

Wisconsin: Joseph E. Davies. 

District of Columbia: Charles A. Douglass. 

Hawaii: John H. Wilson. 

Porto Rico : Henry G. Molina, Henry W. Dooley. 

Kentucky: Henry S. Breckinridge, Governor 
Yagar, nov\^ in Porto Rico ; J. W. C. Beckham. 

[Editor's Note — Mr. McCombs resumes his narrative.] 

After Chairman Norman E. Mack of the National 
Committee, on Jime 25, 1912, had formally called the 
convention to order, he submitted the name of Judge 
Alton B. Parker, former candidate for President of 
the United States, for Temporary Chairman. When 

[ 114 ] 



McCOMBS' ORGANIZATION 

he asked for other nominations, ]Mr. Bryan arose. 
Referring to his credentials as three times the standard 
bearer of the Democracj^ and the fact that six and a 
half million peoi^le had voted for him on each occa- 
sion, he opposed Judge Parker on the ground that the 
Judge had been nominated for the forces in St. Louis, 
chiefly ^Messrs. Thomas F. Ryan and August Belmont, 
who had defeated him (Mr. Bryan) for President. 
He presented Senator John W. Kern of Indiana, who 
had run with him on the Democratic ticket in 1908, 
and he spent much of his time in rehearsing his personal 
achievements. 

Mr. Kern recited his personal friendship for jMr. 
Parker. He urged him to retire in the interest of 
harmony in favor of Senator O'Gorman of New York, 
Senator Culberson of Texas, Representative Clayton 
of Alabama, former Governor Campbell of Ohio, 
former Governor Folk of Missouri or Senator Shively 
of Indiana. He added: 

"If there is to be no response ; if the responsibility 
is to rest there; if this is to be a contest between the 
people and the powers ; if it is to be a contest such as 
has been described — a contest which I ]n'ay God may 
be averted — then the cause to which I belong is so 
great a cause that I am not fit to be its leader. If mj^ 
proposition for harmony is to be ignored, and this 
deplorable battle is to go on, there is only one man, 
who has been at the forefront for sixteen years, the 
great American Tribune, William J. Bryan. If you 
will have nothing else, if that must be the issue, then 
the leader must be William Jennings Bryan". 

[ 115 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

We knew in advance that Mr. Bryan was to make 
the attack, and that Mr. Kern, by declining the nomi- 
nation, was, in effect, to support Mr. Bryan. Judge 
Parker, we also knew, had the support of a great many 
Clark men, as well as the Harmon and Underwood 
people. 

Senator Ollie James, of Kentucky, was Mr. Clark's 
close personal friend. We at once decided that the 
thing to do, inasmuch as we could not win on the issue 
of the Temporary Chairmanship, was to get in behind 
Senator James. 

I conceived this move on the theory that it was a 
foregone conclusion that Judge Parker was to be 
elected Temporary Chairman, and that we might draw 
away some of the Clark support by developing a situ- 
ation where delegates favorable to Mr. Clark would 
not vote for his best and most outspoken friend. This 
would reveal a combination for Judge Parker. It had 
the desired effect. Immediately, over the countr5% the 
Clark forces were accused of joining with the reaction- 
ary forces. 

Right here I may clear up a false impression as to 
Judge Parker's participation. I learned from him, 
that he did not even know that he was to be placed in 
nomination for Temporary Chairman, at Baltimore, 
until his name was submitted to the convention. Wlien 
his name was submitted, and attack was made upon 
him, he felt a personal pride in letting the issue be 
determined by the convention itself. He was not a 
party to the matter at all. He accepted the position 

[ H6 ] 



McCOMBS' ORGANIZATION 

in entire good faith, and of course discharged it with 
high distinction. 

By the support of James, I conceived that we had 
won the first skirmish. 

Of course, it was impossible to determine Mr. 
Bryan's ultimate position, except by a slender chain of 
circumstances and by his moves. I had known that, 
in two states at least, he had suggested that the dele- 
gates be divided equally between Mr. Clark and Mr. 
Wilson. This was a danger signal to me, because, if 
that policy were followed out generally, it would mean 
the impossibility of nominating either. Personally, I 
preferred a whole-hearted minority of the delegation 
to a substantial equality with Mr. Clark of perhaps 
imenthusiastic delegates. My plan was always to hold 
thoroughly intact, as a second line of defense, the 
pledged delegates, in the belief that if we could ever 
get them up to one-third of the convention, my way 
would be easy. 

The James support gave the Wilson candidacy a 
very large impetus. 

After Mr. Kern's speech, Mr. Bryan agreed to 
become a candidate for the Temporary Chairmanship. 
He denounced Parker as the candidate of "Wall 
Street predatory interests". Two things were to be 
determined — the cohesiveness . of the agreement on 
Judge Parker, and the personal following of Mr. 
Bryan in the convention. 

Alabama, whose Presidential preference was Mr. 
UnderAvood, voted for Mr. Bryan with the exception 
of 1% votes. In Arizona, Bryan got 4 and Parker 2. 

[ 117 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

One of the delegates, when Arizona was called, asked 
that the name be called, so that it might be known who 
had voted for Wall Street and who voted for Bryan. 
Illinois cast 53 votes for Parker and 5 for Brj^an. 
The Unit Rule applyuig there, the entire 58 votes 
went to Judge Parker. In Oklahoma, 15 were for 
Bryan and 5 for Parker, the Wilson men voting for 
Bryan. The general result was that Judge Parker 
received 579 votes, Bryan 508, O'Gorman 4 and Kern 
1. The Wilson forces supported the Bryan chair- 
manship almost solidly. 

As a matter of fact, the election of Judge Parker 
was eminently satisfactory to us. We enjoyed the 
selection of Judge Parker in every respect. The 
Temporary Chairmanship of the National Convention 
is not a position of very tremendous power. We knew 
that Judge Parker would be eminently fair, and that 
we would make great inroads into the good graces of 
the supporters of Bryan and the so-called Progressive 
supporters of Clark. 

The suspicion was rife that Judge Parker was 
elected by a combination against the interest of ]Mr. 
Wilson. Mr. James' name, of course, never came 
before the convention of his own desire. The events 
leading up to the selection of Judge Parker as 
Temporary Chairaian were: 

June 21st, four days previous, the selection of Judge 
Parker as Temporary Chairman was made by tlie sub- 
committee on aiTangements. The vote stood: 
Parker, New York, 8 ; James of Kentucky, 3 ; Henry 
of Texas, 3; Kern of Indiana, 1 ; Senator O'Gomian, 

[ 118 ] 



i 



McCOMBS' ORGANIZATION 

1. Daniels of North Carolina, Osborne of Wyoming, 
and Ewing of Louisiana, voted for Henry. All were 
Wilson men. jMcGraw of West Virginia and Huds- 
peth of New Jersey voted for O' Gorman and Kern, 
respectively. Woodson and Wade, Clark men, voted 
for James, as did Ball of Delaware. 

The Parker vote was : Mack of New York, Sullivan 
of Illinois, Taggart of Indiana, Howell of Georgia, 
Johnson of South Dakota, Wood of IMichigan, Brown 
of Vermont, and J. Fred Talbott of Maryland. 

The next day Bryan addressed the following tele- 
gram to Champ Clark, Governor Foss of ^Missouri, 
Governor Wilson of New Jersey, Governor Burke of 
North Dakota, Governor Baldwin of Connecticut, 
Mayor Gaynor of New York : 

"I took it for granted that no committeeman inter- 
ested in Democratic success would desire to offend the 
members of a convention, overwhelmingly progressive, 
by naming a reactionary to sound the ke\mote of the 
campaign. Eight members of the sub-committee, 
however, have, over the protest of the remaining eight, 
agreed not only on a reactionary but upon the one 
Democrat among those not candidates for the presi- 
dential nomination who is in the eyes of the public 
most conspicuously identified with the reactionary ele- 
ment of the party. I shall be pleased to join you and 
your friends in opposing his selection by the full com- 
mittee or by the convention. Kindly answer here." 

Champ Clark answered at once: 

"Have consulted with Committee having my inter- 
ests in charge and agree with them that the supreme 

[ 119 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

consideration should be to prevent any discord in the 
convention. Friends of mine, on the sub-committee of 
arrangements, have already presented the name of 
Hon. Ollie James to the sub-committee. I believe if 
all join in the interests of harmony in an appeal to the 
entire National Committee to avoid controversies in 
matters of organization, the committee will so arrange 
as to leave the platform and nomination of candidates 
as the only real issues on which delegates need divide". 

Mr. Bryan's telegram was a challenge. It required 
an answer. On the sub-committee Mr. Clark's friends 
were divided. His answer had, of course, strong 
points of common sense. But it did not satisfy the 
public. Governor ^larshall's answer approved the 
selection of Parker. The Harmon men regarded the 
selection of Mr. Parker as a victory for themselves. 
The Underwood men were satisfied to be quiet. 

On the whole, there was a feeling in the National 
Committee that Mr. Bryan had put all candidates in 
a very embarrassing position and had raised a very 
unnecessary issue. The situation was probably best 
sized up by the statement of J. Fred Talbott of Mary- 
land, National Committeeman, who was for Mr. 
Wilson, and he said : 

"We need all the Democrats there are in order to 
win the election. Bryan should not say to the Con- 
servatives that they cannot have a look in at that 
convention. Our decision to make Judge Parker 
Temporary Chairman was the decent thing to do. I 
am surprised that Bryan should not be in favor of 
doing the decent thing. I thought I was taking the 

[ 120 ] 



I 



McCOMBS' ORGANIZATION 

best course for the party in voting for Parker, and I 
still think so". 

The Clark men were in distinct discomfort. If they 
did not support Judge Parker they felt themselves in 
a position of antagonizing Charles F. IMurphy of New 
York, Roger C. Sullivan of Illinois, and Thomas T. 
Taggart of Indiana. They made an attempt, on the 
theory that these three men would determine the 
destinies of the convention, to line up the whole Clark 
influence for Judge Parker. In the sub-committee 
the Wilson men did not join in a straight out and out 
fight on Judge Parker, but scattered their votes among 
others, without concentration. 

The fight on Judge Parker was distinctly a Bryan 
fight. It was not a clean-cut issue between the Clark 
and Wilson forces, although the Wilson forces handled 
themselves at that juncture with more boldness. 

The atmosphere of Baltimore could be summed up 
in these words: "What shall we do with Bryan and 
what is Bryan going to do with us"? 

On the night of June 22d, the Wilson Floor Com- 
mittee met and discussed the question of whether jMr. 
Wilson should make a reply, and if so, what it should 
be. It was apparent that the whole campaign of 
Governor Wilson was progressive. The men who 
supported him were progressive. He must stand or 
fall on that issue. While there was no personal objec- 
tion to Judge Parker, we determined that whatever 
Mr. Bryan's motives were, and however unfortunate 
the position was in which he placed the convention, that 
an answer in the first place was the desirable thing. 

[ 121 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

In the second place, silence on the matter seemed the 
height of folly. 

Accepting it as a fact that the so-called reactionary 
element put Mr. Parker forward, it seemed the proper 
thing to agree with T^lr. Bryan, and take the chance of 
alienating New York and the other so-called Con- 
servative delegations. It did not seem to me a very 
great risk. It was obvious, inasnmch as the issue was 
small, and the convention would be a hard-fought one, 
that as soon as Judge Parker had surrendered his 
duties as Temporary Chairman, the convention would 
forget about the petty animosities created. This 
proved to be the fact. 

In our meeting we drew up a suggestion to Mr. 
Wilson as to the logical position to take. The sub- 
stance of it was in the reply given by Mr. Wilson, 
although the Governor went somewhat further toward 
Mr. Bryan than the Committee had recommended. 
The Wilson reply to Bryan v/as : 

"You are quite right. Before hearing of your mes- 
sage I clearly stated my position. The Baltimore 
convention is to be a convention of Progressive, of men 
who are Progressives, in principle and by conviction. 
It must, if it is not put in a wrong light before the 
convention, express its convictions in its organization 
and in its choice of men who are to speak for it. You 
are to be a member of this convention, and are entirely 
within your rights in doing everything within your 
power to bring that result about. 

"No one will doubt where my sympathies lie; and 
you will, I am sure, find my friends in the convention 

[ 122 ] 



McCOMBS' ORGANIZATION 

acting upon clear conviction and always in the interest 
of the peoiDle's cause. I am happy in tlie confidence 
that they need no suggestion from me". 

It is to be remembered that Mr. Bryan had stated, 
many times, that Mr. Clark and IMr. Wilson were both 
Progressives and satisfactory candidates. This left 
the Clark supporters, so far as the Brj^an influence 
was concerned, rather in the lurch. At this time 
Doctor Hall, the committeeman from Nebraska, said 
that he had a letter from ^Ir. Bryan in which ^Ir. 
Bryan stated that he was not a candidate, did not want 
to be nominated and would not allow his name to be 
used Doctor Hall started to bring forth the letter, 
but felt the restraining hand of some of the Bryan 
supporters. 

It was indeed a situation that might well have 
pleased Mr. Bryan, because he had wedged himself in 
as the central figure and had been cast in the role 
again of the "Gladiator Against Wall Street". 

A relatively small position, that of Temporary 
Chairman, the only qualifications of which were that 
the person be a well-known man and a good speaker, 
had become the center of a storm. The whole trouble 
could have been averted if Mr. IMurphy of New York 
had accepted Senator O'Gorman as Temporary Chair- 
man. O' Gorman was not accepted for the reason that 
at a meeting of the National Committee early in 
March his name had been suggested by John T. 
McGraw of West Virginia, a Wilson man. IMr. 
Murphy would not allow it to go through because he 
had not been consulted first about Senator O'Gorman. 

[ 123 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

At that time there was no feeling between Murphy 
and O' Gorman. 

On June 24th, Brj^an arrived in Baltimore. He 
was received with great acclaim. His personal popu- 
larity was at once apparent. He was called on by 
delegates to the convention. It was obvious that there 
was a grim determination on the part of the Eastern 
and Southern states to prevent his nomination in any 
event. To me, that sounded like security. The con- 
clusion was obvious that at some time during the con- 
vention the delegates might feel themselves compelled 
to accept Wilson instead of Bryan. 

As one Pennsylvania delegate said in conversation 
with a New York delegate: 

"You'll take Wilson, or we'll jam Bryan down your 
throat"! 

Later on, vvhen asked about the Temporary Chair- 
manship, Mr. Bryan said: 

"I have declined to accept it and shall not present 
my name for the place". Asked if he were a candidate 
for the Presidential nomination, he replied: 

"Be patient! Hush! Wait! There is no hurry" ! 

The so-called Conservative element was becoming 
unpopular. Wilson delegates were arriving in large 
numbers. We were pouring publicity on them. The 
Wilson delegates in groups of two were going about 
among the delegations with the Wilson propaganda. 
Their manner was one of good nature rather than 
bitter partisanship. Our strength was not great 
enough to be violently against any candidate, and such 
a stand was bad on general principles. 

[ 124 ] 



McCOMBS' ORGANIZATION 

The fury of the Temporary Chairmanship fight on 
the 24.th grew apace. 

Tuesday, the 25th, was the deciding day. The 
National Committee endorsed the action of the sub- 
committee. Judge Parker received 31 votes. Ollie 
James, behind whom the Wilson forces united, received 
20 votes. The Clark followers went to Judge Parker. 

The charge was made that the Clark votes were pur- 
chased by promise of support. It went out through 
the country. This was most unfortunate for Mr. 
Clark, because many of his delegates were not tied up 
for many ballots under instruction. 

Bryan was furious. Senator James said he would 
not accept the nomination for Temporary Chairman 
from the convention as he was for Clark first, last, and 
all the time. This was construed as an indication of a 
Clark alliance with the anti-Bryan leaders. A large 
section of the press construed Judge Parker's success 
in the committee as a combination of Underwood, 
Clark and Harmon followers to defeat Governor 
Wilson at all hazards. 

After the result in the committee I said: 

"I do not think the result of the vote on the Tem- 
porary Chairmanship in the National Committee will 
have any effect on Wilson's chances. We were for a 
Progressive for Chairman, and we are still for a Pro- 
gressive. We accepted a Clark man and voted for 
him. The result may be reversed in the convention. 
Even if it is not, it will not show that the reactionaries 
are in control. Some delegates may have voted for 
Parker because of personal friendship, and some 

[ 125 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

because of a desire to support the National Committee 
as a matter of regularity". 

On the 26th of June the convention assembled. 
Mr. Bryan made a personal appeal that he instead of 
Judge Parker be made Temporary Chairman, and 
designated Parker as the "candidate of the predatory 
Wall Street interests". 

Mr. Bryan played his card magnificently, even 
though he lost by a vote of 579 to 510. lie got a vote 
which attested strongly to his personal popularity. 
Those 510 votes, at the moment they were delivered, 
represented to my mind 510 potential Wilson votes. 
When it came to a fight on the floor, half of the Clark 
delegates could not be delivered to Judge Parker. 
That was significant. Undervx^ood and Harmon were 
temporarily driven into obscurity. 

The Clark interests were paying heavily for the 
imputation of a deal. Bryan put Kern in nomination 
for Temporary Chairman, and it is said that Kern was 
willing to retire if Judge Parker would. This was all 
lost in the din and confusion. Although those who 
were near Mr. Bryan could not fail to be impressed 
by his masterly effort, it was lost on the crowd. Then 
Bryan nominated himself. 

Delegates were rushing to the platform to speak. 
Everything was in confusion. 

The roll was called: Parker 579, Bryan 510, O'Gor- 
man 3, Kern 1. 

The Wilson delegates stood almost solidly for 
Bryan. 

Mr. Parker, taking the chair, made an able speech. 

[ 126 ] 



McCOMBS' ORGANIZATION 

It was conciliatory in tone. Xo exception could be 
taken to it by Conservative or Radical. It was 
received almost formally. The Temporary Chairman- 
ship incident Avas gone. 

A^Hiat stood out was that Judge Parker would not 
have succeeded but for the Clark support in the con- 
vention. That was the opening wedge for driving into 
the heart of the Clark movement. 

Many Clark leaders believed that Brj^an was in 
sight, and that the Conservative element would rush 
immediatel}^ to Clark's sux)port. Predictions were 
made that he would win on the first or second ballot. 
]My conclusion was that Clark was definitely out of the 
race, and could under no circumstances get a two- 
thirds vote in the convention. 



[ 127 ] 



X 

THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

McCoMBs Secures Abrogation op the Unit Rule — Murphy, 
Taggart, Sullivan, et al Ignore the Injunction — 
Bryan Demands Withdrawal of Ryan and Belmont as 
Delegates — Calls Them "Money-Trust Despots" • — 
Clark Receives a Majority Vote on Tenth Ballot, but 
Not the Necessary Two-thirds — Chairman James is 
Accused of Trying to Stampede the Convention for 
Clark. 

[Editor's Note — From this point in the narrative, the story 
of the Wilson campaign will be a compilation from notes 
which Mr. McCombs left and which have been put together 
with as much care as possible.] 

ON THE afternoon of June 26, 1912, the 
century-old unit rule was smashed. This 
feat was accomplished by another combina- 
tion of the Wilson men, led by Mr. McCombs, and the 
Bryan men, led by Mr. Bryan. 

Under the unit rule the vote of every individual 
delegate was cast for the candidate declared for by a 
majority of his s'tate colleagues. Of course, many 
delegations were absolutely dominated by the state 
bosses. Charles F. Murphy, for instance, assumed 
power to cast the solid 90 votes from New York, not 
only for any candidate he desired, but for any proposi- 
tion that suited him. 

[ 128] 



THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

Roger C. Sullivan threw the 58 votes of Illinois as 
he pleased. Thomas T. Taggart threw the 30 from 
Indiana as he chose, while E. IT. IMoore sought to 
handle the 48 from Ohio in a similar way, according 
to his o^^^l plans. 

Twenty of the New York delegates were at heart 
for Wilson. Nineteen from Ohio, a few from Illinois, 
Indiana and other states, whose delegates were used 
by the anti-Wilson bosses as "rubber stamps", also 
desired to vote for the New Jersey Governor. Bound 
by the iron unit rule riveted at state convention or 
caucus, they were forced to be mere mute automatons. 
During ballot after ballot, they were held for the one 
candidate whose nomination they opposed. 

McCombs saw in the abrogation of the vrnit rule a 
chance to break the anti-Wilson strangle hold on dele- 
gates who voted en hloc. 

He called a conference of all the Wilson leaders. 
Newton D. Baker, afterward Secretary of War, rep- 
resented Ohio; A. IMitchell Palmer, afterward Attor- 
ney General, and James M. Guffey, Pennsylvania; 
Senator James A. O'Gorman, William G. jMcxVdoo, 
John B. Stanchfield, J. Sergeant Cram, Herman 
Bidder, and others. New York; Robert S. Huds- 
peth, New Jersey; Josephus Daniels, afterward 
Secretary of the Navy, North Carolina, and Mr. 
Bryan and his brother, Charles W., Nebraska. 

It was determined at this conference that the report 
of the majority of the Committee on Rules permitting 
the leader of a delegation to cast every vote for his 
personal choice, should be beaten. A minority report, 

[ 129 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

submitted by Mr. Baker, of Ohio, declaring that each 
delegate should be upheld in supporting his undivided 
preference, was prepared and presented. 

The Murphy-Taggart-Ryan-]Moore- Sullivan com- 
bine fought this bitterly. For hours an acrimonious 
debate raged upon the floor, ' ut by a vote of 5Q5y2 
to 491% the minority report was adopted. 

Triumphant shouts greeted this from the Wilson 
cohorts. Of course, the anti- Wilson men were cha- 
grined. JMurphy, Taggart, IMoore and Sullivan, 
however, persisted in announcing the vote of their 
respective delegations as solid for Clark, Harmon, 
Marshall or Underwood, as if the unit rule convention 
had reaffirmed the unit i-ule. They justified it on the 
ground that there were no challenges from the state 
delegates. 

This defiance of the convention majority provoked 
fury in the delegations where the pro- Wilson votes had 
been suppressed. Many took the advice of McCombs 
and demanded a poll. This furnished a check for each 
delegate publicly to proclaim his choice, no matter how 
often he was delivered for the favorite of his leader. 

[Editor's Note — McCombs continues his narrative here.] 

Probably one of the most tense moments of the 
convention came after its organization. At 8 o'clock 
in the evening of the 26th, ^Mr. Bryan addressed the 
convention in these words : 

"Mr. Chairman, I understand that the rules under 
which we are acting require that the resolutions be 
referred to the Committee on Resolutions. I have a 

[ 130 ] 



THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

resolution which I think ought to be acted upon before 
we begin the nominations. I, therefore, ask unanimous 
consent for its immediate consideration." 

Mr. Bryan, upon unanimous consent, read the 
resolution : 

"Resolved: That in this crisis in our party's career, 
and in our countrj^'s history, this convention sends 
greetings to the people of the United States, and 
assures them that the party of Jefferson and of Jack- 
son is still the champion of popular government and 
equality before the law. As proof of our fidelity to 
the people, we hereby declare ourselves opposed to the 
nomination of any candidate for President who is the 
representative of or under obligation to J. Pierpont 
Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any 
other member of the privilege-hunting and favor- 
seeking class. Be it further 

"Resolved: That we demand the withdrawal from 
this convention of any delegate or delegates constitut- 
ing or representing the above named interests". 

Mr. Belmont and Mr. R3^an were delegates. Mr. 
Morgan, a Republican, Avas not. The convention "VA-as 
immediately thrown into chaos. All rules of parlia- 
mentary procedure were attempted at once to prevent 
the resolution from coming up, and it required a sus- 
pension of the rules and a two-thirds vote for it to be 
passed. 

Mr. Bryan said furthermore: 

"This is an extraordinarj'^ resolution, but extraor- 
dinary conditions need extraordinary remedies. We 
are now engaged in the conduct of a convention that 

[ 131 ] 



/' 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

will place before this country the Democratic nominee, 
and I assume that every delegate in this convention is 
here because he wants that nominee elected. It is in 
order that we may advance the cause of our candidate 
that I present this resolution. 

"There are questions of which a court takes judicial 
notice; and there are subjects upon which we can 
assume that the American people are informed. There 
is not a delegate in this convention who does not know 
that an effort is being made right now to sell the 
Democratic Party into bondage to the predatory 
interests of this nation. It is the most brazen, the most 
insolent, the most impudent attempt that has been 
made in the history of American politics to dominate 
a convention ; stifle the honest sentiment of a people 
and make the nominee the bond-slave of the men who 
exploit the people of this country. 

"I need not tell you that J. Pierpont Morgan, 
Thomas F. Ryan and August Belmont are three of 
the men who are connected with the great money trust 
of this country; who are as despotic in their rule of 
the business of the country, and as merciless in their 
command of their slaves as any men in the country. 

"Some one has suggested that we have no right to 
discuss the delegates who come here from a sovereign 
state. I reply, that if these men are willing to insult 
six and a half million Democrats, we ought to speak 
out against them, and let them know we resent the 
insult. 

"I, for one, am not willing that Thomas F. Ryan 
and August Belmont shall come here, with their paid 

[ 132 ] 



THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

attorneys, and seek secret counsel with the managers 
of this party. And no sense of politeness or courtesy 
to such men will keep me from protecting my party 
from the disgrace that they inflict upon us. 

"]My friends, I cannot speak for you. You have 
your OA\Ti responsibility ; but if this is to be a conven- 
tion run by these men; if our nominee is to be their 
representative and tool, I pray you to give us, who 
represent constituencies that do not want this, a chance 
to go on record with our protest against it. If any of 
you are willing to nominate a candidate who repre- 
sents these men, or who is under obligation to these 
men, do it and take the responsibility. I refuse to take 
that responsibility. 

"Some have said that we have not a right to demand 
the withdrawal of delegates from this convention. T 
will make you a proposition. One of these men sits 
with New York and the other sits with Virginia. If 
the Siate of New York will take a poll of her dele- 
gates, and a majority of them — not Mr. Murphy, but 
a majority of the delegates on a roll call, where her 
delegates can have their names recorded and printed — 
do not ask for the withdrawal of the name of INIr. 
Belmont; and if Virginia will, on a roll call, protest 
against the withdrawal of Mr. Ryan, I will then with- 
draw the last part of the resolution, which demands 
the withdrawal of these men from the convention. I 
will withdraw the last part, on the request of the state 
delegations in which these gentlemen sit; but I will 
not withdraw the first part, which demands that our 
candidate shall be free from entanglement with them". 

[ 133 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Here again Mr. Bryan referred to his six and one- 
half million votes. 

Several of Bryan's friends surged to the platform 
and urged the withdrawal of the duly elected dele- 
gates, Mr. Ryan and Mr. Belmont. He evidently 
saw that the second part of his resolution was a mistake. 

The dashing and brilliant member of the Virginia 
delegation, Henry D. Flood, rushed to the plat- 
form and said: 

"In the name of the sovereign State of Virginia, 
which has 24 votes on this floor, I accept the insolent 
proposition made by the only man in this convention 
who wants to destroy the prospect of Democratic 
success". 

Mr. Price, of Virginia, came to the platform and 
said: 

*'0n behalf of the sovereign State of Virginia, we 
protest as to the latter part of the resolution ; but no 
one will accede more heartily and more thoroughly to 
the first part of the resolution than the State of Vir- 
ginia. Virginia has always been able to control her 
own internal affairs. She has never yet asked aid or 
help from any outside influence. If there are undesir- 
able citizens on the delegation from Virginia, Virginia 
will take that responsibility. 

"Last night, on the Ohio resolution, there were 
only three and one-half Virginia votes against sustain- 
ing the minority report, and to-day, on the Utah reso- 
lution, it was unanimous. Virgmia is able to right her 
wrongs and demand her rights at the hands of this 
convention. Mr. Bryan has very kindly yielded me 

r 134. ] 



THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

this moment, and he A^ill now niiikc his own statement". 

IMr. Bryan was obviously embarrassed by the latter 
part of the resolution. He asked the states of Virginia 
and New York if they were willing to poll their dele- 
gates. Virginia was, but New York was not. 

Finallj^ Bryan abdicated on the latter part of the 
resolution, saying: 

"I now withdraw the latter part of the resolution ; 
but I do not intend that any member of this conven- 
tion shall shield his negative vote, against the prin- 
cipal part of the resolution, by hiding behind the latter 
part of it. I intend that the men who think the first 
part of this resolution is either wrong or unnecessary 
shall have a chance to say so on roll call. 

"In answer to the argument of the gentleman from 
West Virginia (Mr. McCorkle) that this question 
ought not to be brought up now for fear of disturbing 
harmony, I present him the Bible doctrine — and I 
challenge him to deny if he can — 'If thy right hand 
offend thee, cut it off'. I am sure that if it is worth 
while to cut off the right hand to save the body, it is 
worth while to cut off ISIorgan, Ryan and Belmont to 
save the Democratic Party". 

Of course, the latter part of the resolution was the 
only thing that was really offensive. The first part 
was, in effect, a vote by the delegates as to their free- 
dom from malicious influence and an affirmation of 
virtue. Some of our delegations were chafing under 
it, but I sent word to them to that effect. 

A roll call showed the initial part of the resolution 
adopted by this vote: 883 yeas, 201% nays; not vot- 

[ 135 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

ing, 3%. New York voted its entire delegation, Yea. 
Virginia voted its entire delegation, Yea, with the 
exception of %, not voting. 

At the time that Bryan was making his speech, I 
was standing close by him. I looked at him and Mr. 
Murphy alternatelj^ I said to myself: "One of two 
things will happen now. Murphy will sit still, or he 
will do a very brilliant thing: he will eliminate Wilson 
from the contest by voting for him." But he did not 
rise to brilliancy and the convention gradually flooded 
down to normal, while Mr. Bryan cooled himself with 
a palm leaf fan. 

I remember during this Bryan speech, that Fred- 
erick J. Talbott, for many years a member of Con- 
gress and a member of the Democratic National 
Committee, a very old and a very lovable man, but 
withal possessed of strong traits, passed between me 
and ^Ir. Brj^an. He shook his fist in Bryan's face 
and, with the tears streaming down his own, said : 

"Everybody in this convention wants the Democrats 
to win, except you" ! 

"Uncle Fred" was for Wilson. I gently pulled him 
back to his seat and said : 

"Let the man go on; he has got a lot of speeches to 
make, and this one had just as well be made now". 

After the nominating and seconding speeches, con- 
suming from 3 A. M. to 7 a. m., June 28, the first ballot 
was taken. It showed Mr. Clark to have 440%, INIr. 
Wilson 324, Mr. Harmon 148, Mr. Undenvood 
1171/2, Mr. Marshall 31, Mr. Baldwin 22, Mr. Sulzer 
2, and 2 not voting. 

[ 136 ] 



THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

The vote on the first ballot was, of course, exactly 
as expected. It was calculated to a certainty. 

Before the ballot was taken, I went to a leading 
Harmon member of the Ohio delegation. I said that, 
inasmuch as the question of the unit rule had been 
raised, and although it had been defeated, and 19 votes 
could be cast for Mr. Wilson, I regarded it a courte- 
ous thing that the whole vote of the State of Ohio 
should be cast for Mr. Harmon on the first ballot. 
They could state to Wilson delegates in the Ohio dele- 
gation that I was quite willing and would recommend 
such a procedure. 

My idea, in addition to the courtesy, was, that by 
making this generous ofi'er (which I hoped would be 
accepted by the Wilson men), I would need and get 
the Harmon support at some stage in the proceeding. 
We could lend 19 votes for a few ballots, because 
we did not have the necessary one-third of the 
convention at that time. The Wilson delegates, who 
were more strictly anti-Harmon than pro-Wilson, 
in the main, to my disappointment refused to make 
the concession. 

At this juncture the Wilson votes were: DelaAvare, 
6; Louisiana, 9 out of 11; Michigan, 10 out of 30; 
^linnesota, 24; New Jersey, 24 out of 28; North 
Carolina, 161/2 out of 24; North Dakota, 10; Ohio, 10 
out of 48; Oklahoma, 10 out of 20; Oregon, 10; 
Pennsylvania, 71 out of 76; South Carolina, 18; South 
Dakota, 10; Tennessee gave each of the leading can- 
didates, Clark, Wilson, Harmon and Underwood, 6; 
Texas, 40 ; Utah, 6 out of 8 ; Virginia, 0V2 out of 141/^ ; 

[ 137 ] 



]VIAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Wisconsin, 19 out of 26; Hawaii, 3 out of 6; Porto 
Rico, 3 out of 6. Total, 324. 

Mr. Clark secured Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, part of 
Louisiana, part of Maine, Maryland and Massachu- 
setts ; part of Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 1 in 
Ohio, half of Oklahoma, Rhode Island, part of Ten- 
nessee, part of Utah, Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, Wyoming, most of Alaska, District of 
Columbia, part of Hawaii, and Porto Rico. This 
made a total of 440%. It is to be observed that Mr. 
Clark's votes were well spread over the Union; that 
Mr. Harmon's votes were pretty well confined to Ohio 
and New York, with a few scattering votes. Mr. 
Underwood's votes were limited to the South, with a 
few scattering votes elsewhere. It is readily seen that 
the Underwood and Harmon votes, as a class, were 
very nearly identical in nature. They constituted all 
that part of the convention that wished a "safe" can- 
didate. The various Clark delegations were honey- 
combed with men who were really at heart for some 
of the other candidates. 

When we went into the convention, I was confident 
that the greatest potential strength lay in Mr. Under- 
wood's candidacy; that is, the votes could be delivered 
without much persuasion, and speedily. I told our 
floor managers that if we could get by the tenth ballot 
without Mr. Underwood's nomination, he could be 
gradually marooned in the South. INIy theory was, 
that unless the votes were developed quickly for him, 

[ 138 ] 



THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

his managers would take the x^osition of hoping to be 
the residuary legatees of Clark, Wilson or Hamion, 
or all of them. 

I, therefore, advised our Floor Committee not to 
make any attempt to take votes from Mr. Underwood. 
I preferred that his strength in the South should 
remain normal, because votes in his hands were safer 
than elsewhere. I also suggested that we should 
devote our energies to the Clark delegates, in order to 
bring out the Wilson strength that lay among them. 
I was quite sure that the Harmon strength would 
atrophy of itself. 

I knew that Mr. ^Marshall, Mr. Baldwin, and Mr. 
Foss would receive the votes of their states because 
they were their governors, and the delegations pre- 
ferred to wait until things developed. 

But reverting to the Underwood situation: My 
analysis of the convention was that upon quick devel- 
opment, in addition to the delegates that he had, 
Underwood might have had California, a large part of 
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, IMaryland, 
^lassachusetts, New Hampshire, 4 from New Jersey, 
New York, most of Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Vermont, most of Virginia and West Virginia. A 
fair analysis showed that Mr. Harmon's candidacy 
was impossible and Mr. Underwood was the natural 
legatee of this strength. 

Mr. Clark's delegations had a great many Under- 
wood men among them. I reasoned this way on the 
tactics of the situation: I did not have an idea that 
Mr. Clark could be nominated, but I determined to 

[ 139 ] 



V^i 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

pull out the Wilson strength from his delegations as 
quickly as possible, to forestall the same move on the 
part of the Underwood men. I had not much hope of 
the Hamion strength. 

The first night of the convention was long and 
tedious. The nominating speeches were of course long. 
After we took our first ballot, Friday, about 7 a. m., 
we adjourned until 4 p. m. 

Ballot number two showed Clark with a gain of 5. 
Wilson gained 15%. Harmon and underwood lost 
slightly. 

Proselyting tactics continued in the third ballot. 
The result was about the same. 

On the fourth ballot we broke into Connecticut for 
1 vote and into Nebraska for 3. We got several 
scattering delegates which put Wilson up to 351. I 
was aiming at something more than one-third of the 
delegations early, so that we could have a veto power. 
My plan was to pledge and repledge these delegates to 
stand by Wilson, — to cheer them all the time with the 
argument that he could be nominated. This we did 
before and after every session of the convention. 

The result was that we had very few defections. 
I was never fearful of a defection, for I had it ascer- 
tained positively, before each session, that our votes 
would stay with us. That left my mind free to work 
out the problem of accession. 

The sixth, seventh and eighth ballots remained about 
the same all around. So did the ninth. 

On the tenth ballot the fireworks began. New York 
changed its 90 votes from Harmon to Clark. Most of 

[ 140 ] 



THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION 

Tennessee went to Clark. Mr. Harmon Avas deserted. 
The Underwood strength practically remained intact. 
Mr. Clark had 556 votes, or more than a majority. 

The convention was in bedlam. The standards were 
taken from the various delegations. There was a great 
march of the delegates about the hall and over the 
platform. 

To the casual observer, it looked as though jMr. 
Clark was the sure nominee of the convention, for no 
Democrat had ever failed of nomination in a conven- 
tion who had received a majority of its votes (with 
one possible exception) . 

I got word down to the various Wilson delegations 
that were standing like a rock, that this was as high as 
INIr. Clark could possiblj^ go, and that if a majority 
were a prerequisite of nominating him, he would never 
have gotten it. The 90 votes of New York, for 
example, would not have been cast for him if it was 
necessary to give him two-thirds. 

It was clear to me that the move was made to elim- 
inate ]Mr. Wilson. Furthermore, I was sure that the 
Undenvood managers understood the situation and 
would not leave him for Mr. Clark. INIr. Hamion w^as 
out of the race. 

Chairman Ollie James, in announcing the vote, like 
an exhorter at a camp meeting, shouted: 

"No candidate having received two- thirds of the vote 
cast, no nomination is made. IMr. Clark having 
received eleven more than a majority, is not the nom- 
inee until he receives two-thirds." The language was 
considered an exceedingly unfair attempt on the part 

[ 141 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

of Senator James to indicate that it was now the duty 
of the convention to nominate jNIr. Clark. This 
brought forth a violent Wilson protest. 

I was standing with Billy Hughes of New Jersey. 
I called his attention to the perfectly egregious posi- 
tion which Chairman James was taking to implore the 
convention, under the stimulus of a wave, to give the 
two-thirds to Clark. Hughes was one of James' 
closest friends. He said: "I will fix him"! 

Hughes went to the desk and said to James: "There 
is a movement among the delegates to depose you as 
Chairman because of such unparliamentary tactics". 

The effect on Chairman James was instantaneous. 
After that he was indulgent and polite to a degree. 

After the Clark demonstration, we gave the word 
for a Wilson demonstration. Again bedlam broke 
forth. Sentiment in the gallery was pronouncedly 
with Governor Wilson. 



[ 142 ] 




XI 

WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG 

Begs McCombs to Withdraw His Name as a Presidential 
Candidate — McCombs Replies: "You Bet Your Life, 
I Won't" ! — Other Instances of Wilson's Trying to 
Quit When He Feared Defeat — Bryan Excoriates 
Murphy and "Subtlety" — Swings to Wilson. 

;^ ARLY FRIDAY, June 28, I was apprised 
that Senator William J. Stone, manager for 
Champ Clark, had sent a telegram to Gov- 
ernor Wilson, at Sea Girt, insisting that he withdraw. 
The message urged that never in the history of the 
Democratic Party had a Democratic candidate, receiv- 
ing a majority of the votes in a convention, failed of a 
nomination. The IMissourian argued that it was use- 
less for Governor Wilson to continue in the field, and 
that his nomination was impossible. Therefore, it was 
his patriotic duty to quit. 

The moment I learned of the Stone message, I 
called up Governor Wilson. He admitted having 
received the Stone telegram, and added: "Governor 
Stone's logic is correct. You are authorized to with- 
draw my name from further consideration". 

I begged the Governor, if only to protect his sup- 
porters, to abandon such an idea. I pleaded that 

[ 143 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

thousands of members of his party had risked their 
political and financial lives for him. He owed it to 
them to stick as long as thej^ would stick. 

The Governor seemed obdurate and I rang off. 

About 2 A. M., Saturday, I was sitting alongside of 
Chairman James on the convention hall platform. 
Walter W. Vick handed me a message. It had come 
by 'phone to our headquarters at the Hotel Emerson, 
and had been relayed from there. 

I was engaged in reforming our lines and did not 
inspect the message promptly enough to suit Vick. 
Pale, and apparently alarmed, Vick begged me to read 
the paper. 

It was another message from Governor Wilson. It 
again insisted that I take him out of the race. He 
specifically directed me to release the delegates who 
had been voting for him. 

I was thoroughly enraged. I felt that if loyal Wil- 
son men were willing to fight to the last for the Gov- 
ernor, he at least might maintain his nerve and stand 
with them. I also had an abiding faith that he was to 
be nominated, though Clark still had a majority, but 
not the necessary two-thirds. 

Turning to Vick, I said: "The Governor wants to 
withdraw" ! 

"You won't let him now, will you" ? inquired Vick. 

"You bet your life I won't" ! I answered. "Not a 
word about this to anyone", I added. 

I tucked the Governor's instructions into my pocket. 
They remained there until the convention nominated 
him. That act of itself made history, for which I hope 

[ 144 ] 



WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG 

to be forgiven. Had the contents of that message 
become noised about that convention hall, Woodrow 
Wilson would never have been President of the United 
States. There would have been a stampede to Clark, 
and he and not Wilson would have been nominated. 

My position was that Governor Wilson was not 
through vmtil he was "Imocked out". He owed it to 
his friends, if not to himself, to remain in the figiit 
until the finish. 

As I, suffering from loss of sleep, fought to hold the 
Wilsonian delegates, I could not help recalling other 
occasions when Wilson would have destroyed himself 
but for my interposition. 

I had known him to be subject to frequent panics 
and overweening pride. I learned, from many experi- 
ences, that Wilson was the boldest man when victory 
was near and the first to withdraw when defeat 
threatened. 

When we lost the Illinois primaries by an over- 
whelming majority to Champ Clark, Governor Wilson 
in alarm despatched a Princeton professor to me. He 
said: 

*'The Governor feels it is useless for him to remain 
longer in the field. He authorizes me to say to you 
that he wishes to withdraw from the contest for the 
Presidential nomination. He desires to do this grace- 
fully now, so as to avoid the humiliation of defeat". 

My reply was: "My good Professor, please tell the 
Governor that you saw me, and that I said that he 
should consider others than himself. He should 
remember that a lot of peoi)le may fare worse than he 

[ 145 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

because they have given up their time and their money 
and risked their political future in his cause. He will 
have to debate it with me and give a better argument 
before I will listen". I never heard from the Professor 
again. 

When the Governor passed Clark and secured a 
majority of the delegates himself, he called me on the 
'phone and said: "I was wrong and you were right. 
My eternal gi-atitude to you. You knew the situation. 
I did not. I shall never forget your loyalty and your 
courage". 

After getting Governor Wilson's instructions to 
withdraw, and forgetting them, the Governor called 
me up again and asked if I had made public a message 
to Mr. Bryan agreeing that no candidate should 
accept the support of Charles F. Murphy. 

"No, but we have secured enough delegates to nom- 
inate you since you sent the note, Governor", I rej)lied. 

"That's fine! That's fine! I thank you most pro- 
foundly", added the Governor. 

On the eleventh ballot, an incident occurred which 
was small, apparently, in significance, but proved to 
be of great value. Mr. Ives, of Arizona, changed his 
vote to Wilson. Mr. Clark receded 2 and ^Ir. Wilson 
gained 4. 

On the following ballot Mr. Clark lost a few votes 
again. Evidentlj^ the managers of Mr. Clark were 
quite willing to stand where they were at this time. I 
very much doubted the wdsdom of it, but from their 
viewpoint they had lost very few votes, and by one of 
those fortuitous events of a convention might arouse 

[ 146 ] 



WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG 

further enthusiasm. We were quite willing to adjourn 
and look for weaknesses in our delegations and develop 
further strength if possible. 

The adjournment was at 3 o'clock Saturday morn- 
ing, June 29th, until 1 p. m. During this and the 
previous night not a single one of the Wilson man- 
agers had taken off his clothes. 

As I walked out of the hall I was sure that the 
Clark candidacy was gone. Again, it was possible to 
cast his strength to INIr. Underwood or some other 
candidate. If the late Mayor Ga\Tior of New York 
ever had a chance in the convention it was at this 
moment, when by moving New York and a few other 
states to him a real sentiment might have been built up. 

At the end of the session the floor leaders were 
desperately tired. Six or eight of us went over to the 
Belvidere Hotel and woke up a sleeping waiter. We 
had arrived at that state of exhaustion where neither 
food nor drink appealed to us. After sitting for ten 
or fifteen minutes, in some strange way watermelon 
occurred to me. I said: 

"Gentlemen, in celebration of the forthcoming nom- 
ination of Woodrow Wilson in this convention, I wish 
you to join me in raising to our lips luscious, red, 
Georgia watermelon". 

That was all we had. We analyzed the vote, studied 
the tactics of the situation and planned the next session 
until about 7 o'clock in the morning. 

Of course, the first move was to reassure and 
repledge our delegations. 

I got out my long book, showing the utmost Clark 
[ 147 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

strength. I told m^ friends that I could reach that 
Clark was through. 

After a long discussion of ways and means and the 
delegations we desired to secure, I concluded that the 
first thing to do was to pledge every Wilson delegation 
for the day. This was agreed to, with the exception of 
one leader of giant physique, who left the room saying 
he was an "opportunist'* (Frederick B. Lynch, of 
Minnesota [Ed.]). 

Saturday found all our delegations well tightened 
up and safe. It was clear that the best thing was to 
carry through the general Clark "potting" process, 
turn every Bryan move to our advantage, and watch 
for some tactical change. 

The opening ballot, at 1 o'clock p.m., showed a 
Clark loss of a few votes and a Wilson p. m. gain of 
a few. Governor Foss of Massachusetts for the first 
time entered with two votes. 

On the fourteenth ballot Nebraska asked to be 
passed. Nebraska then asked to be polled. When the 
name of Mr. Bryan was reached he said: 

"As long as Mr. Ryan's agent, as long as New 
York's 90 votes are recorded for ]Mr. Clark, I withhold 
my vote from him and cast it" 

At this point there was a demonstration. 

Senator Stone requested that Mr. Bryan be heard, 
and asked unanimous consent, which was agreed to. 

Mr. Bryan resumed: 

"The vote of the State of New York in this conven- 
tion, as cast under the unit rule, does not represent the 
intelligence, the virtue, the Democracy or the patriot- 

[ 148 ] 



WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG 

ism of the 90 men who are here. It represents the 
will of one man — Charles F. JMurphy — and he rep- 
resents the influences that dominated the Republican 
convention at Chicago and are trying to dominate this 
convention. If we nominate a candidate under con- 
ditions that enable these influences to say to our can- 
didate, 'Remember now thy Creator', we cannot hope 
to appeal to the confidence of the progressive Demo- 
crats and Republicans of the nation. Nebraska, or 
that portion of the delegation for vvhich I am author- 
ized to speak, is not willing to participate in the nom- 
ination of any man who is willing to violate the 
resolution adopted by this convention, and to accept 
the high honor of the Presidential nomination at the 
hands of Mr. INIurphy. 

"When we were instructed for Mr. Clark, the 
Democratic voters who instructed us did so with the 
distinct understanding that IMr. Clark stood for pro- 
gressive Democracy. IMr. Clark's representatives' 
appealed for support on no other ground. They con- 
tended that Mr. Clark was more progressive than ]Mr. 
Wilson, and indignantly denied that there was any 
co-operation between IMr. Clark and the reactionary 
element of the party. Upon no other condition could 
Mr. Clark have received a plurality of the Democratic 
vote of Nebraska. 

"The thirteen delegates for whom I speak stand 
ready to carrj'' out the instructions given in the spirit 
in which they were given, and upon the conditions 
under which they were given ; but some of these dele- 
gates — I cannot say for how many I can speak, 

[ 149 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

because we have not had a chance to take a poll — will 
not participate in the nomination of any man whose 
nomination depends upon the vote of the New York 
delegation. 

"I shall withhold my vote from Mr. Clark as long as 
New York's vote is recorded for him. And the posi- 
tion that I take in regard to IMr. Clark I will take in 
regard to any other candidate whose name is now or 
may be before the convention. I shall not be a party 
to the nomination of any man who will not, when 
elected, be absolutely free to carry out the anti-Mor- 
gan-Ryan- Belmont resolution and make his adminis- 
tration reflect the wishes and hopes of those who 
believe in a government of the people, by the people 
and for the people. 

"If we nominate a candidate who is under no obli- 
gation to these interests which speak through Mr. 
Murphy, I shall offer a resolution authorizing and 
directing the Presidential candidate to select a cam- 
paign committee to manage the campaign, in order 
that he may not be compelled to suffer the humiliation 
and act under the embarrassment that I have, in hav- 
ing men participate in the management of his cam- 
paign who have no sympathy with the party's aims, 
and in whose Democracy the general public has no 
confidence. 

"Having explained the position taken by myself 
and those in the delegation who view the subject from 
the same standpoint, I will now announce my vote" — 

Governor McCorkle, of West Virginia, asked Mr. 
Bryan whether he intended to be understood that he 

[ 150 ] 



WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG 

would not supj)ort the nominee of the convention if he 
were voted for and nominated by the vote of the State 
of New York in the convention. 

Mr. Bryan replied : 

"I distinguish between refusing to be a party to the 
nomination of a candidate and refusing to support 
him. 

*'Now I am prepared to announce my vote, unless 
again interrupted. With the understanding that I 
shall stand ready to withdraw my vote from the one 
for whom I am going to cast it, whenever New York 
casts her vote for him, I cast my vote for Nebraska's 
second choice. Governor Wilson". 

The result of the Nebraska poll showed 12 for Wil- 
son and 4 for Clark. 

Mr. Bryan's subtlety was apparent. The only con- 
struction that could be placed upon it was that he was 
seeking the nomination for himself. Mr. Clark had 
about one-half of the convention. Mr. Wilson lacked 
nearly 100 votes of a majority. By the accession of 
certain Bryan strength in the Clark delegations, Mr. 
Clark and INIr. Wilson could be brought up to about 
even numbers. 

For months reports had come to me that it was Mr. 
Bryan's personal desire that this be the case in the 
Baltimore convention. Indeed, I had direct reports 
from Wisconsin and other states that he wished the 
delegations to be divided between Wilson and Clark, 
the reasoning being that a deadlock between these two 
delegations would produce enough strength in the 

[ 151 ] 



]MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

event of a breakup to nominate him. Mr. Bryan 
began to feel that the Clark strength was too great. 

Governor Brewer, of Mississippi, propounded this 
question to Mr. Bryan: 

"If Mr. Clark, Mr. Underwood, Mr. Marshall, Mr. 
Wilson, Mr. Harmon, Mr. Kern, or Governor Foss is 
nominated by this convention by a two-thirds major- 
ity, with New York voting for the man who is nom- 
inated, will you support the Democratic nominee"? 

Mr. Bryan replied: 

"I deny the right of any man to put a hypothetical 
question to me, unless he is prepared to put into that 
question every essential element that is necessary to be 
understood before it can be answered intelligently. I 
have no expectation that any nomination in this con- 
vention will be secured in any way, or under any 
conditions, that will prevent my giving" 

Mr. Bryan was interrupted, but continuing, said: 

"I expect to support the nominee of this conven- 
tion. I do not expect anyone to be nominated here 
who will not deserve the support of the Democratic 
Party. I do not expect anyone to be nominated who 
would permit a partnership between IMorgan, Hyan, 
Belmont and himself. But I do not consider myself 
under obligations to give bond to answer the question 
categorically until the conditions arise when I can 
know what I am answering" ! 

On the fourteenth ballot jMr. Wilson made a further 
gain. Mr. Underwood began to sink. 

On the sixteenth ballot Idaho asked to be polled, 
with accessions of two for Wilson. The unit rule was 

[ 152 ] 



WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG 

applied. We considered the polling of delegations, at 
frequent intervals, although boimd by the unit rule, 
tended strongly to show Wilson strength in the delega- 
tions and a desire to change. This tactic was used to 
bolster up the enthusiasm that we already had, and to 
continue the solidity of our delegations. I gave them 
distinct hope that at some time, the delegations which 
asked to be polled, and which showed unkno\Mi Wilson 
strength, would ultimately break over. I regarded it 
as of tremendous psychological value. 

On the seventeenth ballot Tennessee asked to be 
polled. The poll showed Mr. Clark was being 
deserted, and an attempt was being made to shift the 
strength from him to Underwood. This was offset by 
further accessions to the Wilson camp. 

The nineteenth ballot showed about the same con- 
ditions. 

On the twentieth ballot Mr. Clark sank to 512, and 
Mr. Wilson went from 358 to 388. 

On the twenty-first ballot, the State of Washington 
asked to be polled, and 21/2 votes were declared for 
Mr. Wilson. The Washington delegation was very 
tightlj^ controlled by Hugh R. Wallace and Judge 
Turner. As soon as I found that 2^/^ votes could be 
relied on in that delegation I had the fact brought out 
by the poll. Wyoming then asked to be polled. It 
showed 2 votes for Mr. Wilson. The whole 6 votes 
had theretofore been cast for Mr. Clark. The unit 
rule applied, but the sentiment was shown. 

On the next ballot Mr. Wilson went to 359%, with 
Mr. Clark do'WTi to 508. IMr. Francis, of Missouri, 

[ 153 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

moved for an adjournment. The motion was defeated. 
We were on the up grade. 

On the twenty-second ballot, Massachusetts changed 
its vote to 2 for Clark and 34 for Foss. Vermont cast 
its 8 votes for Foss. The Clark vote was lessened, 
while the Wilson vote remained practically stationary. 

On the twenty-third ballot Clark slipped a few 
votes, r'hile Mr. Wilson gained a few. Mr. Foss 
received 45. 

The next ballot showed no important change except 
that Mr. Foss lost 2, While Mr. Clark gained. 

The sharpshooters were at work. 

After consultation with one of the Wilson leaders 
I concluded that it was about time to poll the Iowa 
delegation. The result showed 9 for Wilson and 17 
for Clark. The unit rule prevailed, but the strength 
was shown. The psychology was apparent. Governor 
Wilson got an accession of 3^2 votes. 

At this point Senator Stone made a very adroit 
suggestion : 

"I ask the unanimous consent of this convention to 
the following agreement, — that after two additional 
ballots, the candidate receiving the smallest number of 
votes be dropped, and after the next ballot thereafter 
the candidate receiving the smallest vote on that ballot 
be dropped, and so on until the last ballot ; and that on 
that ballot the candidate receiving the greatest number 
of votes be declared the nominee of the convention". 

The introduction of this motion required unanimous 
consent. Objection was made. The motion was never 
put. Its object, however, was apparent. 

r 154 ] 



WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG 

Mr. Marshall would have disappeared, Mr. Foss 
would have disappeared, Mr. Underwood would have 
disappeared, leaving the contest between Wilson and 
Clark. Senator Stone no doubt thought that JNIassa- 
chusetts would return to Mr. Clark, that Indiana 
would go for him, and that the Underwood vote might 
follow. There was every reason to believe that this 
would be true. 

^Ir. Clark was getting into desperate straits. If the 
Wilson managers had not been alert, the motion might 
possibly have been put. But whether they objected 
or not, I am confident that the Underwood managers 
would have objected, because there is every reason to 
believe that they still hoped to be residuary legatees of 
the convention. 

On the very next ballot Mr. Clark dropped 27 
votes. Governor Wilson's vote remained about the 
same. 

Wilson sentiment had begim to work on the IMary- 
land delegation. A poll showed 12 votes for Clark, 
2% votes for Wilson and 1^2 not voting. These tac- 
tics had been winning votes for us right along. l^Hier- 
ever we could get a poll we demanded it. I resolved 
to keep up the practice as a continuous performance. 

But let me revert to the Washington delegation. 

When I began seeking an entry into that delegation 
for the purposes of a poll, I thought that the intellec- 
tual polish of Governor Wilson miglit appeal to 
women. Washington had a woman on its delegation. 
I accordingly selected the two most suave and hand- 
some men that we had to lay siege to the lady. They 

[ 155 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

were present Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson 
and Joseph E. Davies, now Commissioner of Corpora- 
tions. In the various lulls I could observe these two 
on their way back to the Washington delegation 
straightening their ties, smoothing their hair and pre- 
paring to give first-class imitations of gallants and 
cavaliers. 

The lady was fat and of stern appearance. They 
would spend ten or fifteen minutes with her and come 
away with every appearance of being complete misogy- 
nists. Nevertheless, I cheered them on. The lady 
was not susceptible. She voted for Clark until the 
very last ballot. Whether this gives any light on the 
question of women in politics I do not know. It is 
merely mentioned here for what it is worth, and as an 
incident. 

Shortly before the twenty-sixth ballot I had a con- 
ference with ]Mr. Burleson and JMr. Palmer. We con- 
cluded that we had about reached our strength for the 
time being. It was about 10 o'clock at night. We 
concluded an attempt at adjournment. Sunday was 
approaching. We went to the Clark and Underwood 
managers. They agreed that one more ballot should 
be taken and that then we should adjourn. 

At that time the weary delegates were standing in 
the aisles, waiting for an adjournment, glad to get out 
of the heat. The adjournment was taken. The con- 
vention was next to be in session at 11 o'clock IVIonday 
morning. 

Mr. McCombs' narrative again suddenly stops. 

From notes of his own and data supplied for the 
[ 156 ] 



WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG 

book by Walker W. Vick and others, it seems that 
there was a breach of agreement or serious and almost 
fatal misunderstanding between Mr. McCombs and 
Senator Stone as to just when adjournment should 
become effective. 

This provoked a quarrel between Mr. McCombs and 
Mr. Palmer, head of the Pennsjdvania delegation, 
which did not heal for a long time. 

According to the scattered manuscript, the twenty- 
sixth ballot had hardly been completed when Mr. 
McCombs hurried to Roger C. Sullivan, chairman of 
the Illinois delegation. 

"Now, Roger, this is your chance" ! said McCombs. 
"You can name the next President on the next ballot. 
Hurry up"! 

"All right, Billie, I'll call my delegation together", 
replied Sullivan, as he gathered his Illinoisans in a 
side room. 

Wlien the Prairie State delegates got together, 
McCombs uttered a fervent appeal. He said: 

"Clark has shot his bolt. He never again can get a 
majority, much less two-thirds. Harmon has with- 
drawTi. Underwood will soon be out of it. Compro- 
mise on a dark horse is impossible. If Illinois will 
come in, she will get the credit for naming the winner". 

A controversy followed. Ultra-Clark men insisted 
that all was not over with their favorite. Sullivan, 
himself, was skeptical if it were the psychological 
moment to desert the Missourian. 

"Act quick, Roger! They are calling the roll", 
pleaded McCombs, in a frenzy. 

[ 157 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Sullivan directed a poll of his delegation. To the 
delight of McCombs, and the astonishment of Sulli- 
van, it showed 40 for Wilson and only 18 for Clark. 

Under the unit rule, Sullivan would be authorized 
to cast the entire 58 votes for Wilson. 

"I'll throw the whole delegation to Wilson on next 
ballot, Billie", said Sullivan to McCombs, as the two, 
followed by the Illinois contingent, flocked back to the 
convention hall. 

McCombs was amazed, on reaching the auditorium, 
to discover hundreds of delegates streaming out. The 
band was playing "Good Night, Ladies". 

"What does this mean"? demanded McCombs, in 
tones of mingled surprise and disgust. 

"Adjourned until Monday" ! yelled someone. 

"Who ordered this"? shouted McCombs, in wrath. 

"Don't know% but the Clark men put it over", was 
the response. 

Mr. McCombs, amid the uproar, ascertained that 
while he was corraling the Illinois delegation. Senator 
Stone and A. Mitchell Palmer had put their heads 
together. 

"Everybody is hungry and tired. We want food 
and sleep. Let's quit now until Monday", said the 
cunning Stone to Palmer in McCombs' absence from 
the floor. 

Palmer, exhausted and discouraged, suspected no 
trap. 

"All right. Governor, make your motion to adjourn 
and I will not oppose it", he answered the Clark 
manager. 

[ 158 ] 



WILSON HOISTS THE WHITE FLAG 

McCombs sought Palmer. In a fury he exclaimed : 

"Why did you agree to this adjourmiient? The 
compact was for one more ballot before we quit". 

"I regarded it useless for us to continue to-nig'ht 
and believed we could get more votes for Wilson on 
Monday", was the replj"^ of the Quaker from the 
Keystone State. 

"I had it all fixed with Roger Sullivan to bring his 
whole brood to Wilson on the next ballot. You have 
*gummed the cards', — maybe ruined our chance to 
win", IMcCombs shouted in rage. 

"I knew nothing about Illinois. I was busy on the 
floor holding our people in line" ! was Palmer's meek 
reply. 

"Why not consult me once in a while? I am run- 
ning the Wilson campaign, and took the job before 
I ever heard of you", retorted McCombs. 

"Await orders from me hereafter" ! was his parting 
shot at Palmer. 

IMcCombs, who had had little or no sleep for seventy- 
two hours, dashed back to the Belvidere. He issued 
a hurrj^ call for all his counsellors. 

"It's a shameful mess and Mitchell Palmer got us 
into it. But we have twenty-four hours to clear it 
up", said McCombs to his adjutants. 



[ 159 ] 



XII 
BRYAN UNMASKS 

In Deshabille, He Beseeches McCombs to Desert Wilson 
AND Nominate Him — The Petition Spurned Indignantly 
— Mitchell Palmer's Plan Thwarted — Mayor Gaynor 
Bowled Out — Murphy Says "Let Caucus Decide" — 
Wilson Leads Clark for the First Time — James Orders 
Anti-Unit Rule Enforced — Almost a Death-Blow to 
Clark. 

[Editor's Note — McCombs' narrative is here resumed.] 

T BECAME apparent that we must get into 
Sunday in order to maintain our strength, which 
was about 60 votes behind Clark. I suggested 
to Daniel F. Cohalan, of New York, that he should 
get as early an adjournment as possible so as to go 
into Sunday for recruiting. He and I went to Senator 
Stone. Stone agreed to a meeting at 11 o'clock p. M. 
We then went along with the voting sagging back and 
forth, and finally got up to within 40 votes of Clark, 
Harmon and Underwood hanging back in the rear 
with 110 and 117 votes, respectively. 

While they were counting the last ballot before the 
adjournment, I was informed by one of my special 
messengers that IMr. Clark was on the way to the con- 
vention to appear personally in answer to Brj^an's 
speech. While many disagree with me, and I am told 

[ 160 ] 



BRYAN UNMASKS 

most of Clark's friends did, he was on the way to the 
Convention Hall, and close by, when we were near the 
end of counting the last ballot before the agreed 
adjournment. 

It was my view that Mr. Clark should be allowed to 
come on the stage at all hazards. I reasoned that, 
while the attack may have been justified, he would 
commit suicide so far as the convention was concerned. 
I rushed several members do^^Tl, including Senator 
Hughes, of New Jersey, to tell Senator Stone that we 
were willing to take another ballot. The purpose of 
that was to allow IMr. Clark time to get on the floor. 
However, the delegates were drifting into the aisles, 
and going away, and my messengers were wholly 
unable to reach Senator Stone. Therefore, the count 
on that ballot was completed, the convention w^as 
adjourned, and Mr. Clark, too, departed. 

I have always regretted that this dramatic incident 
did not take place. Purelj^ as a dramatic incident, it 
would have filled the night ! In my opinion, it would 
have fixed the convention for Mr. Wilson perma- 
nently. However, I returned to my hotel, went to my 
room, bathed, and put on a fresh suit to work through 
the night. 

At this stage, Mr. Bryan was permitted among us 
by his speech for Wilson, although he had delivered 
only 18 votes. We had about as much of Bryanism 
as the convention could endure. 

Nevertheless, about midnight, Mr. Bryan's brother 
Charles came to my room, which was at the other end 
of the hall from Mr. Brj^an's room, and asked if I 

[161 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

would have a talk with Mr. Bryan. I said, "Of 
course" ! 

I appeared in a few moments, as fresh as a man 
might be who had been at work since 8 in the morning. 

Friends who were in Mr. Bryan's room disappeared 
instantly. We were alone. He was standing in a 
corner, with his side face to me. His appearance was 
very grim. His mouth looked like a mouth that has 
been created by a slit of a razor. He was clad in a 
brown undershirt, baggy black trousers and a pair of 
carpet slippers. His hair was ruffled. 

Mr. Bryan turned to me and, greeting me briskly, 
said: 

"McCombs, you know that Wilson cannot be nom- 
inated. I know that Clark cannot be nominated. You 
must turn your forces to a progressive Democrat like 
me", placing a forefinger vigorously on his chest. 

I replied with great moderation, because I did not 
want him to have a chance to break out again : 

"Mr. Bryan, you have been in national politics 
longer than I have ; but Mr. Wilson has entrusted me 
with the management of his campaign in Baltimore. I 
told him before I left Sea Girt that I would rise or fall 
with his fortunes. We have not fallen" ! and I rapidly 
left the room. 

Mr. Bryan was in a rage. I had secured the true 
Bryan position, which I had suspected since in March 
of 1912, namely, — to create an equal Wilson and 
Clark strength, break through the middle and get the 
nomination. This suspicion came to me early in 
March, when several mid-Western leaders, or their 

[ 162 ] 



BRYAN UNMASKS 

representatives, told me that Mr. Bryan had suggested 
that they divide their state delegations equally between 
Wilson and Clark, I at once concluded that Mr. 
Bryan was a candidate on the "break through the 
middle" theory. I told them to go back home and get 
as many delegates as they could for Wilson ; that they 
would be our delegates when they got to Baltimore 
and would not shift to anyone else. 

Sunday I got busy among the Illinois, Indiana, 
]Michigan, IMaryland and other delegations. That day 
a very astonishing event happened. At the house of 
the brother-in-law of A. Mitchell Palmer (later Attor- 
ney General), there met Messrs. Palmer, of Pennsyl- 
vania, and Burleson, of Texas, both of our forces; 
Judge Cohalan, Mr, INIurphy, of New York, and IMr. 
Sullivan, of Illinois. I knew of the event within 
twenty minutes after the meeting began. 

The purpose on the face of it was to come to a con- 
clusion as to a candidate, pretending to be for Under- 
wood, but really being for Palmer. I had made 
Palmer floor parliamentarian for the purpose of hold- 
ing him tight. I wanted him put in a position to have 
to say Woodrow Wilson every fifteen minutes during 
the convention. Palmer's first choice was himself, — 
strangely enough, because he had no backing. The 
Philadelphia end of his delegation bitterly opposed 
him and only came in through my work. I kept my 
eye on Palmer continuously. I gave him things to do 
that were immaterial, but made him appear for Wood- 
row Wilson. The Sunday conference proved I was 
correct in my suspicions. 

[ 163 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

I went to Palmer Sunday night and told him the 
details of that conference, and that if he did another 
thing I had fifty good husky Irishmen to throw him 
out of Baltimore. There was no more display. 

Burleson, because he had no standing at the con- 
vention to speak of, I utterly ignored in the matter. 
We never brought him into any conference that was 
of any value. Even after the campaign was organ- 
ized, I put Burleson in a position in which there was 
absolutely nothing to do. He was one who could go 
to Coney Island or spend his evenings on the roof 
gardens as pleasantly as he might. 

About 5 o'clock p. m. Sunday, after we had been 
pushing back and forth wearily most of the day, and 
without much headway, Norman E. Mack, Chairman 
of the National Democratic Committee, asked me to 
go into a conference in his room at the Belvidere. 

I agreed readily because there was not much hap- 
pening, nor much ready to happen. I found there, 
beside IMr. Mack, A. Mitchell Palmer, who spoke 
sometimes for Woodrow Wilson; William J. Stone 
and David R. Francis, representing Champ Clark; 
William Banldiead, manager for Oscar W. Under- 
wood; Thom^as T. Taggart, manager for Thomas R. 
Marshall; Roger Sullivan, of Illinois; Luke-Sliea, of 
Tennessee, and Charles F. Murphy, of New York. 

Mr. IMack started by saying that we must select a 
candidate, and that this convention appeared to be 
deadlocked. Therefore, we were gathered for a con- 
ference. 

I regarded it as a set-up game. Mr. Mack called 
[ 164 ] 



BRYAN UNMASKS 

on me first to speak about conditions in the conven- 
tion, and the probability of our agreeing upon a can- 
didate. I sparred and said that I saw present two 
of the elder statesmen of the Democratic Party, Sen- 
ator Stone and Senator Bankliead, and that it would 
be impudence on my part to speak before they did. 
My purpose was to get at the real meaning of the 
conferees. 

Senator Bankliead made a very bitter speech against 
the Wilson forces. Advancing within two feet of me, 
he said that I knew Woodrow Wilson could not be 
nominated, and that I should not be put in a position 
of the dog-in-the-manger. Senator Stone made a 
mellifluous oration about the traditions of the Demo- 
cratic Party, the seriousness of its purposes, its great 
principles and the necessity of allowing the delegates 
to make a choice at the earliest possible moment so 
that they might go home. Then he turned to me and, 
pointing his finger at me, said : 

"Mr. McCombs, Mr. Bryan has asked each candi- 
date in this convention if he would take the nomination 
if the votes of New York were necessary thereto. 
What is your position"? 

Of course, I knew that either answer to that ques- 
tion was wrong. If I said Governor Wilson would 
take those votes under the conditions, it would imme- 
diately get to the Convention Hall, and all the Bryan 
influence and radicals of the West, of which we had 
many, would discard Wilson forever. Either answer 
to that question meant destruction. 

It came my time to speak. I talked about four 
[ 165 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

minutes upon the reason why Wilson should be nom- 
inated and sat down. I did not know how many dis- 
appointments there were. But I recall that Mr. 
Murphy took me by the shoulder and said: 

"You're all right, young fellow" ! 

Then we proceeded into the anteroom, where Mr. 
Mack had provided a buffet. I, as graciously as I 
could, opened a bottle of beer, gave a glass to Senator 
Stone, lifted mine to the flag above the mantel, he 
doing the same. 

I said: "Senator, no matter who is the nominee of 
this convention, the Republic will survive" ! 

We resumed the occupation of selecting a candidate 
as best we might. 

Results of the Sunday and Monday conferences 
were: 

Firsts a definite conclusion on the part of everyone 
that Woodrow Wilson would be a candidate before 
that convention until the last; second, that Mitchell 
Palmer, as a candidate for the Presidency, might as 
well have been in Shantung. 

[ Editor's Note — Narrative here taken up by editor from 
Mr. McCombs' notes.] 

During Sunday Mr. McCombs devoted himself 
especially to delegates from his o^vn State of New 
York, led by Charles F. Murphy, and Indiana, led by 
Thomas T. Taggart. 

Murphy was sticking by Clark, and Taggart by 
Marshall. 

IMcCombs summoned all the Wilson men from New 
York that he could muster. These delegates 

[ 166 ] 



BRYAN UNMASKS 

responded: Senator James A. O'Gorman, John B. 
Stanchfield, J. Sergeant Cram, Charles B. Alexander, 
James W. Gerard, Lawrence Godkin, William G. 
McAdoo, Samuel Untermeyer, Alonzo INIcLoughlin, 
Edward Lazansky, Abram I. Elkus, Herman Bidder, 
Henry L. Schurman, Thomas D. McCarthy, and 
others. 

^IcCombs directed them to keep banging away at 
^Murphy and his adherents to quit throwing away their 
votes on a "dead one" and cast them for a "live one". 

Then McCombs assailed Murphy himself. He told 
him that he would be mighty lonesome if he persisted 
in supporting Clark; that he had been deserted by 
Boger C. Sullivan and other comrades, and that Tag- 
gart, with his Hoosiers, would soon follow Sullivan 
into the Wilson camp, 

IMurphy was obdurate. He was loyal to Clark for 
the nonce. He began to weaken, however, when 
Thomas F. Smith, his most trusted adviser, warned 
him that he would again risk political jeopardy if he 
persisted in delaying a junction in the naming of 
Wilson. 

To add to Mr. McCombs' perplexity in getting hold 
of the entire New York delegation, the William J. 
Gaynor boosters got to work. Mr. Gaynor was then 
Mayoi of New York. He was ambitious to be Presi- 
dent. Corporation Counsel Archibald B. Watson, 
Fire Commissioner Joseph F. Johnson, and other 
members of the Gajmor cabinet, were doing their 
utmost to break into the Empire State and other dele- 
gations. They had greatly impressed William J. 

[ 167 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Bryan that Gaynor could at least be used to defeat 
Clark. They were almost incessantly prodding Mr. 
Murphy with the argument that neither Clark nor 
Wilson could be nominated, and that here was his 
chance to name a 'New Yorker. 

McCombs sought to block the Gaynor movement 
with pleas that the Mayor's Democracy was of a dubi- 
ous brand. As an aspirant for judicial and mayoralty 
honors, he had demanded supj)ort from the most 
implacable enemies of the party, and he had, after his 
election, refused to fulfil his contracts with the organ- 
ization that nominated him. In proof of this, Mr. 
McCombs produced a list of appointments of the 
"Mugwump" stamp and another list of loyal Demo- 
crats who, as applicants for office, had been denied 
preferment of any sort. 

Early Sunday morning, IMr. McCombs discovered 
that Senator Stone, the Clark field marshal, was still 
conniving to force the witbdrawal of all "trailers". 
That is, he was planning to put out of the race Under- 
wood, Harmon, Baldwin, and other aspirants, and 
bring their supporters in a block to Clark. 

Thomas F. Ryan was found trying to deliver his 
Underwood men to Clark. Ohio delegates pledged to 
Harmon were being importuned to desert him, while 
Homer S. Cummings had been approached to with- 
draw the Governor of Connecticut and line up with the 
Missourian. 

McCombs put Roger Sullivan to work on the Vir- 
ginians who stuck to Underwood, and the Ohioans 
who held on for Harmon. He also induced Edmund 

[ 168 ] 



BRYAN UNMASKS 

H JNIoore, manager for Harmon, to withhold as many 
Harmon men as he could control from Clark. Newton 
D. Baker, too, aided in preserving the integrity of the 
Harmon forces so far as Clark invasions were con- 
cerned, and helped to pick off a few delegates from 
the Buckeye State for Wilson. 

Meantime, all the managers were being besought to 
"stake" impoverished delegates who were threatened 
with being dispossessed of their lodgings and denied 
food. INIcCombs, Stone, Francis, Banldiead, and 
others, were constantly implored to furnish means for 
room rent and food. Threats were made by many 
delegates that if they were not given funds they would 
board the first train for their homes. 

Managers for all the candidates had to put up large 
sums of money to hold proprietors of votes in Balti- 
more for at least another twenty-four or forty-eight 
hours. They turned their pockets inside out and bor- 
rowed right and left to satisfy the demands of 
sleepy, hungry delegates. 

Despite all the Sunday exertions of Mr. McCombs 
and his associates, the initial ballot (twenty-seventh) 
on ISIonday was intensely disappointing. Wilson got 
but 406%, — a loss of one since Saturday night. Clark 
held 469, which had been cast for him on the twenty- 
fifth. On the tAventy-eighth ballot, however, Wilson 
suddenl}?- gained a block of 30. One only came from 
Clark; the others were deserters from Harmon, 
Underwood and Baldwin. 

On the thirtieth, Wilson jumped into the lead for 
the first time. His supporters shouted in glee. 

[ 169 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

As the Clerk called, "Wilson, 460; Clark, 455," the 
band struck up "Glory, Glory, Hallelujah"! The 
Pennsylvania delegates, led by Palmer and Guffey, 
chanted: 

*'Peimsyl, Pennsyl, Pennsylvania ! 

Pennsyl, Pennsyl, Pennsylvania ! 

Pennsyl, Pennsyl, Pennsylvania ! 

We'll vote for Wilson too !" 

Counting on Wilson leaping to the van on the thir- 
tieth, McCombs rushed over to Roger Sullivan and 
begged: "Now, Roger, make good. You promised 
that Illinois would come in on the twenty-sixth. Get 
a move on" ! 

But Mr. ISIurphy and Mr. Taggart had seen Sul- 
livan since McCombs had. They had persuaded him 
to "hold off" for awhile. 

On the thirty-first Wilson scored 475^/2 ^^^ Clark 
446%. 

The thirty-second chalked up 4771/0 for Wilson and 
4471/2 for Clark. 

On the thirty-fifth Wilson increased his total to 
494%. 

Clark got 4331/0, the lowest number received by him 
during the convention. 

During this ballot Florida, which had been voting 
solidh^ for Underwood, threw 2 votes for Wilson. 
This break, which McCombs had engineered over Sun- 
day, caused Governor Gilchrist to leap upon a chair 
and shout: 

"Florida was instructed for Underwood. Any 

[ 170 ] 



BRYAN UNMASKS 

delegate who violates those instructions commits a 
dishonorable act" ! 

McCombs had seen to it that Senator James A. 
O' Gorman, an ardent Wilsonite, had become substi- 
tute for Chairman Ollie James, when the latter had 
all but collapsed through fatigue. 

"The unit rule has been abolished. Each delegate 
is at liberty to vote for whom he pleases", was the 
rebuking edict of the acting Chairman. 

Wilson voters greeted this with thunderous cheers. 

IMcCombs walked over to the Wilson contingent of 
the New York delegation, whose block of 90 was still 
being cast for Clark, and implored them to follow the 
example of their Florida brethren. He also appealed 
to Chairman ^lurx^hy to release such of his delegates 
as wished to vote for Wilson. 

"If the caucus agrees, all right. The caucus will 
decide" ! was IMurphy's response. 

But no caucus other than those yet held was called, 
and 'New York continued to cast her entire vote for 
Clark. 

Senator James having returned to the chair. Senator 
Stone insisted that he reverse the ruling of Senator 
O'Gorman that no imit rule prevailed. James 
answered this by declaring a break of one to Wilson 
in the Colorado delegation to be in accordance with 
the convention mandate. 

Iowa, on the thirty-ninth ballot joined the Wilson 
procession. This put the New Jersey Governor's total 
at 501 for the first time. 

V^Tien, on the forty-second ballot Ohio registered 

[ 171 ] 



BRYAN UNMASKS 

19 for Wilson, and it looked as if Wilson might api^ro- 
priate the whole 48 on the forty-third, the Clark man- 
agers sprang another adjournment resolution. 

It was nearly 1 a. m. Tuesday. Delegates were 
exhausted and hungry. No power could hold them in 
their seats. So they voted 761 to 260 to adjourn until 
Tuesday noon. 

Though Clark managers boasted that the adjourn- 
ment was still another victory for them, it proved the 
undoing of the former Speaker of the House. 



[ 172 ] 



XIII 
WILSON WINS NOMINATION 

Victorious on Forty-Sixth Ballot — Sullivan Clinches It 

— Murphy Capitulates — McCombs Warned: "Remember 
Jim Smith"! — McAdoo Picks Palmer for Vice President 

— McCombs Selects Marshall — Summary op the Unpre- 
cedented Ballots for the Presidency. 

[Editor's Note — Editor's narrative continued.] 

BEFORE daylight Tuesday, IMr. McCombs 
had exacted a renewed and copper-riveted 
pledge from Roger C. Sullivan to head the 
final stampede for Wilson. This time, Sullivan ful- 
filled his contract. 

On the fort}''-third ballot, Sullivan, measuring every 
word, roared: 

"Illinois casts 18 votes for Clark and 40 for Wilson. 
Under the rule adopted by the delegation, therefore, 
all 58 Illinois votes are cast for Wilson" ! 

A wild whoop came from the forty Texans ; another 
from the seventy-six Pennsylvanians. 

Sullivan was hugged and kissed and cheered by 
"Wilson devotees. 

Surlily, Clark men shouted : "Wliat did you get for 
it, Roger"? 

[ 173 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

"The choice of this convention, that's all"! was the 
retort. 

With the total defection of Illinois from Clark to 
Wilson, Wilson's aggregate mounted to 612. Clark's 
dwindled to 329. 

Wilson gained 17 on the forty-fourth. Clark could 
get but 306, — the memorable number that stood to 
the finish for Ulysses S. Grant at the Republican 
National Convention of 1880. 

Clark stuck at 306 on the forty-fifth, while Wilson's 
total went to 633. 

Underwood and Foss, the latter of whom on late 
ballots had been supjiorted by Massachusetts, were 
both withdrawn. Their followers joined the Wilson 
parade. 

Then Charles F. Murphy nodded to John J. Fitz- 
gerald, of Kings. 

Amid a frightful hub-bub, created by yelling, 
marching battalions of Wilsonites, Fitzgerald wearily 
and reluctantly mounted the stage. 

In husky tones, tinged wdth a look of disgust, he 
was barely heard to say: 

"I move that the nomination of Woodrow Wilson 
for President of the United States be made unani- 
mous" ! 

Frenzied cheers from the jubilant Wilson shouters 
smothered what Fitzgerald might have added. 

Amid a crash of band music, tooting of horns, 
shrieks through megaphones, and yells from thou- 
sands, the tally clerk informed Chairman James that 
the f ort3''-sixth and final ballot registered : 

[ 174 ] 




McCoMHS rK.r.K ITATKS WlI.SON ON HiS PhKSIDKNTIAL 

Nomination at Ska Giht, X. J., 11)12 



WILSON WINS NOMINATION 

Wilson, 890 ; Clark, 84 ; Harmon, 25 ; Underwood, 
12; Foss, 27. 

Chairman James, his voice subdued to a whisper, 
proclaimed : 

"I declare Woodrow Wilson the unanimous choice 
of this Convention for the Democratic nomination for 
President of the United States"! 

The full table of ballots follows: 

THE BALLOTS 

Wilson Clark 

First 324 4411/2 

Second 3391/2 4461/2 

Third 345 441 

Fourth 349I/2 443 

Fifth 351 443 

Sixth 354 445 

Seventh 3521/2 4491/2 

Eighth 3511/2 4481/2 

Ninth 3511/2 452 

Tenth 3511/2 656 

Eleventh 3541/2 654 

Twelfth 354 547I/2 

Thirteenth 356 5541/2 

Fourteenth 362 550 

Fifteenth 3621/2 651 

Sixteenth 3621/0 651 

Seventeenth 3621/2 645 

Eighteenth 361 635 

Nineteenth 358 632 

Twentieth 3881/2 612 

Twenty-first 3951/0 608 

Twenty-second 396l/o 6IOI/2 

Twenty-third 399 4971/2 

Twenty-fourth 4021/2 496 

[ 175 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Wilson Clark 

Twenty-fifth 406 469 

Twenty-sixth 40?!/^ 463 

Twenty-seventh 406^^ 469 

Twenty-eighth 4371/^ 4681/^ 

Twenty-ninth 436 4681^ 

Thirtieth 460 455 

Thirty-first 4751/2 4461/^ 

Thirty-second 4771/2 4461/2 

Thirty-third 4771/2 4471/^ 

Thirty-fourth 4791/0 4471/^ 

Thirty-fifth 4941/^ 4331/^ 

Thirty-sixth 4961/^ 4341/^ 

Thirty-seventh 4961/2 4321/^ 

Thirty-eighth 4981/^ 425 

Thirty-ninth SOll^ 424 

Fortieth 6011/^ 424 

Forty-first 4991/2 424 

Forty-second 494 430 

Forty-third 612 329 

Forty-fourth 629 306 

Forty-fifth 633 306 

Forty-sixth 890 84 

TOTAL: 

Wilson 890 

Clark 84 

Harmon 26 

Underwood 12 

Foss 27 

As Mr. McCombs stood upon the Convention hall 
platform, both his hands squeezed almost to a pulp by 
hysterical Wilsonites, a Princeton chum accosted him 

with "Well, Bill, you certainly put 'Woody' over! I 

[ 176 ] 



WILSON WINS NOMINATION 

did not think it possible. But look out! Recall the 
fate of Uncle Jim Smith"! 

"What do you mean"? asked McCombs. 

"The first throat cut politically in New Jersey after 
Jim Smith had nominated and elected Wilson Gov- 
ernor was Jim Smith's. Be careful that the first 
throat cut after you elect Wilson President is not your 
omi"! 

"I ridiculed this warning at the time," said Mr. 
McCombs frequently to me after his turn came. 
"Had I but taken my Princeton friend's advice, I 
might have been spared much mental and physical 
ang-uish". 

Mr. McCombs fulfilled his pledge to Thomas T. 
Taggart, to throw the Wilson vote to Thomas R. 
Marshall, of Indiana, for Vice President. Influen- 
tial friends of Champ Clark begged him to become 
Wilson's running mate. The JMissourian declined. 
Marshall was nominated after a battle of five hours. 

Mr. McCombs, in describing the selection of the 
Hoosier, wrote: 

[EDiTOR'a Note — Mr. McCombs' narrative resumed.] 

Unfortunately, the psychology of every convention, 
whether Democratic or Republican, has been that 
very little regard is paid to the selection of a Vice 
President. This is particularly true where the con- 
vention is long and intense, as was the case at Balti- 
more. 

Nobody seriously discussed the Vice Presidency 
until Mr. Wilson had been nominated. During a con- 
vention, the Vice Presidency may be made the subject 

[ 177 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

of a trade for delegates from this territory for some 
candidate for the Presidency. This should not be. 

Under our Constitution the Vice President's func- 
tions while in office are exceedingly small. He merelj^ 
performs the duties of a presiding officer. Natur- 
ally, that does not involve the selection of a very great 
man. 

He does not even participate in the debates. He 
is more or less out of touch with both Houses. He is 
entirely out of touch with the President and the execu- 
tive side of Washington. 

He should be made of the same mental stature as 
the President, for if the President dies, the Vice Presi- 
dent immediately becomes President and charged with 
all the great duties of that office. 

If I were proposing a constitutional amendment, 
I would at least make the Vice President a member 
of the President's cabinet so that he may keep in touch 
with things as they go from the executive side. I 
would give him full voting powers in the Senate. The 
present Vice President, Mr. Marshall, has told me 
the actual truth about the office. 

When Mr. Wilson was nominated in Baltimore 
early that Tuesday afternoon I went to my hotel and 
slept for a while. Refreshed, I called up the Gov- 
ernor and asked him what he thought about the Vice 
Presidency. I told him the candidates would prob- 
ably be Governor Burke, of North Dakota; Mayor 
Preston, of Baltimore, and Governor Marshall, of 
Indiana. I told him that he could have his choice 
for the Vice Presidency, and asked him to make a sug- 

[ 178 ] 



WILSON WINS NOMINATION 

gestion. His suggestion was that I do what I was 
willing as representing him. 

I went to the Convention that evening. On the 
way I mulled over various possibilities of the Demo- 
cratic Party. 

Governor Burke, of North Dakota, was a good man, 
but he came from a sparsely settled territor3\ He 
had no National promuience. He could not help on 
the ticket. Mayor Preston, of Baltimore, labored 
under the same difficulties. I thought of other men 
and concluded that Marshall was the man. 

As I went into the door of the Convention hall I 
was met by Luke Lee, of Mississippi. He took me 
into a private room. There were gathered jMcAdoo, 
Burleson, Palmer, and a few others who had worked 
for Wilson. I don't remember the names of all, but 
curiously enough, I do the number. There were 
eleven. 

They started in by sajang that we must decide who 
should be the Vice President. A vote was proposed. 
Somebody mentioned Palmer. Then I knew what 
the vote would be. I also laiew that Palmer could not 
help the ticket at all, because he came from the State 
of Pennsjdvania. 

I said that eleven men could not decide who was to 
be the Vice President of the United States. 

I proceeded to the floor. I spoke to the leaders of 
the large delegations. Marshall was nominated by a 
tremendous majority. I humbly record that on the 
first ballot I received 28 votes from my native state, 
Arkansas, for this exalted position. 

[ 179 ] 



XIV 
"PROVIDENCE DID IT"! 

Wilson So Exclaims to McCombs, Who is Chilled by Absence 
OF Gratitude from the Presidential Nominee — Mc- 
Combs, IN Collapse, Beats McAdoo to "His Presence" — 
Messrs, Kern, Palmer, Daniels, Taggart and Hudspeth 
Urge McCombs for National Chairman — Wilson Pre- 
fers McAdoo, but Makes Him Vice Chairman and Chooses 
All Campaign Committee. 

[Editor's Note — The McCombs narrative is resumed.] 

I WENT up to Sea Girt with the National Com- 
mittee to congratulate Governor Wilson the day 
after his nomination for President. He shook 
hands with us generally. When I spoke to him, he 
said: "McCombs, you know I am a Presbyterian 
and believe in predestination and election. It was 
Providence that did the work at Baltimore". 

Now, I sliall not pass into any discussion of the 
various theologies ; but I stood there a complete wreck 
from a campaign at Baltimore, during which I slept 
no more than two hours a night. I saw other drawn 
faces about me. I saw faces, too, of men who had 
come to the Wilson standard as events turned. None 
cast their eyes to a selfish future, but all were hopeful, 
highly hopeful, that the man who stood before them 

[ 180 ] 



"PROVIDENCE DID IT" 

might be elected, and that in their own locality they 
might restore Democracy completely. 

I could not accept Wilson's view of fore-ordination 
in the presence of that group who had all but given 
their life's blood to make him the nominee of the Dem- 
ocratic Party for the Presidency of the United States. 

I must confess that I felt a chill, because I felt that 
the man had in mind the using of entirely new meth- 
ods. I was chilled, also, because I thought that if he 
attempted to apply that Predestination doctrine to the 
extreme, the Democratic campaigTi might find itself 
very much in the ruck. 

I was tired beyond expression. I did not desire to 
become Chairman of the Democratic National Com- 
mittee, though this had been suggested to me by mem- 
bers on all hands and it had been suggested to the Gov- 
ernor himself. 

In the National Committee itself there was a fair 
amount of discord growing out of many campaigns. 
It was thought that I would smooth ever\^thing over 
and could handle things without any friction. I w^as 
personally friendly with every member of the Com- 
mittee. I had dealt with them all and none came out 
of Baltimore with anything but the friendliest feelings 
toward me. 

ISIr. Wilson, after two weeks of silence, acquiesced 
to my election as Chairman of the National Com- 
mittee, July 12th. 

There had been wonderment about his delay in 
they suspected conspiracy. I said I really did not 
want the place as I was already worked to death, and 

[ 181 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

giving his opinion. Many of the members told me 
that I would not take it unless the sentiment of the 
entire Committee was taken and unless, without the 
exercise of force from any quarter, I should be the 
unanimous choice. But in accepting, I sailed into a 
sea upon which I hope no other man will ever have 
the misfortune to laimch his bark. 

Mr. Wilson, at the outset, handed me a campaign 
committee list composed of gentlemen all of whom I 
liked, but many of whom I would not have chosen 
for this particular Vvork, 

I was given absolute power by the National Com- 
mittee to select the campaign committee and to do 
nearly anything I thought fitting. At the meeting 
of the Conmiittee in Chicago where I was elected, 
there was great enthusiasm over the fact that we were 
"on our way" and intended to push the campaign 
through to victory. I felt very much heartened. 

Returning to New York I found Wiltion intent 
upon having William G. McAdoo for Vice Chairman, 
for what reason I can never divine. However, since 
Wilson's inauguration many reasons, Wilsonian, have 
appeared why he wanted him, but from a public and 
political point of view there was none. 

I strongly advised JMr. Wilson to have as Vice 
Chairman a man from the West who understood 
Western conditions. I also spoke insistently for 
Judge Martin J. Wade, who was a member from 
Iowa and an exceedingly able man. He was held 
very high in the esteem of the Westerners, and on the 
Committee itself. I thought he could handle V^estern 

[ 182 ] 



"PROVIDENCE DID IT" 

headquarters better than anybody else. But Gov- 
ernor Wilson was obdurate and we accepted McAdoo 
as Vice Chairman grudgingly. 

[Editor's Note — Mr. McCombs modestly bequeathed the 
task of elaborating the story of his selection as the National 
Chairman to fellow Committeemen. They prepared the follow- 
ing details.] 

Immediately upon the adjournment of the Balti- 
more convention, Mr. ^IcCombs nearly collapsed 
physically. A physician was called and McCombs 
was ordered to bed. Instructions were given that he 
must not be disturbed for at least a day. To make 
his I'cst doubly sure, Mr. McCombs was then taken 
to a private apartment which he had used for secret 
conferences during tbe Convention. The patient, 
suffering from brain, as well as body fag, was induced 
to sleep. 

"VSHiile ]\Ir. McCombs was undergoing this enforced 
vacation, IMr. McAdoo dashed off to Sea Girt, N. J., 
to be the first to recite to Governor Wilson the details 
of the Convention. After Mr. ^IcAdoo had hurried 
from Baltimore, rumors reached the McCombs head- 
quarters that McAdoo had gone to insist that he 
should be rewarded with the Chairmanship and the 
executive conduct of the campaign. Mr. McCombs' 
friends were also told that William J. Bryan would 
demand the retention of Chairman Norman E. jNIack, 
who had handled his 1908 campaign, while Wisconsin 
leaders were reported to have gotten back of Jose^^h 
E. Davies of the Badger State. 

While McCombs, maybe unconscious of much of 
this, slept at Baltimore, National Committeeman 

[ 183 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Robert S. Hudspeth, of New Jersey, was also speed- 
ing to Sea Girt. Hudspeth had been very influential 
in securing all the delegates but four from New 
Jersey, Wilson's home state, and holding them intact 
for forty-six ballots. 

But in the race Hudspeth won and reached Sea 
Girt before IMcAdoo. Governor Wilson learned from 
him first, the accurate story of how and to whom he 
owed his nomination. Hudspeth frankly informed 
Wilson : 

"But for that crippled but militant Princeton lad, 
McCombs, Clark, Bryan, or an unknown would have 
defeated you. If any one individual is to be rewarded 
for your triumph it is Billy IMcCombs. He lies ill 
in Baltimore. Never, never forget what he did for 

you"! 

Governor Wilson listened rather frigidly to Judge 
Hudspeth's encomiums on IMcCombs. He gave no 
intimation a,s to wliat, if anything, he proposed to do 
to prove his gratitude. 

After his conference with the nominee, Judge 
Hudspeth was asked by newspaper correspondents if 
he would be a candidate for National Chairman. 

"Under no consideration. I don't want the place", 
he replied decisivelj'-. "IMcCombs has won it through 
distinguished service. He has been the pacemaker. 
He knows the delegates who fought with him the fight 
for Wilson. It would be bad business, indeed, to trade 
horses in the middle of the stream". 

A. Mitchell Palmer went straight to Governor 
Wilson, too, and said, "We need a campaign con- 

[ 184 ] 



"PROVIDENCE DID IT" 

ducted in the same spirit in which McCombs con- 
ducted the nominating battle for you. We need a 
Chairman young enough to inject that spirit into the 
party and voters". 

Senator Ollie James, who had been permanent 
Chairman of the Convention, reinforced Hudspeth's 
advice with: "INIcCombs has shown himself to be a 
young man of great ability as an executive and a 
wonderful organizer". 

"Hum"! observed Wilson. "That is right. Mc- 
Combs undoubtedly is a fine executive"! iVnd that 
was all. 

Senator John W. Kern, of Indiana, who had been 
Alton B. Parker's running mate in 1904, told Gov- 
ernor Wilson : "We all like McCombs first rate. We 
like the type to which he belongs". 

Senator Thomas T. Taggart, also of Indiana, 
former Chairman of the National Committee, who had 
finally s'-Aamg the Hoosier delegation to Wilson, added 
his insistence that :McCombs lead the party organiza- 
tion in the coming fray. 

Governor Wilson had been so inoculated with 
demands for IMcCombs' retention as Campaign Man- 
ager that when INIcAdoo finally turned up he was 
told that the Vice Chairmanship was all he could 
hope for. 

Possibly INIcAdoo would have made some headway 
had not McCombs himself suddenly appeared at Sea 

Girt. 

When, after fourteen hours' sleep, McCombs was 
informed of McAdoo's activities, he set out for Sea 

[ 185 ] 



jVIAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Girt as fast as a seventy-mile an hour car could carry 
him. 

Governor Wilson was entertaining guests at 
luncheon, on the laMU at his Sea Girt cottage, when 
McCombs hove in sight. As he, like an apparition, 
alighted, and, with the aid of a cane, started straight 
for the "Boss", as Tom Taggart addressed Wilson, 
National Chairman Norman E. Mack, who sat next 
to the Governor, exclaimed, "Why, there is McCombs 
now! I thought he was ill in Baltimore"! 

Governor Wilson, himself astounded, greeted ]Mc- 
Combs: "Why, how did you get here ? I thought you 
were sick in bed at Baltimore" ! 

McCombs, as if looking for McAdoo, smiled grimly 
and replied: "I was never sick a minute. I slept 
fourteen hours yesterday and am fit as can be. I am 
like a leather shoestring. You can stretch me quite 
a ways without breaking me". 

Governor Wilson, My. Mack and others laughed at 
this simile and treated McCombs as if he had just sur- 
vived a serious surgical operation. 

Josephus Daniels, afterward Secretary of the Navy 
eight years, tapped McCombs affectionately on the 
back and said: "Governor Wilson, I want you to 
loiow that we learned at Baltimore to respect Mr. 
McCombs and have faith in him. We found that he 
talked our language and that we talked his. If he 
makes the same brilliant campaign for your election 
as he did for your nomination, no Taft nor Roosevelt 
can possibly defeat you"! 

It was not until July 12th, over a fortnight after 
[ 186 ] 



"PROVIDENCE DID IT" 

he had been nominated, that Governor Wilson finally 
determined to risk his Presidential election manage- 
ment to IMcComhs. 

Those who had been associated with, or had observed 
IMr. McCombs' masterful management of the Pre- 
and in-Convention campaigns had been persistent in 
their support of McCombs, and finally induced Gov- 
ernor Wilson to name him as chairman. 

On July 12, National Committeeman Hudspeth, 
of New Jersey, Josephus Daniels, of North Carolina, 
and Mr. McCombs held a prolonged conference with 
Governor Wilson at Sea Girt. When it ended, Judge 
Pludspeth came upon the la^\^l and announced: "It's 
McCombs! Governor Wilson has selected him for 
Chairman of the National Committee". 

McCombs, smiling but mute, limped to his auto as 
rapidly as he could. 

National Committeeman Daniels, addressmg a 
group of newspaper coiTCspondents, said: "You saw 
that young man going past vvdth a slight limp. I 
have no doubt many of you, as hundreds of others, 
will wonder, whether he is robust enough for 
the big job that may be asked of him. He is a great 
deal more robust than he looks and will outlast a great 
many men that may appear to be stronger". 

"Did you urge Governor Wilson to make Mr. 
McCombs National Chairman"? IMr. Daniels was 
asked. 

"I certamly did, and he is the choice of all genuine 
friends of the Governor", responded Daniels. 

"The National Committee will meet at New York 
[ 187 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

July 15th to organize for the campaign", announced 
Chairman Mack. 

"The 'Boss' says Chicago", quoth Tom Taggart 
mischievously. "If you doubt it, ask him", added the 
Hoosier leader. 

Mack went inside the Wilson cottage. He looked 
sheepish when he returned. 

"Right, Tom. The Committee meets at noon at the 
Hotel Congress, Chicago, July 15th". 

"That's what the 'Boss' told me, and what the 'Boss' 
says, goes", retorted Taggart with a snicker. 

Judge Hudspeth personally carried Governor Wil- 
son's orders to the Committee which met at Chicago 
the following Monday. The Judge presented ]Mr. 
McCombs' name for the Chairmanship in this way: 
"Mr. McCombs' intelligence and sagacious handling 
of Governor Wilson's nominating campaign during 
the past year and a half has demonstrated his 
entire fitness for leadership and showed him to be 
amply equipped to carry the Democratic Party to 
victory". 

Neither McAdoo, nor any follower, offered a word 
openly against McCombs. He was chosen Chairman 
unanimously. 

When Mr. Mack surrendered his gavel, Mr. 
McCombs briefly acknowledged his election: "I can- 
not hope to achieve success unless I have the active 
support of this Committee. 

"This is to be a business campaign. We shall pay 
strict attention to the business of electing Governor 
Wilson President". 

[ 188 ] 



"PROVIDENCE DID IT" 

"And we must raise a million dollars at once to do 
it", said Roger Sullivan, of Chicago. 

McCombs did his best to get a nation-wide repre- 
sentative of all factions in the Executive Committee. 
He planned to put upon it Charles F. Murphy, Tom 
Taggart, William J. Stone, John H. Bankhead, and 
others wiio had fought Wilson's nomination. The 
"Boss" overruled him. 

July 17th Governor Wilson, premising it by saying 
"I am entirely satisfied with the Avay the National 
Committee has met my suggestions", announced his 
famous "Veranda" or "Rocking Chair" Committee. 

It comprised William F. McCombs, William G. 
McAdoo and James A. O' Gorman, of New York; 
Robert S. Hudspeth, of New Jersey; A. Mitchell 
Palmer, of Pennsylvania ; Josephus Daniels, of North 
Carolina; William Saulsbury, of Delaware; Joseph 
E Davies, of Wisconsin ; Thomas P. Gore, of Okla- 
homa; Col. Robert Ewing, of Louisiana; Will R. 
King, of Oregon; James A. Reed, of IMissouri, and 
Daniel ^IcGillicuddy, of ^Maine. 

All had loyally supported Wilson for the Presi- 
dential nomination except IMr. Reed, of Missouri. He 
had made the nominating speech for Champ Clark in 
the Convention. 

The Governor directed that Mr. McAdoo assume 
the duties of "Vice Chairman", and Joseph E. Davies 
the Secretaryship. He also named Henry INIorgen- 
thau as Chairman of the Finance Committee. 

With a Campaign Committee, every member of 
which was picked by Governor Wilson, Chairman 
McCombs began the arduous duties of the canvass. 

[ 189 ] 



XV 

McCOMBS AND McADOO QUARREL 

At Bitter Odds as Campaign Begins — McAdoo Ignores His 
Chief in Selecting Headquarters Force — "Beat Roose- 
velt", Directs McCombs as He Falls III — McAdoo 
Levies on McCombs' Political Assets and is Put Out op 
His Pre-empted Post — Nominee Fails as a Peace-Maker. 

[Editor's Note — This chapter is written by the Editor.] 

THE popular vote-getting campaign for Wilson 
began auspiciously on the surface. But bick- 
erings inside the camp were constant. 
The Republican camp was splitting up. William 
H. Taft had been renominated for President by the 
reactionary Republicans. Progi-essives had bolted the 
convention and nominated Theodore Roosevelt, who 
had twice been President. 

McCombs' plan was, of course, to keep the Repub- 
licans split. He was convinced from the outset that 
Taft was hopelessly out of the iTinning. It was 
Roosevelt Avho must be beaten in order to elect Wilson. 
Mr. McCombs, therefore, concentrated his efforts 
toward weaning Progressives away from Roosevelt as 
well as Taft. Roosevelt was posing as the only Pro- 
gressive. McCombs saw to it that Wilson was pre- 

[ 190 ] 



McCOMBS AND McADOO QUARREL 

sented to the voters as rather more of a Progressive 
than Roosevelt. 

With all this serious business in hand, there was, 
of course, the question of national headquarters. 

Chairman JNIcCon^bs authorized Vice Chairman 
McAdoo to lease headquarters in the Fifth Avenue 
Building at Broadway and Twenty-third street, New 
York City. This McAdoo did. But without con- 
sulting ^IcCombs, he engaged a large staff. Among 
them was K. B. Conger, who had been associated with 
iMcAdoo in his Hudson Terminal enterprise. 

Inspecting the pay-roil one day, McCombs discov- 
ered that Conger was down for a weekly salary of 
$1 50, and BjTon R. Ne^\^on, afterward Collector of 
the Port of Xew York, for $120 a week. 

As jMcCombs had been struggling to get enough 
money to pay headquarters rent, he was surprised. 

"What are these men doing for their fancy sala- 
ries"? demanded ^IcCombs of IMcAdoo. 

"Conger leased headquarters for us and is acting 
as Superintendent. Newton is working at Sea Girt, 
New Jersey, with Walter Measday, at the Wilson 
publicity bureau. He volunteered", was McAdoo's 
reply. 

"Get rid of both", directed McCombs. "Conger is 
useless. I fired Newton months ago". 

But JilciVdoo carried Newton's case to the Presi- 
dential nominee and he was retained. Conger is said 
to have continued to draw $150 a week for the re- 
mainder of the campaign, though IMcAdoo and Treas- 
urer Rollo Wells had many a dispute about it. 

[ 191 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

August 12, 1912, Mr. McCombs was prostrated 
with neurasthenia. He was stricken while on duty at 
headquarters, and he was carried to the Hotel Knick- 
erbocker. Dr. John D. McBarren advised that unless 
McCombs were immediately relieved from duty he 
might die. The stricken Chairman was taken to the 
home of Mrs. Ethel Thomas, a sister, at Flushing, 
L. I. He grew worse and was removed to Paul 
Smith's in the Adirondacks where his sister, Corinne, 
accompanied him. 

For six weeks ^IcCombs fought illness and physi- 
cians to get back at his job. Despite protests from 
his medical advisers and his family, McCombs slipped 
away from his sanatorium September 4, 1912, and 
suddenly appeared at the Hotel Plaza in New York. 
There he again collapsed. Dr. Simon Baruch, father 
of Bernard M. Baruch (one of Wilson's financial 
angels) was summoned. He ordered McCombs to 
bed and to retire from active campaign duties. 

"I'll do my job by 'phone"! was McCombs' dogged 
response. 

"And commit suicide" ! admonished Dr. Baruch. 

Wliile McCombs was doing wire work from the 
Plaza, IMcAdoo sat in a swivel chair at the Fifth 
Avenue headquarters. He assumed the full duties of 
National Chairman and started in to reorganize the 
force employed by McCombs. He packed off to Chi- 
cago, Albert S. Burleson, of Texas, whom Colonel 
House afterward induced President Wilson to make 
Postmaster General; Thomas P. Gore, afterward- 
United States Senator from Oklahoma; Frank B. 

[ 192 ] 



McCOMBS AND McADOO QUARREL 

Lord, and other staff officers installed by McCombs. 
Any officer or employee of the McCombs brand 
seemed persoTia non grata to him. 

One day, a loyal friend of jMcCombs dropped in 
upon him at the Plaza. McCombs, propped up with 
pillows, was 'phoning commands to lieutenants in 
other states. 

During a lull, McCombs asked: "How are things 
going at headquarters"? 

"McAdoo is trying to administer on your estate 
before you die" ! was the shot returned. "He has fired 
about all your friends, except Joe Daniels". 

INIcCombs went immediately to the Fifth Avenue 
building. 

Reaching headquarters, he recognized few attaches 
whom he had appointed. He was mystified and 
angered by an army of strange people. The office boy 
accosted him with : 

"Who do you want to see"? 

McCombs entered the room which he had reserved 
for himself prior to his i)hysical collapse. McAdoo 
was swinging about in his revolving chair giving 
orders to subordinates of his own selection. 

Regarding McCombs as if he were a spectre, 
McAdoo asked: "How are you feeling, Bill? Why 
did you come back until you were completely recov- 
ered? Things are going fine". 

"I am here to resume command, and you will please 
vacate my desk", said McCombs. McAdoo obeyed. 
McCombs fell into his old chair and summoned Treas- 
urer RoUo Wells, Chairman Henry Morgenthau, of 

[ 193 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

the Finance Committee, Chairman Josephus Danieis, 
of the Publicity Bureau, Secretary Joseph E. Davies, 
and Assistant Secretary Walker W. Vick. 

"I desire to see these gentlemen alone", said 
McCombs as he glanced at McAdoo. JMcAdoo 
departed. IMcCombs then learned additional details 
about INIcAdoo changing his campaign plans and rear- 
ranging the office force. Rollo Wells reported the 
treasury all but empty. 

Just then, however, Chairman McCombs opened a 
letter from a North Carolina friend. It enclosed a 
check for $54<.66, the proceeds of the final bale of 
cotton sold by him that Fall. 

"We are not broke yet, Rollo", observed McCombs 
in glee. "But we shall have to dig somewhere, or we 
shall be broke". 

Just as Chairman McCombs was about to start for 
Sea Girt to get a show-down from Governor Wilson 
as between him and McAdoo, the Governor suddenly 
appeared in New York. He called upon McCombs. 
At the conclusion of the interview. Governor Wilson 
said: 

"There is no friction between Mr. McCombs and 
Mr. McAdoo. It was necessary for ^Ir. McCombs 
to have a short rest. Mr. IMcCombs is one of the most 
indomitable men I ever knew. There is a sacrifice 
that no one can accept from any man. That is his 
health. Mr. McCombs is much stronger and will con- 
tinue to perform his duties as Chairman of the 
National Committee". 

McCombs' friends were elated over Governor Wil- 
[ 194 ] 



McCOMBS AND McADOO QUARREL 

son's at least public support of Chairman McCombs 
as absolute campaign manager. JNIr. McCombs was 
mightily pleased and accepted as an expression of 
popular approval this editorial in the New York 
American, September 12, 1921: 

"Justice to Manager McCombs. 

"Governor Wilson has done well to lay at rest the 
rumor that j)olitical bosses and jealous rivals were to 
compass the retirement of William F. INIcCombs as 
manager of his campaigTi. 

"To IMr. McCombs, more than to any single indi- 
vidual friend in the United States, Governor Wilson 
owes his nomination at Baltimore. 

"The labors of the young Princetonian to this end 
were assiduous and extraordinary. His devotion 
amounted almost to consecration. His energy was 
prodigious, and he displayed conspicuous ability in 
every phase of the campaign of which he was the 
recognized manager and director from the beginning. 

"Working at times almost single-handed, and 
spending his time and his money with lavish loyalty, 
Mr. ^IcCombs impaired his health in the cause of his 
candidate. 

"We felt sure that Governor Wilson could not 
afford and would not consent to his retirement. The 
Democratic nominee loiows better than most men the 
character and capacity of the young leader who piloted 
his fortunes at Baltimore. Nothing short of a physical 
incapacity to go on with the work could possibly jus- 
tify McCombs' enforced retirement. 

[ 195 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

"Least of all, could Governor Wilson, at this stage 
of his campaign, afford to bring upon himself the 
charge of ingratitude to a friend and benefactor such 
as this able and brilliant young laywer has so splen- 
didly demonstrated himself to be. 

"The American took it for granted that the wise and 
discreet Democratic nominee would allow no machine 
bosses or new-found friends to compass the humiliation 
of the best and most effective friend that his political 
career has developed. 

"Mr. McCombs deserves to finish the work that he 
began". 

Six hundred admirers of Chairman McCombs 
joined in a Hotel Astor dinner September 29, 1912, 
to celebrate his convalescence and restoration to com- 
mand of the Wilson campaign. Governor Wilson 
joined in the greeting. He eulogized McCombs in 
this way: 

"I am not here for any other purpose than to render 
my tribute of sincere admiration and affection for 
William F. McCombs. It must mean a great deal 
to a man who has spent his life in teaching, that one 
of the men he taught, one of the men with whom he 
has been associated as master with pupil, should so 
believe in him as Mr. McCombs has believed in me, 
for this is the highest reward of a teacher/' 

As Mr. McCombs arose to reply, he was more 
lustily cheered than his "master". He said: 

"I am working in the interest of an ideal. I am 
working to accomplish what is best for the Govern- 

[ 196 ] 



McCOMBS AND McADOO QUARREL 

ment. I consider Woodrow Wilson the best man to 
carry out my ideals. There is no reason why the one 
million college graduates in this country should not 
participate in government. I hate distinction of class. 
We should all collaborate for the best kind of gov- 
ernment". 

William B. Homblower, President John H. 
Finiey, of the College of the City of New York, Col. 
John Temple Graves, Rennold Wolf and Augustvts 
Thomas threw oratorical bouquets at Mr. JNIcCombs. 

Assuming that the Democracy of the country was 
solidly behind Wilson, Chairman McCombs resumed 
his battle to rally every Republican he could to his 
candidate's support. His arguments were admirably 
epitomized in an address to all voters October 28, 
1912. Here it is: 

"It becomes my duty, as Chairman of the Demo- 
cratic National Committee, at the beginning of the 
last week of the campaign, to convey two messages to 
the millions of citizens who are striving to uphold the 
principles of constitutional and popular government 
by electing Woodrow Wilson President of the 
United States. 

"The first is of good cheer. A painstaking and 
unprejudiced examination of reports from all sources 
fully justifies the common expectation of a sweeping 
victory on November 5. The party which polled more 
than 6,000,000 votes four years ago is united abso- 
lutely, the opposition is broken about evenly in twain, 
and hundreds of thousands of patriotic citizens who 
have never cast a Democratic ballot will surely vote 

[ 197 ] 



IVIAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

for Woodrow Wilson. Defeat, under such circum- 
stances, is virtually inconceivable. 

"My second message is one not of apprehension, but 
of warning. We must expect that the desperate situ- 
ation in which our antagonists now find themselves 
will incite them to extreme measures as they apx3roach 
the end of their resources. There should be no relaxa- 
tion of effort in these last few days at any point in 
the line. There will be none on the part of those 
charged with the responsibility of conducting the 
campaign. 

"To those who are being told that Democratic suc- 
cess spells panic and depression we say: Remember 
1907 — with President Roosevelt at the helm and Ses- 
retary Taf t at his elbow. Whose, then, was the respon- 
sibility? 

"To those confronted by the dilapidated bogy of 
free trade, we say: Read not what our opponents 
write, but what our candidate saj^s. He needs no 
interpretation. None can deny either his ability or 
his freedom to speak for himself. And when he pro- 
nounces the Democratic proposal and his purpose to 
be 'neither free trade nor anything approaching free 
trade', but only 'readjustment of the schedules to meet 
the actual business conditions and interests of the 
country', to the end that the tariff shall cease to be the 
well-spring of oppressive monopoly and covert taxa- 
tion of the many for the benefit of the few, no fair- 
minded man can question either the truth of his words 
or the reality of his intent. 

"All agree that business stability and popular satis- 
[ 198 ] 



McCOMBS AND McADOO QUARREL 

faction cannot be achieved until the tariff shall be 
revised. Both Mr. Taft and Mr. Roosevelt promise, 
if elected, to take steps to that end. But the history 
of their administrations shows conclusively that it 
cannot be done under their guidance. The policy of 
each, as clearly indicated by the methods he proposes, 
is one of procrastination. The Democratic purpose 
no less surely is that of prompt and effective, though 
careful and considerate, action. 

"President Taft generously admits that the Repub- 
lican Party is not entitled to exclusive credit for the 
bountiful crops, but his advocates do not shrink from 
advancing the fact as an argument for standing pat. 
Prosperit}^ they assert, is at hand if the existing con- 
dition be maintained. Wliy interfere? ^Vhy not let 
well enough alone? Why elect a President and install 
a party whose purpose is to close our mills, destroy 
our industries and drive a starving people to soup- 
houses ? 

"It seems strange that questions such as these should 
be propounded to presumably intelligent persons ; and 
yet they are put forth constantly upon the only sup- 
posable theory that the supreme object of one-half 
of the American people is to bring ruin and disaster 
upon the other half and incidentally, of course, upon 
themselves. 

"Not many, I suspect, are likely to impute to Gov- 
ernor Wilson this malign intent; and even those who 
try to conjure up with him a spirit of destructiveness 
do not deny his possession of intelligence. May it not 

[ 199 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PKESIDENT 

be pertinent, then, to ask what could be his object in 
inflicting miseries upon his fellow men? 

"Assuming, as one must, if these premonitions are 
to be heeded at all, that his heart would be rejoiced 
by universal calamity, is it within reason to anticipate 
that he would be eager to go do^^ii in history as a 
President w^ho has wrought only havoc ? Is it not more 
probable that he would be ambitious to give the 
country a praiseworthy and successful administra- 
tion?" 

"But we are told that the business world is seri- 
ously apprehensive, that Governor Wilson's election 
would retard the return of prosperity. This fear, it 
is solemnly declared in the face of full confidence 
manifested while the betting is 4 to 1, is the only 
obstacle in the path of great industrial progress. 

"Suppose the existing conditions were reversed. 
Suppose business was at a standstill and prospects 
seemed hopeless. What, then, would be the outcry 
of our critics, now pressed so hardly as plausible argu- 
ments? Surely nothing else than positive insistence 
that the Democratic Party and the Democratic can- 
didates are at the bottom of it all. And the moral, 
of course, would be plain : Vote against the man who 
inspires misgivmgs. 

"But the facts do not coincide with the theory. It 
becomes necessary to advance a paradox as an argu- 
ment to fit the case. The absurdity of the whole thing 
is too apparent. Moreover, if stability is the chief 
desideratum, what is to be said of the record begun 
with the agitation of Mr. Roosevelt in 1906 and con- 

[ 200 ] 



McCOMBS AND McADOO QUARREL 

tinued with the shilly-shallying of JNlr. Taft to this 
very day? 

"We will let well enough alone when we have made 
it better. 

"To those sincere citizens who want real progress 
accomplished we say: What could in reason be antici- 
pated from Mr. Roosevelt's best endeavors, with Con- 
gress and the courts against him, except turmoil and 
strife? Does not JMr. Wilson embody all that is best, 
most rational and attainable in IMr. Roosevelt's 
declared aspiration? Surely Governor Wilson is as 
clear-minded, as wide-visioned, as free-handed, as 
honest, as earnest and as resolute. 

"^Moreover, if elected, unlike Mr. Roosevelt, he will 
have a Congress of his o^vn party faith, open to his 
suggestion and responsive to his leadership. Does not 
such a situation presage greater actual accomplish- 
ment in the interest of the whole people? 

"To the thousands of patriotic Republicans who 
regard apprehensively the violation of our most vital 
tradition and resent the attitude of Mr. Roosevelt 
toward the great party to which he owes every step 
in his marvelous political advancement we say this: 
You are being urged to vote for IMr. Taft, not for 
the purpose of electing him, because that is known to 
be impossible, but merely to give him a larger number 
of ballots than will be cast for IMr. Roosevelt. What 
is to be gained thereby? 

"It is a recognized fact that hundreds of thousands 
of Republicans are going to vote for Wilson anyway. 
The Taft vote, then, will be no measure of the real 

[ 201 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Taft strength and sentiment. Its size, whether larger 
or smaller than Mr. Koosevelt's vote, will signify 
nothing. Since the President is to be in the minority 
in any case, as compared with Mr. Wilson, it cannot 
matter how small that minority shall be. 

"Nobody on November 6 will be able to estimate 
the number of Republicans who voted for Wilson, 
who would have voted for Taft but for their sense of 
a patriotic duty to defeat Mr. Roosevelt at all hazards. 
Under such circumstances, whatever the result as to 
second and third places, Roosevelt boasting can avail 
nothing. 

"Why, then, take chances? Why not make assur- 
ance of the perpetuation of constitutional government 
doubly sure by voting for Wilson, as President Taft 
most certainly would advise and do himself if he should 
become convinced of the possibility of ]Mr. Roosevelt's 
accession to a third term? 

"This is said in no partisan si)irit. The action pro- 
posed is urged upon sober, thoughtful and honorable 
men as that of patriotism. Everybodj^ knows that Mr. 
Taft cannot be elected. How great will be the politi- 
cal effect of the sympathy accorded Mr. Roosevelt as 
a consequence of a lunatic's misdeed is wholly conjec- 
tural. It seems apj)arent, however, that the avidity 
of his supporters in trying to capitalize the shocking 
performance of an irresponsible person has defeated 
its own purpose, and that Mr. Roosevelt has practi- 
cally no chance of success. 

"There remains the one and only remote possibility 
of the election going to the House of Representatives, 

[ 202 ] 



McCOMBS AND McADOO QUARREL 

and the utter chaos, confusion, bartering and strain 
upon our governmental system, which would surely 
upset the country beyond possible calculation, and 
might easily endanger American institutions. 

"Upon these grounds we solicit the suffrages of our 
fellow citizens of all political faiths for Woodrow 
Wilson, and urge continuance of unremitting endeavor 
upon those already committed to the great cause of 
wholly free and trulj^ popular government for which 
he stands as a candidate for President of the United 
States". 

A note in the McCombs manuscript indicated 
anew his belief that Roosevelt, not Taft, was the can- 
didate who stood most in Wilson's way. ^Ir. 
McCombs wrote: 

"Never at any time did anyone assume that Mr. 
Roosevelt was not dangerous in that campaign. I 
believe that if his campaign had been i^roperly organ- 
ized he might have been more successful and very 
close to ;Mr. Wilson indeed. 

"The idea often expressed that when Wilson was 
nominated nothing need have been done to elect him 
is fallacious indeed. We had to fight every minute of 
the day. I knew that Taft was out of it. But there 
were so many possible turns in the fortunes of the 
Roosevelt wheel, and so many tremendous possibilities 
in the resourceful Roosevelt himself, that no foe was 
safe in counting him out until the ballots were 
counted". 



r 203 ] 



XVI 
"I OWE YOU NOTHING—'* 

Wilson Elected by an Unprecedented Plurality — O'Gor- 
MAN Proclaims "This Boy, McCombs, Did It" — Presi- 
dent-Elect Wires His "Thanks" — "It Was Ordained of 
God That I Should be President"! Said Wilson to Mc- 
Combs When Actually Elected — Wilson Ignores All 
National Committee Recommendations for Appointments 
— Names Bryan, McAdoo, Tumulty, et al. Despite Pro- 
tests of Those Who Won for Him — McCombs' Slate 
Thrown Into the Waste Basket — House Picks Cabinet 
Ministers. 

[Editor's Note — This chapter is compiled from posthumous 
notes.] 

H AIRMAN McCOMBS received election 
returns November 5, 1912, in the East Room 
of the Waldorf-Astoria. Grouped about him 
were Colonel E. IM. House, Josephus Daniels, Senator 
James A. O'Gorman, Frederic C. Penfield, Rollo 
Wells, Henry Morgenthau, John L. DeSaulles, 
Colonel George Harvey, Jolm W. Clifton, and others. 
At 9 p. M., Mr. McCombs, pale and worn, leaning 
upon the ami of Robert Adamson, stepped to the 
doorway, and with a jubilant smile, announced: "We 
have carried forty states. The victory is complete. 
We have carried New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, 

[ 204 ] 




MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Indiana, New Jersey and even Senator Penrose con- 
cedes we have carried Pennsylvania". 

Senator O'Gornian placed his arms aifectionately 
about JMcCombs and exclaimed: "This is not a victory 
for the Democratic Party. It is a victory for the 
American people. It is the biggest sweep in the 
history of the country". 

All but hugging McCombs, Senator O'Gorman 
added: "And here is the boy who did it" ! 

JNIany present, including the women, crowded about 
INIcCombs and wrung his hand. An hour later this 
wire came from President-elect Wilson, dated Prince- 
ton, reading: 

"William F. McCombs, Democratic National Commit- 
tee, New York: 
"I deeply appreciate your telegram and wish to extend 
to you and the members of the campaign committee my 
warm congratulations on the part you played in the or- 
ganization and conduct of a campaign fought out upon 
essential issues. A great cause has triumphed. Every 
Democrat, every Progressive of whatever alliance, must 
now lend his full force and enthusiasm to the fulfillment 
of the people's hopes, the establishment of tlie people's 
rights so that justice and progress may go hand in hand. 

WooDROw Wilson" 

This message came in response to one sent the 
President-elect by Chairman IMcCombs reading: 

"President-Elect Woodrow Wilson, Princeton, N. J.: 
"My warmest congratulations to you, our next Presi- 
dent. You have won a splendid and significant victory. 
At this hour you appear to have received the largest 

[ 205 ] 



"I OWE YOU NOTHING" 

electoral vote ever given to a Presidential candidate. 
The indications are that your administration will be sup- 
ported by a Congress Democratic in both branches. 

William F. McCombs" 

By midnight Chairman IMcCombs received advices 
warranting him in saying: "Taft has caiTied but two 
states — Utah and Vermont. We have won thirty- 
nine, if not forty, states, with at least 442 of the 531 
electoral votes. We have the House of Representa- 
tives by two to one and the Senate is safely Demo- 
cratic." 

The final returns proved the accuracy of Mr. 
McCombs' statement. Wilson got 442, Roosevelt 77, 
and Taft only 12 votes in the electoral college. Wil- 
son carried every state except IMichigan, Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Washington. Taft 
carried Utah and Vermont only. 

Wilson's pojDular and electoral plurality was the 
greatest in America's history. The total vote was 
14,720,037. Wilson received a total of 6,292,718 
votes, Roosevelt 4,057,429, Taft 3,369,221. Wilson 
got over Roosevelt a plurality of 2,235,289, and over 
Taft 2,923,497. He got more electoral votes than 
Roosevelt and Taft combined. 

Justifiably elated that under his direction a Demo- 
cratic President had been elected for the first time 
since 1892, Mr. McCombs decided to pay a personal 
visit of felicitation to the President-elect. Sleeping 
hardly two hours after a night of receiving returns 
and jubilation, Mr. McCombs went to Prmceton, New 
Jersej^ November 6, 1912. 

[ 206 ] 



"I OWE YOU NOTHING" 

He received a rousing greeting from the university 
students for his masterful and victorious conduct of 
the campaign. He was all but stunned, however, by 
the reception from the man for whose nomination and 
election he was the indisputable chief instrument. 
Mr. INIcCombs frequently recited to me the incidents 
of that visit. He said: 

"I called upon the President-elect at the residence 
he had leased after resigning as President of Prince- 
ton University. I was somewhat amazed to be kept 
waiting for an audience. I forgave that, at the 
moment, because the house was thronged with jubilant 
men and Avomen, pressing about the winner with their 
congratulations. 

"At last the President-elect deigned to recognize 
me. He imperiously beckoned me into his library. 
Wlien we reached there, I said: 'Governor, I came 
over to offer you my sincerest congratulations upon 
your election and to express my hope that you will 
have a happy and successful administration'. 

"The President-elect took my hand in a frigid, 
mechanical way. His stenogTapher started to leave 
the room. 

"He said to the stenographer: 'You need not leave. 
I shall continue my dictation'. 

"Surprised, I inquired: '^Vhat does this mean. 
Governor' ? 

"The Governor fidgeted a bit and jerked out: 'It 
means that every word that passes here is to be 
recorded in black and white'. 

"Then I became provoked and insisted upon an 
[ 207 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

explanation of the affront which I believed had been 
deliberately offered me. When I protested, the Presi- 
dent-elect, with a heartlessness of which up to this 
time I was ignorant, turned upon me and in measured 
tone said: 

*' 'Before we proceed, I wish it clearly understood 
that I owe you nothing'. 

"I modestly suggested that I might be given credit 
for doing a little toward his nomination and election. 

"Haughtily, Governor Wilson retorted: 'Whether 
j'^ou did little or much, remember that God ordained 
that I should be the next President of the United 
States. Neither you nor any other mortal or mortals 
could have prevented that' ! 

"I gasped. I could hardly believe what I heard. 
As I distinctly recall it, I observed that of course God 
helped, but there were men who had sacrificed health, 
wealth and time to give Wilson the high office he 
sought. 

"I had been commissioned by members of the 
National Committee to ask that some of them be 
rewarded. 

"With an iciness which was, I believe, natural, or 
cultivated at times, the President-elect replied: 

" 'I am tired out. I am going to Bermuda for a 
rest. I must insist that I shall not be annoyed with 
applications for office until my return'. 

"I replied, as calmly as my resentment would per- 
mit: * I am tired, too. So are hundreds and thousands 
of others who, when you attempted to hoist the white 
flag, rallied about you and nominated and elected you. 

[ 208 ] 



"I OWE YOU NOTHING" 

They are entitled to immediate and generous consid- 
eration. They have commissioned me to speak for 
them. I recognize your right to name your private 
secretar}^ and other members of your confidential 
staff. But members of the National Committee have 
some suggestions to submit as to members of the 
Cabinet and heads of other departments and bureaus'. 

"Very curtly, Governor Wilson responded: *I 
reserve the privilege of naming whom I please for my 
official family. But, in any event, I shall consider no 
one seriously until after I return from my vacation'. 

" 'May I ask if you have selected your private 
secretarj^? During your absence I may have to com- 
municate with him if I caimot get in touch with you', 
I persisted. 

" 'I have none and will make no choice until I get 
back from Bermuda', was Wilson's ansv/er. 

"All the satisfaction I got was that the President- 
elect had not selected a single man to serve under him. 
I presented him a list of names of men who had been 
indorsed by the National Committee for some of the 
most desirable offices. He, scarcely glancing at it, 
tossed the document to his stenographer and said, as 
he bowed me out: 'I may have another talk with you 
when I get back from Bermuda'. 

"This was the briefest interview I ever had with 
^Ir. Wilson. If ever I had to know Mr. Wilson, this 
was the way to find him out. 

"I determined not to be on bad terms with him no 
matter what happened. I had a perfectly certain idea 
about the way he was going to handle things. I knew 

[ 209 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

that it meant the ruin of the Democratic Party if it 
continued ; but I felt that I owed an obligation to the 
party which had not been in power for twenty years. 
I felt that what had not been done before must be done, 
namely: that the party as a party must be strength- 
ened in the matter of its organization ; that its policies 
must be formulated definitely and distinctly. 

"There should be no turpiture, no excuses, no vacil- 
lation. I believed, as I do yet, that the processes of 
government must be derived from the ]3eople, and that 
the people, high and low, must be furnished with all 
the facts about all the great events or the great pro- 
posals affecting them. 

"I concluded to remain over at Princeton a few days 
and do what I could to impress the President-elect 
that I had made pledges to his most influential sup- 
porters which he must satisfy. I soon learned that Mr. 
McAdoo and Mr. Tumulty had spent election day 
with Governor Wilson and had submitted a list of 
recommendations for nearly every desirable office 
within his gift. 

*'\^nien the newspaper correspondents asked Mr. 
McAdoo why he was not at his desk at New York 
Headquarters, he stammered: 'Well, I thought I 
M ould come over and be the first to congratulate the 
President-elect'. 

"Mrs. Wilson, I was afterward informed, reached 
the President-elect with the definite news of his victory 
only a minute or two ahead of Mr. McAdoo. 

"I called on the President-elect again the Thursday 
after election. 

[ 210 ] 



"I OWE YOU NOTHING" 

"An army of photographers besieged us for snap- 
Shots. The President-elect finally condescended to 
have his picture taken with me. I can hardly say I 
wore a triumphant smile as the 'snapshooters' shot us 
in various poses. 

"Apparently to show the j)ublic that he was not 
ungrateful or discourteous, the President-elect invited 
me to go with him to tlie Princeton-New York Uni- 
versity football game the following Saturday. We 
were accompanied by 'Big Bill' Edwards. While we 
were watching the 'Tigers' overwhelm the Gotham 
boys, I once or twice sought to get a definite answer 
about appointments to carry back to my associates on 
the National Committee. At each hint Governor 
Wilson scowled. Finally, in indignation, mock or 
genuine, he said : 

" 'Once and for all, Mr. McCombs, not a word on 
this subject until I get back from my vacation. I 
must insist upon rest and a chance to think'. 

"I did not renew the subject, and returned to New 
York absolutely in the dark as to the fate of men who 
had fought and made sacrifices to make Wilson 
President". 

Governor Wilson departed for his vacation a few 
days later. He was absent until December 16th. 
Whether or not, while away, he inspected the recom- 
mendations of Chairman McCombs and his associates, 
the fact remains that in the list submitted by them 
these names appeared : 

For Secretary of State: Richard Olney, of Massa- 
chusetts. 

[ 211 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

For Secretary of the Treasury: Henry Morgen- 
thau, of New York. 

For Secretary of War: Colonel John T. McGraw, 
of West Virginia, or General "Bibb" Graves, of 
Alabama. 

For Attorney General : Robert L. Henry, of Texas. 

Not one of the men proposed by McCombs was 
appointed. 

Wliile the President-elect was hibernating in South- 
em climes, McCombs learned that William G. 
McAdoo was stating that he would be Secretary of 
the Treasury, and Joseph P. Tumulty that he would 
be Secretary to the President. 

He was not surprised that McAdoo aimed to handle 
the nation's billions. But he was rather astonished 
that Tumulty still sought the Secretaryship to the 
President. McCombs had been informed that just 
before leaving the country Governor Wilson had 
offered, and Tumulty had accepted, the Secretaryship 
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. This position 
carried a salary in excess of that drawn by the Presi- 
dent's Secretary. Nevertheless, McCombs kept hear- 
ing that Tumulty was to be at the elbow of the 
President at Washington. Unwelcome as this was to 
him, he decided to witlihold continued opposition on 
the ground that the President of course was warranted 
in choosing whom he pleased for this confidential place. 

McAdoo, for Secretary of the Treasury, was a 
proposition which McCombs found difficult to tolerate. 
He called a conference of those who had been inti- 
mately associated with him in the campaign and sought 

[ 212 ] 



"I OWE YOU NOTHING" 

their advice. It was agreed that McCombs himself 
ought to avow himself a candidate for head of the 
financial branch of the government. Reluctantly, 
JNIcCombs accepted the advice on condition, however, 
that he personally should not submit the suggestion to 
the President-elect. 

*'I wish", urged IMcCombs, "to be in the position of 
one seeking no office at all under the Wilson adminis- 
tration. As Chairman of the National Committee, 
however, I reserve the right of recommending candi- 
dates whose fitness is guaranteed by those who were 
most responsible for the nomination and election of 
Governor Wilson. Of course, should the President- 
elect offer me the Secretaryship of the Treasury, or 
the Attorney Generalship, I would feel very grateful 
and complimented. But I shall never personally ask 
either or any place from him". 

Colonel E. INI. House, Cleveland H. Dodge, and 
others, called upon the President-elect upon his return 
from Bermuda, December 16, 1912. They eulogized 
McCombs and urged that he be made either Secretary 
of the Treasury or Attorney General. They argued 
that he was entitled to any office the President-elect 
could give him. 

"What about IMcAdoo"? asked the President-elect. 

"Consider first the man who did more to put you in 
the TVTiite House than any other. We do not care 
what you do for jNIcAdoo after that", was the reply 
of Mr. Dodge. 

"Well, I'll see McCombs and talk it over wnth 
him", responded Governor Wilson. 

[ 213 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Within a few hours after the President-elect got 
back from his outing, the writer happened to meet a 
Wall Street friend. 

"It is no news to you, I presume, that William J. 
Bryan is to be Secretary of State, is it"? asked my 
friend. 

"It is", was my answer. 

"Well, President-elect Wilson has offered the port- 
folio to Bryan and there is the devil to jDay about it. 
But Bryan will accept", said my informant. 

I called up Mr. McCombs at his New York office. 
I told him of my information. He answered: "Don't 
believe all you hear in Wall Street. Most people go 
broke on that. There is no chance of Bryan's appoint- 
ment. The President-elect knows, as well as I do, 
that Bryan did his best to deprive him of the nomina- 
tion and sought to apx)ropriate it for himself. I am 
going to Princeton to see the Governor this afternoon. 
I shall call you up this evening and give you the facts". 

About 10 p. M. McCombs did call me. He said: "I 
regret to say that your informant was right. The 
President-elect, in his desire to start his administration 
without friction with any factions of his party, has 
offered the Secretaryship of State to Mr. Bryan. I 
have made as vehement a protest as I can, and shall 
continue to do so until the very hour of the nomina- 
tions. I have, in detail, reminded the President-elect 
of the plot engineered by Brj^an at the Baltimore 
convention to prevent the Governor's nomination and 
secure his o^\^l. I shall ask every true friend of the 
President-elect to unite with me in insisting that 

[ 214 ] 



"I OWE YOU NOTHING" 

Bryan shall not be intrusted with any confidential 
place under the administration. I have cordially 
renewed my recommendation that Richard Olney, who 
was Secretary of State under Grover Cleveland, is the 
ideal man to handle foreign affairs. I shall persist 
in this". 

During this memorable interview with the Presi- 
dent-elect, Governor Wilson asked Mr. JMcCombs if 
he and his associates would strenuously oppose the 
appointment of William G. McAdoo for Secretary of 
the Treasury. 

"We shall content ourselves with filing our objec- 
tions", replied Mr. McCombs. "We know ]McAdoo. 
We do not consider him a friend of your friends, or of 
yours. He is for McAdoo. That's all! Had his 
advice been accepted at Baltimore, j^ou would not 
have been the convention nominee". 

"Would you personally resent IMcAdoo's apj)oint- 
ment" ? asked the President-elect. 

"Not personally, but for your o^^'Tl sake", was 
iMcCombs' reply. 

]\Ir. ]\IcCombs learned that the President-elect was 
considering Lindley M. Garrison, of Xew Jersey, for 
Secretary of War. He commended this, but wamily 
recommended Colonel John T. IMcGraw, National 
Committeeman from West Virginia, for Garrison's 
assistant. As a second choice, ]\Ir. McCombs sug- 
gested General "Bibb" Graves, of Alabama. Mc- 
Graw had been one of the original Wilson boosters. 
General Graves, despite the fact that his state delega- 
tion was pledged to and fought to the finish for the 

[ 215 ] 



IVIAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

nomination of Oscar W. Underwood, contended as 
hard as he could for Wilson's selection. 

For Attorney General, McCombs argued earnestly 
for the naming of Robert L. Henry, of Texas. He 
was Chairman of the Rules Committee of the House 
of Representatives and had charge of the Wilson 
parliamentary programme at the Baltimore con- 
vention. 

But the President-elect had already promised 
Colonel House to appoint Albert S. Burleson, of 
Texas, Postmaster General. He pleaded that he 
could not choose two members of the cabinet from 
Texas. McCombs admitted that this would be unfair 
to other states. So Henry was eliminated and 
Burleson agreed upon as the Texas member. 

The final conference of the cabinet makers was held 
on the night of the last day in February at the home of 
Colonel House in Nev/ York. There were present the 
President-elect, Colonel House, Chairman jMcCombs, 
and others. 

The session was protracted until almost daylight. 
Colonel House fought for the appointment of Bryan 
as Secretary of State. jMcCombs renewed his attack 
upon the Nebraskan, declaring: "He has opposed 
you. Governor, from the day you became a candidate 
for the Presidency''. He regards himself as the only 
American fit to be President. You are in his way. 
He will, if appointed, seek to build up, out of patron- 
age, a machine to plague you. I beg of you, again, do 
not take this man into your confidence". 

The President-elect was obdurate. He persisted 
[ 216 ] 



"I OWE YOU NOTHING" 

that Bryan must be placated, and that the party wing 
of which he was leader would become an administra- 
tion auxiliary if the man from Lincoln was made Sec- 
retary of State. Governor Wilson also laid stress 
upon the jDoint that even if Brj'-an was out for mischief, 
he could accomplish less in the State than in any other 
department. 

Disgusted, and still admonishing Wilson that he was 
risking ruin for himself and his administration, 
IMcCombs reluctantly withdrew his open opposition 
to Bryan. 

To the very last he fought McAdoo for Secretary of 
the Treasury and Tumulty for Presidential Secretary. 
He, however, cheerfullj'- acquiesced in the election of 
Franklin K. Lane as Secretary of the Interior, and 
David Houston for Secretary of Agriculture. Mc- 
Combs at first questioned whether Josephus Daniels 
possessed the ability to fill the Secretaryship of the 
Navy, a post so admirably administered by William 
C. \Miitney, Benjamin F. Tracy and others who had 
built up America's sea armada. 

But Daniels had rendered valuable service in the 
campaign. Southern Democrats appeared to be 
behind him. Then, too, Daniels had been loj^al to 
McCombs when the plot was brewing to remove him 
as National Chairman and substitute IMcAdoo. 

IMcCombs was astounded when informed that the 
President-elect had chosen William C. Redfield for 
another New York member of the cabinet and assigned 
to the Secretaryship of Commerce. Redfield, Mc- 
Combs maintained, was without any following at all. 

[ 217 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

He was in disfavor with Democrats of his home county 
of Kings. He had been a frequent caller at head- 
quarters during the campaign, and had "annoyed" 
the managers constantly, persisting in interrupting 
their work by dissertations on the tariff. The 
President-elect, however, stuck to Redfield. 



[ 218 ] 



XVII 
INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 

McCoMBs Declines All Offers op Place Under Wilson — 
Treated as a "Rank Outsider" at Inauguration — Can- 
not Pass Bryan-McAdoo-Tumulty Trocha — Republican 
Manager Frank H. Hitchcock, "Down and Out", Com- 
miserates WITH McCoMBs — White House Announcement 
That McCombs is "Patronage Distributor" — McAdoo is 
Real Dispenser. 

THREE DAYS before inauguration, March 4, 
1912, Mr. IMcCombs publicly announced that 
he would not accejit any office within the gift 
of the President. At a reception in his honor given 
by the National Press Club, Washington, D. C, 
IMarch 1, he was introduced as a "man who can have 
anything he wants under the Wilson administration". 
Mr. McCombs smiled. In response, he said: "I 
accept this introduction instead of the cabinet place 
for which you boys have so generously supported me 
and other honors j'ou have sought to confer. I shall 
take no official place under this administration. I 
consider myself amply rewarded because I have been 
identified with the battle which temiinated in the elec- 
tion of Woodrow Wilson as President of the United 
States". 

[ 219 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Newspaper correspondents were astonished at this. 
They had picked McCombs for ahnost every desirable 
place the President had to bestow. They thronged 
about McCombs and asked if he was serious. 

"I certainly ani. There is nothing of the office- 
seeker about me. I shall retain the National Chair- 
manship, however, and do all in my power to 
strengthen the administration and party with the 
people". 

IMcCombs' announcement seemed to confirm reports 
that he and the President-elect had quarrelled over 
the distribution of offices. The newspaper men rushed 
telegrams all over the country to that effect. 

Mr. McCombs felt like, and was treated by jealous 
rivals, as a "rank outsider", at the inauguration of 
President Wilson in 1913. William J. Bryan, Wil- 
liam G. McAdoo, Joseph P. Tumulty and A. ^litchell 
Palmer constituted themselves a bodyguard about the 
new executive which Mr. jMcCombs was too modest to 
try to break through. 

Early in the morning of March 4, ]Mr. McCombs, 
merely as a citizen, courteously called upon the Presi- 
dent, at the latter's hotel. He was lost in the multi- 
tude assembled in and about the Presidential suite. 
He did not attempt to force his way in. 

]Mr. Bryan, who had been aj^pointed Secretary of 
State; Mr. McAdoo, who had been appointed Secre- 
tary of the Treasury ; ]\Ir. Tumulty, who was named 
for Secretary to the President, and IMr. Palmer, who 
afterward became Attorney General, saw to it that 
McCombs had no chance to get a word in private with 

[ 220 ] 



INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 

the man he had helped much more than they had to 
send to the White House. 

After being closeted with the President an hour, 
Mr. Bryan came out. He told newspaper men that it 
had been decided to offer the French Ambassadorship 
to Mr. JNIcCombs. 

The veriest novice in politics loiew that McCombs 
could not afford and would not accept the post. 

Just as ]Mr. McCombs was leaving the Presidential 
quarters he was told by a third party of the tender. 
A smile of derision played upon his face. FrowTiing, 
he said: *'I cannot take a place which would cost me 
a hundred thousand dollars a year to maintain". 

It was exasperating enough to have the rumor of 
the tender come through a comparative stranger. It 
was the more galling that the official news should 
emanate from a man against whom he had warned the 
President, but who had been taken into the Presiden- 
tial family. 

Mr. Wilson had hardly been sworn in than Mr. 
IMcCombs spied, in the crowd at the rear, Frank H. 
Hitchcock. Hitchcock had been Chairman of the 
Republican National Committee from 1907 to 1912 
and Postmaster General under President Taft. He 
had just lost his job. 

"One touch of nature makes the whole world kin". 
So thought JNIcCombs as he greeted Hitchcock. With 
a sadness and sympathy that Hitchcock will never 
forget, ^IcCombs said: 

"I wonder, Frank, if I don't feel and look quite as 
miserable as you do"? 

[ 221 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

"I'm son-y for you, old man. Let's go do\vntown 
and have some lunch", replied Hitchcock, as he linked 
his arm in McCombs' and led him to his limousine. 
The Democratic and Republican Warwicks drove to 
a hotel. For an hour or more they discussed their 
respective predicaments. 

"Well, Bill ! At least I had a chief who was grate- 
ful, though the man you picked defeated him", said 
Hitchcock, commiseratingly. 

The men rehearsed their disappointments until they 
heard the bands blaring on their way down from the 
Capitol. They joined a party on the reviewing stand, 
opi)osite the White House, to witness the return of 
the parade escorting the new President. 

March 5, the day after President Wilson's inaugu- 
ration, Chairman McCombs called the National Com- 
mittee together. Rumor had it that William G. 
McAdoo, jubilant over his elevation to the Secretary- 
ship of the Treasury, and Joseph P. Tumulty, angered 
by McCombs' opposition to his appointment as Secre- 
tary to the President, planned to supplant the Chair- 
man and substitute one of their o^mi clique. 

McCombs learned of this the night before. He con- 
ferred with Hemy Morgenthau, smarting under the 
refusal of the President to make him his Secretary of 
the Treasury; Committee Treasurer Rollo Wells, 
Homer S. Cummings, of Connecticut; Clark Howell, 
of Georgia, and others. He discovered that enough 
votes were available to prevent consummation of any 
McAdoo-Tumulty plot. 

When the Committee met, members flocked about 
[ 222 ] 



INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 

McCombs, pledged their support and denounced as 
an outrage the refusal of the President even to con- 
sider their recommendations for office and his per- 
sistent declination to testify publicly to Mr. McCombs' 
wonderful achievements in nominating and electing 
him. 

McCombs expressed his gratitude for the devotion 
of his associates. He was much touched when a reso- 
lution was offered and adopted tendering the gratitude 
of the Committee for his great accomplishments, and 
pledging undying affection and loyalty to him for the 
future. 

Chairman McCombs returned his appreciation and 
added: "It will be a great delight to carry on the work 
of the Committee and to join with you in broadening 
its scope. I do not believe that, after an election, 
whether it results in victory or defeat, a committee 
should be dormant until a few months before another 
election. We should be in thorough co-operation all 
the time. I don't know how to get along without 
organization. My mind runs in that channel. We 
have the best body of fighting Democrats in the coun- 
try. In order to assure a continuation of what we 
have accomplished, we must continue an organized 
army. Unless we do, we are going to meet an organ- 
ized army on the other side. That will be dangerous. 

"It will be a great delight to receive suggestions 
and advice from Committeemen. Two years from 
now, when we meet strong opposition, we can mam- 
tain ourselves in a Congress and reorganize for the 
Presidential battle of 1916". 

[ 223 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

This speech was vociferously applauded. 

Clark Howell offered a resolution empowering 
Chairman McCombs to name a committee to take 
charge of the Senatorial campaigns in Illinois and 
New Hampsliire. The Chairman chose Homer S. 
Cummings, of Connecticut, as McCombs' Vice Chair- 
man; Rollo Wells, of Missouri, Treasurer, and 
Thomas J. Pence to take charge of Washington Head- 
quarters. The McAdoo-Tumulty group uttered not 
a public peep against McCombs at this meeting. 

Commenting on the foregoing, IMr. McCombs wrote 
this memorandum for his book : 

"I contemplated resigning as Chairman on the 5th 
of March, 1913. I was making every preparation for 
it. Before the Committee meeting, I told some of 
my most intimate friends on the Committee of my 
purpose. It went the rounds. Their answer to 
me was : 

*' 'You have just laid do^vn plans for the cohesion 
and the strengthening of the Democratic Party; you 
have been all through this thing; you know its every 
corner; you have the complete confidence of the 
Democracy of America; you must stay and finish 
the job.* 

" I yielded to that argument, much to my regret." 

Chairman McCombs remained in Washington for 
a few days to renew his efforts to place friends. He 
called frequently at the White House and kept at the 
President to fulfil his obligations. ^larch 14th a semi- 
official note from the White House read: 

"Mr. McCombs will not accept the Ambassador- 
[ 224 ] 



? 



\\il 




KowAHi) M. House 



INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 

ship to Paris. He will remain as the head of the 
Democratic National Committee. 

"Second: Mr. McCombs will supervise the distribu- 
tion of patronage throughout the United States — all 
the states. 

"Third: In New York Senator James A. O' Gor- 
man, wlio has evinced an inclination to lean toward 
Tammany in the matter of recommendations, will step 
aside, and ^Ir. McCombs, who has never had any con- 
nection with Tammany, will recommend the patronage 
there." 

It was also announced: "Under the agreement 
reached, ^Ir. McCombs' word will be final with the 
President. This does not mean, however, that Mr. 
McCombs and the President will not confer with Sen- 
ators and Representatives. On the contrary, there 
will be many such conferences. The best men will 
get the places. Wliere there is a number of appli- 
cants, the recommendations of Senators and Repre- 
sentatives will be followed. 

"The President's action in deciding to accept Mr. 
McCombs' recommendations means that the indepen- 
dent and Progressive Democrats in New York will 
fare just as well as the Tammany men. Senator 
O'Gorman is satisfied with the arrangement. He and 
Chairman McCombs will work together in New York 
with the understanding that all recommendations 
must be passed upon by McCombs." 

Despite this compact, the President failed to fulfil 
any part of it. 

Popular ^^Tath at the refusal of the President to 
[ 225 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

manifest the slightest gratitude for his Warwick's 
prodigious accomplishments in his behalf became 
nation-wide. Even Wilson administration organs 
attacked the President for his alleged declination to 
show some appreciation of what McCombs had done 
for him. The President renewed his offer to Mr. 
McCombs for a foreign mission. 

The moment this became kno^vn, enemies of the 
administration shouted : 

"Wilson and McAdoo plan to drive McCombs out 
of the country and thus lay hold on the party organ- 
ization he has in his grip" ! 

However this may have been, President Wilson, 
soon after his inauguration and shutting McCombs 
and his friends out of his official family, formally 
tendered to Mr. McCombs the Ambassadorship to 
France a second time. It came in the form of a brief 
note. Mr. McCombs received it while prostrated by 
illness in New York. He felt that the honor offered 
required an answer in person. He was about to go 
direct to Washington when his physician directed that 
he remain in bed. Mr. McCombs therefore deputized 
his law partner, Frederick R. Ryan, to carry his 
answer to the President. 

JNIr. Ryan went to the \^niite House, and was there 
courteously received bj^ Mr. Tumulty. It was neces- 
sary to await the President's convenience, he being 
extremely busy that morning. After a delay of about 
three hours, the President met Mr. Ryan in the office 
of the Executive Secretary. Mr. Ryan explained 
briefly his mission to the President, stating the reasons 

[ 226 ] 



INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS 

actuating Mr. ^IcConibs in declining the Ambassador- 
ship. On learning that jNIr. McConibs was ill, the 
President asked: "Is he following the advice of his 
physician"? INIr. Rj^an replied that he believed he 
was. The President then said: "If that is so, it is the 
first time in his life that jMr. JMcCombs ever followed 
anybody's advice". With that si:atement he turned 
abruptly and went back to his office. 

Shortly thereafter Mr. IMcCombs talked the matter 
over with the President, and on March 21, 1913, issued 
the following statement in connection therewith : 

"To-day I communicated to the President my final 
decision as to the very great honor he has done me in 
tendermg me the Ambassadorship to France, with 
assurances of my profound appreciation. No public 
position within his gift could be more attractive to me 
personally. In view of its very great dignity and 
importance, I have naturally studied the matter with 
much care. 

"After reconsidering the tender, the prime motives 
which were in my mind before have impelled me to 
decline. The acceptance of the post would involve 
greater sacrifices than I should make. I do not feel 
that I can afford to leave my lif ework — practice of 
the law. I feel compelled to devote myself to my per- 
sonal affairs, and at the same time I will lend any 
assistance in my power that will contribute to the 
success of the Democratic Administration and the 
Democratic Party". 

The President issued this comment: 

"I am very sorry indeed that Mr. McCombs cannot 
[ 227 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

accQpt the appointment to France. I was particu- 
larly anxious that he should. jMy admiration for his 
abilities, mj^^ knowledge of his singular capacity for 
grasping complex situations, my confidence in his tact 
and resourcefulness, as well as my affection for him 
and the intimate relations that of course exist between 
us, combine to make my disappointment very great 
indeed. But I, of course, appreciate the force of the 
reasons he gives. He would have accepted at an 
unreasonable sacrifice. I could not further press the 
offer upon him". 

Simultaneously the President issued this memo- 
randum : 

"It is a great pity that the country has to ask such 
sacrifices of those who are invited to serve abroad — a 
service which every year becomes more exacting and 
more important. The sacrifice of time, of means and 
of opportunity at home is very serious for any but 
men of large means and leisure, and the diplomatic 
service is unnecessarily hampered". 

Mr. McCombs was later informed by the President 
during a short interview that he had offered the 
<' Ambassadorship to Great^Britain to Richard Olney, 

who had been recommended by INIr. McCombs for 
Secretary of State. Mr. Olney declined. Then the 
mission w^as offered to Charles W. Eliot, President 
Emeritus of Harvard University. He, too, declined. 
Then William H. Sharp took the post. 



[ 228 ] 



?■ 

XVIII 

COLONEL HOUSE — THE "INTRIGUER" 

Tries to Bargain with McCombs to Discard Wilson for 
Bryan and "We'll Control the United States" — Offer 
Furiously Rejected — Though Opposed to Wilson's 
Nomination, the "Colonel" Names Whom He Pleases 
for Office — "Fed on Wilson's Passion for Greatness 
AND Said 'No' ! or 'Yes' ! as Pcequired" — How He Muddled 
Things for the President — Morgenthau, Baruch and 
Elkus Portrayed. 

[Editor's Note — ]Mr. McCombs takes up his narrative again, 
devoting nearly an entire chapter to Colonel House.] 

DURING the pre-convention months, once a 
week, whenever possible. Governor Wilson 
came to my apartment, the Royalton, in 
West 44th Street, to talk over matters in general. I 
always made it a point, in view of his lack of knowl- 
edge of men in public or political life, or men who 
might be of assistance, to have him meet them there. 

It is to be understood that Governor Wilson spent 
his life exclusively in an academic atmosphere. I dare 
say that even when he went to Washington as Presi- 
dent he did not Imow seventy-five men in public life. 
Indeed, I think this is no exaggeration. 

The meetings at the Royalton had this advantage: 
I could select the men that I knew might be attracted 

[ 229 ] 



IVIAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

to him, and those whom I knew w^ould at once dislike 
him intensely. In the case of the latter, I must con- 
fess that I kept them away from him and drew the 
picture myself. 

During November, Governor Wilson was to be in 
town. I asked Colonel House if he would care to 
meet him. Mr. House, of course, accepted with 
pleasure. In a few minutes he arrived from his hotel. 
I presented him. The conversation ran along conven- 
tion lines. It did not touch any subject involving 
public affairs, much less the Presidency. 

Other gentlemen came, who had an appointment, 
and Colonel House retired. 

Late in December, the Colonel called up and asked 
me if I would care to present an invitation to Governor 
Wilson to dine with a Professor Houston, who had 
been President of the University at Austin, Texas, 
but who was then President of the University at St. 
Louis. 

Mr. House said, incidentally, that Mr. Houston 
had made a special study of the tariff, and that the two 
might meet on common grovmd on that issue, especially 
since the Governor was to make his tariff speech on 
January 3, 1912. 

The dinner passed off quite pleasantly. There was 
general conversation. President Houston intimated a 
desire to discuss the tariff. Governor Wilson caromed 
off the issue and there was nothing further heard of 
that. The conversation was then resumed along con- 
ventional lines, Colonel House not participating. 

I went later to see Colonel House on the very prac- 
[ 230 ] 



COLONEL HOUSE — THE "INTRIGUER" 

tical matter of his contribution. He said he could 
make none, then disappeared. 

However, during the spring of 1912 I was invited 
by Colonel House to become a week-end guest at 
Beverly, Massachusetts. I accepted the invitation and 
moreover had a very pleasant time. 

The Texas situation was discussed. I told him that 
it was all "sewed up" and that Colonel Ball, of Austin, 
had the matter thoroughly in hand. The Colonel then 
made it known to me that he, too, had been writing 
some letters. 

I can positively state that Colonel House had noth- 
ing to do with carrying the State of Texas in the 
primaries for Woodrow Wilson, except, as he told 
me himself, he had written a few letters. I think no 
responsible person who took part in that difficult 
primary would contradict me for an instant. 

But returning to the Beverly week-ends : As I was 
getting in my cab to go for my train one day, Colonel 
House came out with me. He said: "You know, Mr. 
McCombs, that Woodrow Wilson cannot be nom- 
inated. I think I can do something with Bryan, and 
if you will turn the present forces of Woodrow Wilson 
to Senator Culberson of Texas, you and I will control 
the United States for the next four years'*. 

I tried to be as polite as possible inasmuch as I was 
a departing guest. But I said that I had told Gov- 
ernor Wilson that I would be with him until the end. 
No such combination as the Colonel suggested was 
possible in the convention. 

Senator Culberson was unfortunately a sick man. 

[ 231 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

For that reason he was losing his grip on the pubhc. 
In addition, he came from the wrong state. I felt sure 
that if Mr. Bryan had anything in his mind at all about 
the convention it would be his own candidacy. 

I left House, feeling that he was a puny intriguer, 
but bold enough to assert an absurdity when it might 
possibly be to his advantage. I think when this Bev- 
erly conversation is analj^zed in the light of subsequent 
events, much may be augured of what happened in 
Washington during Mr. Wilson's incumbency as 
President. 

Colonel House took no further interest. I never 
saw nor heard of him again until some one told me, 
shortly before the Baltimore convention, that he had 
sailed for Europe for an indefinite stay. 

Contrary to other published statements, and my 
associates in the Baltimore convention will bear me 
out. Colonel House had nothing whatever to do with 
that convention or its processes. 

On his return from abroad, the Colonel came to me, 
and said he would like a letter from me of presentation 
to the Presidential nominee. I thereupon wrote one 
for him to Governor Wilson, but in the confusion of 
his mail probably he did not have a chance to answer 
it. Colonel House came to me ten days later, much 
perturbed. He asked if I would give him a letter of 
presentation which he would take by hand to Sea Girt. 
It was a small courtesy. I loiew that the Governor's 
business was such that he might not to able to see him 
for days. But Colonel House persisted. I wrote to 
the Governor saying that this letter presented Colonel 

[ 232 ] 



COLONEL HOUSE — THE "INTRIGUER" 

House, whom he perhaps remembered as having met 
at my apartment, and at dinner at Colonel House's 
home in New York when Professor Houston and I 
were present. 

Colonel House took the letter and expressed profuse 
thanks. I heard nothing of it for some time. I noticed 
about the third week before the Presidential campaign 
closed that Colonel House was aroimd headquarters 
every afternoon, trjang to meet everybody. Further- 
more, he was anxious that I should go riding through 
the park with him, but I never did. 

In some way or other, which I can never tell, I 
became suspicious that House was at that time intrigu- 
ing. I paid no special attention to it because I could 
not imagine that he could he helpful or hurtful to 
anyone. 

The election took place. I did not see anything 
more of Colonel House. He had been merely a 
passing incident to me because I had been in the large 
business of putting a big operation through. 

About December 15, 1912, the President-elect went 
to the Waldorf-Astoria prior to sailing for Beniiuda. 
I called to pay my respects and wish him a pleasant 
journey. 

I found House there, seated with him alone. The 
President-elect and I had fifteen or twenty mmutes' 
general conversation. House sat silently, in a bowed 
position, his hands crossed over his chest. He never 
took his eyes off the President-elect. With servile 
alacrity he agreed with every word the President-elect 
uttered. y.' 

[ 233 ] ■' 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

After this session I left the President-elect, and he 
went to his boat bound for Bermuda. 

I could not but wonder at the presence of House. 
. . . Why, above all men, should he be there? His 
manner was nothing more or less than that of a digni- 
fied flunky who was only permitted to sit down and 
say "Yes" or "Xo" to the President-elect, as the case 
might require. 

As I walked down the corridor to the elevator, I 
wondered very much where House fitted in. I kept 
wondering about him as I went down the elevator. 
As I passed out of the hotel, I felt I had the psychol- 
ogy of it, when I remembered that James R. Keene 
told me about the great horse Sysonby: that in order 
to keep him quiet, his trainers always kept a kitten 
in the stall with him. Very often, too, the kitten 
was taken as far as the track when the horse was to 
race. 

Nobody seemed to know that House was becoming 
influential. But it was only about the time of the 
inauguration that I found out that he had a power 
with Wilson. Of course, it is well known that he put 
Brj'^an, Burleson, McReynolds and Houston into the 
Cabinet. This he did out of hand. 

It became clear to me that if House, an unknown, 
had this much power, in the end the organized Democ- 
racy of America was to receive a severe shock. There 
is no question that House was responsible for most of 
the large appointments of the Wilson administration 
and for grievous mistakes in that regard. 

It is absolutely sure also, that his hand was evident 
[ 234 ] 



\ 



COLONEL HOUSE — THE "INTRIGUER" 

in some of the great mistakes in Wilson's executive 
politics, as well as his legislative suggestions. 

I have made faithful inquiry and have yet failed to 
get a view from a single impartial man who Imew 
House that he did not exactly conform to the impres- 
sion which I took away with me on the first evening at 
the Gotham in INTew York. 

House has been called by many "a man of mystery". 
Such is far from the case. In my mind, in the first 
instance, we must take count of the analogy of 
Sysonby. In the second place, House did the thing 
w'hich any newspaper man will tell you can be done, — 
created an air of mystery about himself by being with 
the President, and alwaj'^s refusing to talk. 

House no doubt fed to the limit on Mr. Wilson's 
all-absorbing passion for the appearance of greatness. 
I say it, without reserve, that a practical man would 
not keep House about him fifteen minutes. 

But House likes publicity. He likes to create, 
through his atmosphere of mystery, a conviction of 
greatness. The egotistical book called the "Real 
Colonel House" reveals this characteristic of House. 
That book w^as written, at the instance of House, by 
a newspaper man. I am told by the editor who pub- 
lished it that House personally revised the proofs and 
wrote most of what is quoted of him in that volume. 
If one can stand the reading of it without nausea in 
the light of the above facts, one can indeed understand 
the "Real Colonel House". 

In February, 1913, House appeared at my apart- 
ment. "Now", said he, "we must all fix this thing up. 

[ 235 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

I will call jMcAdoo right up here. He will arrive in 
twenty minutes. I know where he lives, and you and 
he can have the selections of posts in the Cabinet with 
the exception of one". 

I quickly realized who the one was — Bryan. 

House continued: 

"Now if we fix this thing up among us, McAdoo 
and you and I will control the United States for the 
next four years". 

I was so enraged at the thought that I answered him 
in far from drawing-room langiiage and asked him to 
get out of my apartment as quickly as possible. 

Subsequent events prove that House was right, for 
later nothing that House or McAdoo desired was 
turned down. They delivered vast volumes of patron- 
age throughout the United States, and by this they 
high-handedly offended and overruled Congressmen 
and Senators. 

I have been told bj" hundreds of truthful men that 
when they wanted anything done at Washington, it 
was essential to get the approval of ]Mr. House first. 
I have seen this system in operation. It is well lalo^vn 
that McAdoo practically had his way in everything, 
and that the other members of the Cabinet need not 
have been there at all. 

'No man I have ever asked about House has said 
that he had any intelligence. A^Hien persons have vis- 
ited him he has rubbed his hands like a girl, using a 
soft, low voice. His only answer to any question has 
been a "We will see" ! 

It was early in February, 1913, that Colonel House 
[ 236 ] 



\ 



COLONEL HOUSE — THE "INTRIGUER" 

arranged that "Captain" Bill McDonald be dispatched 
to Princeton as the special bodyguard of the Presi- 
dent-elect. This amused me intensely. "Captain" 
Bill was an old withered up man, since dead, wlio had 
at some time acquired, under the skill of an artist, the 
reputation of a "Gun Fighter". 

The "Captain" brought two guns down. Pie walked 
up and dowTi the quiet streets of Princeton proclaim- 
ing himself as the bodyguard of Wilson and the great- 
est "Gun Fighter" in the world. It then became clear 
to me that Wilson liked "Opera Bouffe", and the 
little publicity this would bring. It also appeared that 
House was getting very close to the President. 

Another man who, in making Wilson, rose himself 
to fame was Bernard ]M. Baruch. He was the strong- 
est character that developed during the administration. 
For many years prior to Wilson's election Baruch was 
engaged in speculation on the New York Stock 
Exchange. The onl}'- place or position he held was 
that of Trustee of the College of the City of New 
York. It was there that I first met him. 

Baruch was absorbed in money making. I came to 
know him very w^ell at the board meetings of the col- 
lege. In our talks I often urged him to try to keep 
his millions, taken merely from speculation, and not 
lose them as had every man I had known. To this 
point I cited the case of Mr. James R. Keene. 

I have told how I introduced him to Mr. Wilson. 
His first public work was on the Preparedness Com- 
mittee of NTew York under Mayor John Purroy 
Mitchel. In this he was an active factor. He then 

[ 237 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

went to Washington and became a member of the 
Defense League, an unofficial body, of which he was 
made Chairman. Later the President made him 
Chairman of the War Board. 

Baruch is one of the most pleasant men to meet in 
the world. But his dominating idea is quick turns 
for profits. The President constantly pushed him on 
until he was a real power in Washington. 

In 1911, Rabbi Stephen Wise, who had always been 
an ardent follower of jMr. Wilson, thought he might 
interest LLenry Morgenthau in the cause. After meet- 
ing Govei-nor Wilson, and after his speech for the 
revocation of the Russian Treaty, Mr. Morgenthau 
agreed to underwrite Governor Wilson's campaign 
for $20,000 — $5,000 a month. In the very "weak" 
days of April and May, ^Ir. Morgenthau became 
"very" weak, but I held him to his pledge. I made 
him Chairman of the Finance Committee later on this 
agreement. I told Mr. Morgenthau and Mr. Abram 
I. Elkus that I would make either of them Chairman 
of the Finance Committee, if the other would give his 
endorsement, including mine, for some public office, if 
he desired one. 

Elkus and Morgenthau consulted. Morgenthau 
was agreed upon. Nevertheless, Elkus came to head- 
quarters on important work and served in a very 
efficacious manner. 

INIorgenthau, on the other hand, proved a disap- 
pointment. When I found a deficit and the $640,000 
budget, I called in Morgenthau and Rollo Wells, the 
Treasurer. I had already signed a note for $200,000. 

[ 238 ] 



COLONEL HOUSE — THE "INTRIGUER" 

I'pa.ssed it to Morgenthau for execution. His pallor 
was such that I thought we would need a physician. 
He begged for time to see some of his friends. There- 
upon I ended the conversation. What I wanted was 
to get ^lorgenthau on his toes in the matter of con- 
tributions. He succeeded in collecting about $50,000 
from somewhere in about two days. Elkus contributed 
something like $20,000 himself. 

JNIorgenthau, early in January, 1912, came to me 
before breakfast one morning, and said he was a can- 
didate for Secretary of the Treasury. I asked him 
what had become of Mr. Elkus. He was to have the 
first choice. "Oh", he said, "Abie is ineligible"! 

In the early part of the summer of 1913, Mr. Mor- 
genthau came to see me while I was ill at my hotel in 
Paris. His first words, accompanied by violent ges- 
ticulations, were that he had been insulted; that the 
President had offered him the Ambassadorship to 
Turkey, and that he wouldn't take it if he knevv' that 
the four walls in which we were should crush him to 
death. 

I said: "Henry, these walls are pretty thick. You 
had better go back to Washington and take the place". 

He did. 

As for Mr. Elkus, he waited for many months with- 
out an appointment. He then succeeded Morgenthau 
as Ambassador to Turkey. At the beginning of the 
War he came back with a most excellent record. He 
was one of the few men, also, who appreciated the fact 
that having been an Ambassador in the foreign service 
does not necessitate writing a book, or lecturing, or 
engaging in moving pictures. 

[ 289 ] 



PART II 
ANALYSIS, RETROSPECT — OPINIONS 



[ 241 ] 



XIX 

THE COST OF VANITY 

"Stand-Patter" Aldrich Provoked the 1912 Republican 
Revolt — "Roosevelt Lost Through Bad Tactics- — Wil- 
son Won Because Sick Parties Clutched Each Other's 
Throats — Wilson Lost Through Lust for Power, Which 
Made Him the Joke of the World Powers — Meddling, 
Muddling and Colossal Vanity — Brutal in Victory — 
Cowardly in Defeat". 

[Editor's Note — The McCombs narrative is resumed in this 
chapter. ] 

|HE SUCCESS of Wilson was due not only to / 
cumstances in the Republican ranks and to the 5 
/good campaign work, but to a series of cir- x 
lloosevelt-Taft split. The following, in brief, shows -/- 
the state of affairs : 

The Republicans had reached the zenith of their 
]:>ower in the time of Senator Nelson W. Aldrich, of 
Rliode Island. His power became so supreme that the 
younger and disobedient members of the Senate had 
no chance whatever. Mr. Aldrich, no doubt, believed 
that the Republican Party could remain in power as 
long as it desired by "standing pat"; admitting no 
progressive legislation whatever, but grinding along 
with its group control. 

[ 243 ] 




MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

The first sign of explosion appeared in the failure 
to recognize in any way the strength of the younger 
M _— „ members and excluding them from participation. 
'• Senator Robert ^. LaFollette, of Wisconsin, was the 

first to pry up the lid. Then many members of the 
party followed the same process. It proved that the 
power of the old leaders was passing fast, although 
they did not know it. 

There sprang up a Progressive group which, to my 
mind, did not mean at the beginning anything except 
opposition to the control in the Senate. Young lead- 
ers developed. They voiced their views against the 
powers that be, and by 1911 this protest had spread 
all over the country. 

President Taf t was sitting by, in a kind of way try- 
ing to please everybody and inevitably pleasing 
nobody. However, the bold crowd of "Stand-Patters" 
made up their minds that they would see it out and 
demonstrate their control of the party by renominating 
President Taft in 1912. 

The so-called "Progressives", first led by Mr. 
LaFollette and later and finally by Theodore Roose- 
velt, began a most vigorous campaign for the nom- 
ination. They produced almost, but not quite, enough 
strength. Thereupon, in another convention, the voice 
of protest was raised like a clap of thunder by Theo- 
dore Roosevelt as the Progressive nominee. 

I have always believed that had Roosevelt not 
stayed in his rooms in Chicago in 1912 while the 
Republican nominations were going on, and had he 
appeared with all his tremendous vigor in the conven- 

[ 244 ] 



THE COST OF VANITY 

tion, he could have overthro^vn the opposition and 
could have been the nominee. ^Ir. Roosevelt was a 
great judge of politics. But as a tactician he was a 
tremendous failure. Nobody in the Republican con- 
vention was very strong for Taft. It was a conven- 
tion dominated by elderly men who could have been 
SAvept over as ten pins if vigor and force had been 
applied. 

Then came the Baltimore Democratic Convention. 
There was bitter fighting, struggling and manouev- 
ring from the first until the last. No contest could have 
been staged that was more virulent, more soul-search- 
ing, more acrimonious at times. There was a struggle 
of strong men, each strii^ped to his waist to support his 
0A\Ti particular candidate. 

The Wilson nomination was made. As one, the 
whole convention like magic came together for the 
nominee. Leaders and rank and filers worked for him 
throughout the campaign, believing that the moment 
had come when the Democratic Party might get 
together and again become a constructive, fighting 
organization. As I have shown elsewhere, after Mr. 
Wilson was elected he set about to destroy the pur- 
poses of these men and to make them victims of his 
o\Ml1 vanity and love of power. 

But to return to the Republican Part3^ It was 
sick; it was tired and disconsolate. The campaign 
centered about Roosevelt alone. There was no time 
to form an organization. Unfortunately for him, 
those closest by him were not organizers. The Pro- 
gressive Party was sick also, sick of the Republican 

[ 245 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Party, groping about, holding up its hands to Roose- 
velt as the possible saviour. 

It can be seen that Wilson had opposed to him the 
Republican Party that was politically sick, and the 
Progressive Party, unorganized and relying upon the 
strength of one man protesting against things as they 
were. 

I must say of Mr. Roosevelt that he premised many 
of our national necessities. Although his platform was 
loosely joined, it pointed to things which the American 
people must do, and some of which they have done. 

Mr. Wilson's strength lay primarily in the fact that 
he had as his opponents two sick parties at each other's 
throats. While the Democratic Party had no particu- 
lar enthusiasm for him, the leaders had a vigorous de- 
sire to come back into power. And they worked. It 
was not INIr. Wilson's personality. In that campaign 
it amounted to very little. It was X3rimarily the fact 
that the Rei^ublican Parties had disintegrated into 
factions and schisms. 

Prior to the '16 campaign. President Wilson had 
made much more progress with the rank and file of 
this party. 

He made no friends and many enemies. He took a 
detached view of everything. He sat at Sea Girt, 
assuming the best. But the War was on. The idea 
of not changing parties in the middle of the stream 
and the slogan, "He kept us out of War", was abroad. 
So he came back to power, with very little to spare, 
and with no kindness of feeling from the American 
people. 

[ 246 ] 



THE COST OF VANITY 

As I write this (1919), Mr. Wilson is alone in the 
midst of a most convulsive situation. He has proven 
himself utterly unfit to deal with it. 

Wilson's visit abroad, w hich consumed seven months, 
resulted in this: A wonderful welcome whereby it was 
arranged that he should sleep in the palaces of kings, 
where his exceeding vanity from the beginning was 
catered to. 

The crowds in Milan and other cities of Italy, told 
that he was their saviour, wildly acclaimed him. They 
threw flowers. He threw kisses. This parade was 
soon over. His Fourteen Points, which he solemnly 
asserted would go into the Leagxie of Nations, had 
disappeared. 

President Wilson told the foreign potentates "that 
the American people were with him". Europeans 
have some knowledge of America. They knew the 
Americans were not with Wilson. 

Wilson took over to France with him on the commis- 
sion men who would do his bidding. There was the 
ever present "Little Colonel House". There was 
Henry T. White, an aged man ^^^o has long since 
retired from the active affairs of the world. There 
was General Tasker T. Bliss, also an aged man, who 
had never figured in diplomacy. Finally, there was 
Secretary of State Lansing, who, according to his o^vn 
testimony before the Senate Committee, was not 
apprised of many of the vital parts of the proposed 
covenant until they were actually agreed to by Wilson. 

It was Wilson who proposed to give Shantung to 
[ 247 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Japan, which would set up for Japan a most powerful 
enemy against us in any future war. 

He said he did not loiow anything about the existing 
secret treaty prior to 1916, when it had been published 
all over Europe. At this writing he is the joke of 
every power in the world. He came back somewhat 
more willing to see people. He is in trouble (August 
21, 1919). 

It is the usual Wilson. He allowed his pockets to 
be picked by the Powers of Europe while masses were 
throwing bouquets at him and he kisses to them. The 
transformation has come. 

I have said, and rejieat, that Wilson is the most 
remorseless, the most tyrannical man when he gets the 
smell of power. In possible defeat no one that the 
earth has ever produced can excel his speed in retire- 
ment. 

Ajs I write these observations, there lies before me 
Colonel Henry Watterson's analysis of President 
Wilson's continuous performance at Paris. I cannot 
improve upon it, so I reproduce it: 

"The Herald, March 31, 1919. 

"Mr. Wilson a Punishment for Some National 
Sin, Is View of Colonel Watterson. 

"president's 'mediocre mind and colossal vanity' 
will result in setting europe afire by mid- 
SUMMER, EDITOR DECLARES 'hIS MISSION 

to make trouble wherever he 
appears' 

[Special Despatch to the Herald.] 
"Miami, Fla., Sunday — In response to the Herald's 
i 248 ] 



THE COST OF VANITY 

inquiry 'What of the President's continuous performance 
in Europe?' Mr. Henry Watterson, detained in Miami 
by a recent indisposition, replied: — 'I think the events 
helped along by the President himself, will verify my 
forecast that he is not merely a candidate for a third 
term in the WHiite House but that for a nomination to 
such he holds all the winning cards in his hands.' 

" 'You mean that he controls the Democratic machine?' 

" 'Why, yes', he answered, 'if you care to put it that 
way. The Democratic party so called, he long ago 
abolished, having previously much debauched it. Noth- 
ing of it survives, except the tattered label, and he holds 
that betwixt his thumb and forefingers. I am inclined 
to believe, however, that he has eliminated the United 
States from his immediate activities as an established 
conquest and is now giving his mighty thought to the 
sublimation of the world'. 

" 'That suggestion, Mr. Watterson'. interrupted the 
reporter, 'would seem to require elaboration, if not ex- 
planation'. 

" 'Mr. Wilson', the editor resumed, 'like most of those 
whose ambitions outrun their talents, has become the 
victim of contingencies he has himself raised up. He 
has been caught by the foreign lure. He sails the blue 
of the empyrean. The scion of a race of religious fan- 
atics and rustic scholars, his commonplace mind grew 
to be overtrained, and he reached manhood already a 
dangerous intellectual adventurer. 

" 'Such characters seem strangely favored by fortune. 
The powers of evil delight in exhibiting them. Within 
less than a decade, advanced from a university professor 
to the chief magistracy, Woodrow Wilson has so thrust 
himself into the affairs of his own land, and other lands, 
as to be at this moment the most conspicuous figure at 
the forefront. 

[ 249 ] 



IMAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

"A virtuous, right minded man thus situated would 
emulate the humility o£ a Washington and the humanity 
of a Lincoln. Mr. Wilson sees nothing but himself and 
his personal exaltation — lives for nothing except his own 
advantage — seeks nothing save power and authority, 
the concrete things of rulership represented by the regal 
splendors and feudal glories which though somewhat 
frazzled and faded still go on about him. He is too 
clever not to set up for a prophet. Thus the League 
of Peace and the Religion of the Uplift. The once 
famous faker, the 'Immortal J. N.*, as he called himself, 
must turn over with envy in his grave and the bones of 
Mother Eddy grow sick with the thought of lost oppor- 
tunities. 

" 'Don't you think, Mr. Watterson,' I asked, 'that 
Mr. Wilson is doing more good than harm on the other 
side* ? 

" 'If I were phrase making or word splitting' he 
replied, 'I might say that he deserves impeachment for 
going at all. It is the old story of meddle and muddle. 
The world is full of it. As a consequence of his mal- 
adroit tinkering Europe will find itself the middle of the 
coming summer in flames. Then we shall have him alone 
again urging~interventi5Sf' It has been his mission in 
life to make trouble wherever he appeared. When the 
great Jehovah interjected such a sinister spirit into our 
affairs it must have been to punish us for our manifold 
delinquencies as a nation and a people. 

"We should steer clear of European complications. 
Never has there been a time when the admonitions of 
Washington, Jefferson and Monroe carried greater weight. 
Mr. Wilson's mediocre mind and colossal vanity have 
already carried him far to sea. It is ours to look to it 
that he does not carry the country to the shipwreck of 
its institutions". 

[ 250 ] 



i;^^^^.»-- Vka^^ SjuUL*^ OlkJ) -<^-^ wv^, 

c4t-^»AvvdU t-cli;), (^vJlCtJ^ 4^«iai2. f-OL^^^S^ 



'I Wadkd TiiHorciH I'lUK TO :\rAKi.: Wilson PnESinENT- 



i 

















A-*v»^ «'>j 



THE COST OF VANITY 

Mr. Wilson's ideas of the functions of the Execu- 
tive changed after entering the public service. I have 
turned to my notebook which sets out the lectures of 
Professor Wilson at Princeton when I was a student 
under him. One of the points most pressed was that of 
the co-ordinate powers of the President, the Supreme 
Court and the Congress. 

He lectured long and often upon the very distinct 
functions of these three bodies, and disj)araged any- 
thing that might tend to disrupt the balance of power 
among the three bodies as set out in the Constitution, — 
or, rather, the system of checks and balances. 

Wlien I came out of Princeton I was much imbued 
with that idea. I did remember, however, reading 
Thomas Jefferson's works. 

jMaybe the smell of power of Princeton and the 
complete dominance of a very few men, members of 
the Legislature in New Jersey, completely changed 
his ideas. I often think that a man's conception of his 
duties is much affected by his powers. Those powers 
sometimes have little regard for the Constitution, the 
statutes and the common law. 

Mr. Wilson went to the ^^^lite House a supreme 
ruler in his own heart. He dared not take about him 
strong men, for strong men might disagree with him, 
and in the end his conception as well as his practice 
might disappear. 

The working out of Wilson's administrations has 
shown that no man who had creative ideas or con- 
structive ability could long survive the Wilson contact. 
I suspect that was the predominant reason of ^Ir. 

[ 251 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Brj^an's leaving the Cabinet. I know that this was 
the reason for the resignation of the able Lindley M. 
Garrison, Secretary of War. 

I think that Attorney General ^IcReynolds, who 
had a testy sort of mind, with no particular vision, 
used his remaining spirit of independence and was 
glad to go on the Supreme Court for that reason. Of 
course, there must be included the high reason that any 
lawyer would accept a nomination to that august tri- 
bunal. But it was not the august tribunal which 
broug'ht the matter about. It was because McReyn- 
olds did not alwaj^s agree with President Wilson. Yet 
that was no reason for throwing him out of the Cabinet. 
But there was a place on the Supreme Court then. 

It became early apparent that Wilson was not only 
going to regard himself as the President of the 
country, but as the Premier of the Congress. Pie said, 
I recall, during my college daj^s, that, after all, the 
English sj'^stem of government was the best, and that 
idea never left him. 

But we must assume that he forgot that there is no 
provision in our Constitution for a Premier who goes 
out of office immediately after the majority of Parlia- 
ment has passed adversely upon an issue that he has 
proposed, and that a general election is then declared ; 
that thus the people are closely in touch with the gov- 
ernment because the Parliament, as the present Pre- 
mier, must always more directly than our President 
represent the wishes of the people. 

But Mr. Wilson was President of the United States 
under a written Constitution. He had his functions 

[ 252 ] 



THE COST OF VANITY 

definitely outlined. He could not fall if his policy or 
the policies of the majority in Congress failed of sup- 
port. Whatever act the Congress adopted, and what- 
ever act he committed short of an impeachment pro- 
ceeding, was valid, and he must stay for the period of 
his election. 

It was late in his administration after he had arrived 
from the Peace Conference, and it was during that 
conference that he proclaimed himself Premier of the 
United States and of the Congress, — the most auda- 
cious proclamation that was ever emitted from the 
mouth of a President of the United States. He must 
stay in his place until the time of election expires. 
He could not fall, and constitutionallj^ he could not act 
indirectly, as he did from the beginning of his admin- 
istration as Premier. 

A man who has the Wilson conscience and tech- 
nique can override a Congress and make it obedient to 
his will. He can, as in Wilson's case, propose legis- 
lation direct from the White House and force it 
through. 

From the beginning. President Wilson proposed 
legislation in final form to the Congress and it was 
passed. These bills were called administration bills — 
that is, bills proposed by the President or Premier. 
The force that put them through in the early stages 
was the desire which was then prcA^alent to make the 
party "harmonious" — and then there was patronage 
to be distributed. The Congress went along and 
accepted bills known as administration bills, and when 
anyone opposed them the President chopped his head 

[ 253 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

off, whether by ignoring him or opposing him in subse- 
quent elections. 

Wilson was in a high stage of exultation then. He 
was the schoolmaster who could make the student do 
anything he desired or be punished. 

Congressional bills went along until the Panama 
Toll Bill was proposed. Mr. Wilson would not even 
explain why the Panama Toll Bill was necessary, and 
has not to this day. He said it was for a high purpose, 
and those thinking Senators who finally opposed it 
were called the ''Wilful Twelve", — an admirable 
Wilsonian coinage. 

As the Congress became more supine to him, and 
had accepted him as the Premier who could not fall, I 
was reminded that when he became Governor of New 
Jersey he proclaimed himself "Leader of the Party". 
This was unprecedented, as far as I am informed, in 
history. 

He meant wliat he said. He meant that he must 
control the Legislature, and, as far as possible, the 
courts. 

'\^nien he got to Washington, he proclaimed himself 
the "Leader of the Party in the United States". This, 
I am sure, no other President ever did or ever dared 
think of doing. For how can one man, having co- 
ordinate power with two other equally important 
powers in the government, proclaim himself the party 
leader, and how can he, by the same im^Dlication, 
express the intention of making the party malleable 
to his will? But this thing was done. 

From the very beginning President Wilson took a 
[ 254 ] 



THE COST OF VANITY 

complete assignment of the National Congress. Few 
members were allowed even to see him. He consulted 
with few leaders in either branch of Congress, and that 
was on the rarest occasions. Generally, it was to 
inform them that such and such Avas a bill that was to 
be introduced and passed. 

The only consultation ever had, so far as any person 
ever knew, was with the "mysterious" House and with 
his son-in-law, William G. McAdoo. 

Mr. Wilson was a historian. He preached con- 
stantly the preservation of constitutional rights and 
the maintenance of the system of checks and balances 
which Mr. Roosevelt actually had not. I know leaders 
in the party who could do this work with some degree 
of boldness, but who would always keep their minds 
on the Constitution and not on themselves. 

It was within a very few months after his election 
that I discovered that IMr. Wilson sought merelj'^ to 
advance himself; that he had lost sight of the new 
problems confronting him, and dealt only with those 
which might advance him. I knew within six months 
that his high purpose was to abolish the Democratic 
Party, make it supine to his will, and to consider noth- 
ing except through the eyes of one who was drunk for 
power. 

The idea of "serving" that ran all through his 
speeches disgusted me, because it was apparent that 
he meant in fact serving himself. The reader of cur- 
rent events since 1913 ought to be aware of this fact. 

I suppose that President Wilson has not been much 
more truculent to labor than the average President or 

[ 255 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Member of Congress. He has had more opportunities 
to be so. 

In 1916 the Adamson Law was demanded of Con- 
gress by President Wilson. This was a political ven- 
ture for the railroad employees. The Presidential 
election was coming on. It was passed. It was passed 
in the interest of the President's re-election. 

In that year I was the nominee of the Democratic 
Party for the United States Senate. After the cam- 
paign had warmed up, I talked to the New York State 
leaders. I knew they would tell me the absolute truth. 
I concluded that, far from any good effect that the 
Adamson Law would accomplish, it was distinctly bad. 

After speaking at a railroad town, the other speak- 
ers being Secretary Lane and Secretary Baker, and 
the Democratic nominee for Governor, Judge Samuel 
Seabury, I felt there was nothing of comfort in the 
Adamson Law. It was the coldest meeting I ever 
addressed. Afterward Judge Seabury, who had been 
on the bench for ten years or more, came into my state- 
room on the train. He said: "I may now address you 
as the next member of the LTnited States Senate by 
100,000". I got up, closed the door, and said to Judge 
Seabury: "Now, let's be good sports. You and I are 
both beaten by 150,000. The Adamson Law is not 
going to help ; it is going to hurt". 

However, I do not believe labor en masse can be 
controlled. At the very beginning of the Presidential 
campaign of 1912, at the first meeting of the Cam- 
paign Committee, one member asked, how are we 
going to handle the Church Question. I said: "We 

[ 256 ] 



THE COST OF VANITY 

are not going to handle it". "How are we going to 
handle the Labor Question" ? I said: "That question, 
too, we will not handle. There may be a general senti- 
ment running through Churches, or running through 
Labor, but in neither case can any party ever hope to 
control it as a mass. It is an impossibility". 



[ 257 ] 



? 



XX 

McCOMBS A "SOCIAL LION" 

Gets Appendicitis and a Bride — Feted in London and Paris 
— Refuses Public Service Commissionership and State 
Chairmanship — Frames Party Platforms and is Nomi- 
nated FOR Constitutional Convention Delegate — 
Attacks Roosevelt as a Bolter — Offers Services as 
Party Peace-Maker — Backs Glynn for Governor and 
Gerard for United States Senator. 

N 1913 Mr. McCombs became a social lion in 
London and Paris, recovered from an operation 
for appendicitis, and brought to America a bride. 
All this happened within less than five months. 

In June, Mr. McCombs went abroad. Though he 
sought to keep his presence unkno>^Ti, desiring com- 
plete rest, he was deluged with invitations to dinners, 
luncheons, suppers and other functions by royalty, 
statesmen and clubmen. 

Frederick Townsend Martin, who was Mr. Mc- 
Combs' companion, described his visit as a "social joy 
ride". William Gillette, dean of London clubdom, 
pronounced IMr. McCombs as a "wonderful social sen- 
sation, who conquers everything with silence and 
smiles, exhibiting the suavity and restraint the 
English admire as mannerisms". 

[ 258 ] 



McCOMBS A SOCIAL LION 

Mr. McCombs was frequently guest of honor at the 
exclusive JMarlborough and Bachelor Clubs, inside 
which few Americans could penetrate. He was much 
in the company of Count Kinsky, the Duke of ]\Ian- 
chester. Sir Herbert Tree, Lord Ingestra, Lord 
Athlumney, the Duke of ^Mecklenburg Strelitz and 
Gustav Harvel, the aviator. 

Too much social effort lowered Mr. McCombs' 
resistance, and while in Paris he was stricken with 
appendicitis. On July 8th he was operated on success- 
fully by Doctor DuBouche, the famous French sur- 
geon. The night before the operation IMcCombs gave 
a dinner to James W. Gerard, then Ambassador to 
Germany, Archibald White, Perry Belmont, and 
i\Iartin W. Littleton. They, with the Ambassador to 
Paris, Myron T. Herrick, saw to it that McCombs had 
the very best of care. The patient was out of the 
hospital in ten days and plunged again into society. 

Mr. McCombs' state of mind at this time is admir- 
ably sho^vn by the following letter to his favorite 
sister, Corinne: 

"Paris, July 17, 1913 
"My darling sweetheart sister: — 

I got your sweet letter and loved every word of it. 
It found me just getting over the operation for appen- 
dicitis (which finally had to come although I fought it 
hard). After all, I think it improved me. The wound 
is quite healed but I lost strength somewhat. 

I am going to Baden Baden, Germany, to-morrow for 
a rest cure of three weeks. Then probably up into 
Switzerland in the mountains. I shall try to be in New 
York in September but I doubt it. October is more 
likely. 

[ 259 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

/ waded through fire to make Wilson President, and 
now that he is there, I am paying a terrible penalty of 
shattered health. I know you are aware of what I went 
through. I would not do it again for the whole earth. 

I left New York because my health and my spirits 
would not stand it a day longer. I simply had to 
do it to live. Ever since I have been here I have been 
illj making as brave a fight as possible to restore myself. 
I am glad to say my health has improved but I am heart- 
sick and I would give anything to see you. Returning to 
America now would merely mean getting into the cruel 
grind again and I can't stand it for some months to come. 

I have many friends here who look after me as best 
they can. The circle of real friends is however very 
narrow. Unliappily, we have to find that out as we go. 
You know how I was tricked and duped when I was ill. 
However, that is a closed chapter and I shall try to 
forget it. My address is always c/o Munroe & Co. 
7 Rue Scribe, Paris. Letters will be forwarded. Lyons 
arrives in Paris to-morrow. I felt I must have someone. 
Let the boys and Ethel know how I am. I shall write 
you N. Y. c/o Ethel. 

With all my love, 

Bro. Frank" 

Americans generally and official Washington were 
astounded November 7, 1913, to read of Mr. Mc- 
Combs' marriage to Miss Dorothy Williams, daughter 
of Colonel John R. Williams, U. S. A., and sister of 
Mrs. Joseph Leiter. The ceremony was performed 
within the shadow of Buckingham Palace, at the 
quaint little Roman Catholic Chapel of St. Peter and 
St. Edward, by the Rev. Father Bernard Vaughn. 
Among the witnesses were the American Ambassador 

[ 260 ] 



McCOMBS A SOCIAL LION 

to London, William H. Page, and Mrs. Page; the 
Ambassador to Paris, ^l3^ron T. Herrick, Lord Derby, 
the Earl of Suffolk, who married ^largaret Hyde 
Leiter, of Chicago; the Earl and Countess of Craven, 
and Rig-lit Hon. Henry Chaplin. Charles W. Halsey, 
a Princeton classmate, was ^Ir. ^IcCombs' best man. 

Mr, McCombs was much amused that he had sur- 
prised his bachelor friends by suddenly becoming a 
benedict. Explaining, he said: "I met Miss Williams 
"^t the inauguration of President Wilson. We were 
engaged for several months, and our marriage was 
necessarily delayed by my attack of aj)pendicitis". 

jMr. and Mrs. McCombs returned to America early 
in November, 1913. 

January 11, 1914, ^Ir. McCombs visited Governor 
Martin H. Glynn at Albany. He received two offers 
from the Governor. One was a Public Service Com- 
missionership. The other was the Chairmanship of the 
Democratic State Committee, carrying with it the 
management of Governor Glynn's campaign for re- 
election. 

Mr. IMcCombs declined both because he said he could 
not afford to abandon his law practice. IMoreover, his 
acceptance of the State Chairmanship would mean his 
retirement as National Chairman. He purposed to 
retain that place for his full term, regardless of the 
Wilson-McAdoo-Tumulty j)lot to supj)lant him. 

Months after, JMcCombs' intimates asserted that the 
Gljmn offers w^ere all a part of the White House con- 
spiracy to oust him from the^National Chairmanship. 
Though Glynn failed to inveigle McCombs into the 

[ 261 ] 



IMAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Wilson trap, Glynn was chosen by the President to 
preside over the National Convention which renom- 
inated him in 1916, and later was awarded a lucrative 
place on the Federal Industrial Board. 

"Maybe Governor Gljmn, for whom I have a sin- 
cere affection, was unaware of what Wilson and 
McAdoo were trying to do to me", observed Mr. 
JMcCombs; "but I was not caught. I visited the 
Governor at his request to advise him about the fall 
State Campaign. In tendering the Public Service 
Commissionership and State Chairmanship, I believe 
he had no ulterior motive. Anyway, I took neither, 
but I did do all I could to secure the Governor's 
renomination and re-election". 

The Democratic State Convention of 1914 unani- 
mously chose Mr. McCombs Chairman of its Platform 
Committee. It also named him as a candidate for 
member of the Constitutional Convention of 1915. 

Mr. McCombs drew one of the briefest, but most 
comprehensive, declarations of principles on record. 
Its keynote was protection of the direct nominations 
law against the assaults of machine bosses. It urged 
anew the submission of the unanimous suffrage propo- 
sition to popular vote; declared for a short ballot, 
home rule, biennial legislative sessions, and challenged 
political adversaries to cite a single instance of malad- 
ministration or malfeasance in the state administration 
headed by Governor ]\Iartin H. Glynn. 

Arguing for harmony, the renomination of Gov- 
ernor Glynn, and the adoption of the platform draft, 
Mr. McCombs said: 

[ 262 ] 



McCOMBS A SOCIAL LION 

"The Democratic Party is unreservedly committed 
to the princij)le of direct primaries. The purpose of 
the law is to give every voter a fair and equal chance 
to secure the nomination of his choice. The law is 
contrary to the spirit or use of oppressive power 
which may be exercised by those holding political office 
or leadership. I am assured no attempt will be made 
by Democrats to repeal this law. They will do all 
they can to perfect it. 

"Those who refuse to support candidates named at 
Democratic primaries are not Democrats. If there be 
differences before or after the primaries, I offer 
Democrats mj^ undivided service". 

The reference to bolters was aimed at an organiza- 
tion formed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, later Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy and candidate for Vice Presi- 
dent, and Jolm A. Hennessey, to defeat the regularly 
selected ticket. Roosevelt ran at the primaries against 
James W. Gerard, who was supported by Mr. JNIc- 
Combs for United States Senator, and was unmerci- 
fully drubbed. Hennessey ran against Ghmn for 
Governor, also supported by Mr. McCombs, and was 
overwhelmingly defeated. 

^Ir. McCombs devoted himself night and day to the 
campaign to keep New York Democratic. Scandals 
which had resulted in the impeachment of Governor 
William Sulzer in 1913 proved too heavy a load. The 
Democrats lost to Charles S. l^Hiitman (Republican) , 
who was elected Governor, and James W. Wadsworth, 
Jr. (Republican) , who became United States Senator. 

[ 268 ] 



XXI 

McCOMBS RETIRES AS CHAIRMAN 

Quits National Committee — Defeats All McAdoo-Burleson- 
TuMULTY Plots to Oust Him — Wilson Coterie Conspires 
Four Years to Supplant the President-Maker — Mc- 
Combs Wins Fight for 1916 Convention City and Volun- 
tarily Steps Out in Formal Notice to the President — 
Wilson's "Greatest Regrets". 

[Editor's Note — The editor has written this chapter from 
Mr. McCombs' notes.] 

AMcADOO - BURLESON - TUMULTY 
cabal plotted four years to oust Mr. 
McCombs as Chairman of the Democratic 
National Committee. Though apparently inspired by 
the benediction of the President himself, the con- 
spiracy to overthrow him forcibly was thwarted. ISIr. 
McCombs, backed by a large majority of his fellow- 
Committeemen, stuck to his post for the full term for 
which he was elected. In a pert note to the President, 
personally, he asked to be relieved after his successor 
was chosen at the National Convention of 1916. He 
then gladly retired. 

As already hinted, the White House coterie sought 
McCombs' scalp even upon the eve of Wilson's first 
inauguration, but were unsuccessful. Taking their 

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McCOMBS RETIRES AS GHAIRMAN 

cue from the President's refusal to honor any recom- 
mendation Chairman ^IcCombs made in behalf of the 
National Committee, the Wilson group, almost from 
month to month, sought to oust JMcCombs and name 
a substitute "next the throne". Repeated polls of the 
National Committee, however, revealed a big majority 
for ^IcCombs. Many stood by INIcCombs because 
they were angered by the President's persistent rejec- 
tion of the merest suggestion as to patronage or policy 
presented by them through their Chairman. They 
were boldly and coldly informed that "^IcCombs' 
O. K. does not go with W. W. See McAdoo, Tumulty 
or Joe Daniels" ! 

Any National Committeeman suspected of so much 
as sympathizing with JMcCombs was denied the slight- 
est consideration, and any who dared make a request 
through jMcCombs was blacklisted. 

For upwards of three years, few, if any, avowed 
McCombs devotees could get the appointment of even 
his village postmaster. Meantime, IMcAdoo was con- 
structing a well-formed and powerful machine through 
the Treasury. 

Albert S. Burleson, who deserted McCombs the 
instant he became Postmaster General, filled his offices 
^^•ith ardent Wilson-McAdoo satellites. Daniels used 
the Navy Department as an adjimct to the Wilson 
dynasty. Even Cabinet officers, except perhaps Secre- 
tary of War Lindley JprGTaiTison, seemed allied with 
the President to exclude McCombs and his friends. 

In December, 1915, however, the plot to depose 
McCombs was resumed in earnest. Willis J. Abbott, 

[ 265 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

in a special to the New York American, exposed it. 
Here is what that able journalist wrote on the eve of 
the Democratic National Committee meeting of 
December 7, 1915: 

"The Democratic National Committee will meet 
here next Tuesday to fix the time and place of the 
next National Convention. 

*'Four cities are contestants for the honor — San 
Francisco, St. Louis, Dallas and Chicago. 

"There is lively interest in a topic not specified in 
the call, but which, nevertheless, is likely to engross 
the attention of the Committee. 

"That is the effort to force the retirement of Chair- 
man William F. IMcCombs and the substitution for 
him of Committeeman Fred B. Lynch, of Minnesota. 

"This project is purely an administration move. 

"At the Wliite House this will be gravely denied; 
but men in the closest relation to the President do not 
hesitate to admit their participation in the war upon 
McCombs. 

"Before the combination now arraj^'cd against the 
Chairman, the record of his effective work for IMr. 
Wilson's nomination both before and at the Baltimore 
convention is likely to be displayed in vain. 

"Mr. Wilson, Who permitted the sidetracking of 
McCombs during the campaign, and thrust him into 
comparative obscurity in the first flush of victory, is 
now determined upon his complete obliteration from 
politics. 

"Of course, such action as the enforced retirement 
of a National Chairman of the National Committee 

[ 266 ] 



McCOMBS RETIRES AS GHAIRMAN 

between campaig-ns is without precedent, in the Demo- 
cratic, or any other party. 

"Viewed dispassionately, it would seem merely the 
expression of a private grudge, for between conven- 
tions the Chairman of a National Committee is with- 
out authority or any useful function. In theory, at 
least, the Committee is free from interest in any par- 
ticular candidate for the nomination, and exists for the 
sole purpose of arranging a convention which shall be 
free for all. 

"This, however, is not the view of the Wilson forces. 
They want the Committee reorganized and made a 
fighting force for the President's renomination. An 
official closely identified with the political side of the 
administration said to-day: 

" *We must get rid of McCombs, because, while he 
controls the Committee, we can't begin the campaign 
for the President's nomination. We can't raise a 
dollar while he is at the head of things. He has antag- 
onized many of our strongest supporters, and we are 
absolutely blocked by his continued control.' 

"All of which is well enough if the National Com- 
mittee is to be regarded merely as a Wilson machine. 
But the effort to make it one has arrayed against the 
administration plan many members who care little for 
IMcCombs, but will show their resentment against the 
administration hy fighting for his continuance in office. 

"Mr. McCombs expresses a confidence in the out- 
come which his friends do not share, and which per- 
haps, at heart, he does not feel. That any effort to 
depose him at this meeting will result in a nasty fight, 

[ 267 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

and a serious injury to the party, few doubt. It might 
be shrewdly seized upon by Bryan to widen the split 
he is planning to make in the party. 

"But there can be no doubt of the power of Wilson 
to force his earliest and perhaps most efficient champion 
out, if he so desires. The only question is whether 
prudence will lead the President to put a curb on his 
followers who are now proclaiming their purpose to 
force the issue next Tuesday". 

But the Wilson-McAdoo plot to put Chairman 
McCombs out did not succeed. A majority of the 
National Committee would not tolerate such a sugges- 
tion. They denounced it long before the Committee 
met at Washington, December 7th, for the ostensible 
task of selecting the date and place for the National 
Convention of 1916. 

Weeks before the Committee got together McCombs 
had a big majority pledged not only to his retention as 
Chairman, but to vote with him to send the convention 
to St. Louis. He reached Washington two days in 
advance of the Committee meeting. He found the 
Wilson-McAdoo group split among three men who 
had been suggested for his successor. They were 
Frederick B. Lynch, of Minnesota; Vance McCor- 
mick, of Pennsylvania, and Henry Morgenthau, of 
New York. McCombs made it his job to keep them 
split. 

The Ljmch coterie had lined up behind Chicago as 
the Convention City. Some of the McCormick men 
were for St. Louis, some for Chicago, and some behind 
Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson to send the 

[ 268 ] 



McCOMBS RETIRES AS GHAIRMAN 

President-maker to Dallas, Texas. As for Morgen- 
thau, there seemed to be no votes for him at all. 

McCombs clinched a renewed grip on the party's 
national machine by inducing the Committee to select 
St. Louis for the convention. 

The President, hearing that the anti-McCombs 
movement had proved abortive, ordered the fight to 
cease. 

[Editob's Note — Mr. McCombs here resumed his story.] 

The National Committee, as v/as customary, met the 
first week of January, 1916, to make prelimmary 
arrangements for the convention to come. There were 
many .present. After attending to our business we 
were informed that we were invited to the \^niite 
House to luncheon the next daj^ 

Of the many luncheons I ever attended, this was the 
most curious. ^lany of the Committee did not desire 
to go. They told me so. I advised them it was proper 
under the circumstances to go, notwithstanding their 
individual feeling. And with this spirit I went. 

I never attended such a funereal function in my life. 
Every Committeeman seemed embarrassed and ill at 
ease. The meal was eaten almost in silence. 

I, of course, was put on the President's right. 
Homer S. Cummings was on his left. We could 
pump no language out of the President. Therefore, 
we turned to our neighbors. One Committeeman, 
seated at some distance, handed in a note behind the 
others to me with these words on it : 

"This looks like the 'Last Supper' ". 
[ 269 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

"WTien we had consumed the wines set before us, 
everybody was anxious to go. 

We had to comply when it was suggested that our 
picture be taken. So we went out behind the "V^Tiite 
House, where a member of the Committee said to me, 
*'I wonder if he wants our finger prints too" ! After 
the picture was taken, everybody moved away from 
the White House and took a fresh breath of air. 

[Editor's Note — The Editor again resumes from notes.] 

Having secured from his colleagues the vote of con- 
fidence he desired, McCombs planned to quit of his 
own accord. 

April 24, 1916, he served formal notice that he 
desired no identification with the movement to violate 
the Baltimore platform pledge by naming the Presi- 
dent for a second term. 

Mr. McCombs wrote President Wilson: 

"My dear Mr. President: 

"I have just formed a new partnership for the practice 
of law which will become effective the first of May. The 
change will necessitate my devoting substantially all my 
time to my profession. My political activities must be 
largely curtailed. My arrangements, however, will just- 
ify my proceeding through to the end of the convention 
at St. Louis. 

"In view of the party precedent that the nominee for 
the Presidency is requested to indicate his preference 
for the chairmanship of the National Committee, and in 
view of the unity of sentiment for your renomination, I 
am writing you at the earliest moment to let you know 
that I could not, under any circumstances, assume the 
leadership of the coming Democratic campaign. I am 

[ 270 ] 



McCOMBS RETIRES AS CHAIRMAN 

happy in the thought, however, that there are hosts of 
able and true men who can readily take my place. 

"The Democratic organization is loyal to your policies 
and your purposes. We feel assured of a triumphant 
result for you and for the party nominees in November. 
For fifteen years, now, I have been in the active service 
of the party, and it is with a keen feeling of regret that 
my activities are of necessity to be more limited. If 
within the limits of my time I can be of assistance, be 
assured that I am always available, 

"With assurance of high regard, 
"Sincerely yours, 

William F. McCombs" 

The President replied: 

"My dear McCombs: 

"I have your letter apprising me of your inability to 
retain the chairmanship of the Democratic National 
Committee for the approaching campaign. 

"I fully appreciate the necessity you feel yourself to 
be imder to resign after the convention shall have been 
held in June; I know that you would not have reached 
such a decision had not your new business obligations 
made it unavoidable. I do not feel at liberty, therefore, 
to urge you to make the sacrifice that a retention of the 
chairmansliip would in the circumstances involve. 

"You have made many and great sacrifices already 
for the party and I know that I am speaking the senti- 
ment of all loyal Democrats when I express the very 
deep appreciation I have felt of the great services you 
have ungrudgingly rendered. 

"I am sure that the greatest regrets will be felt at 
your retirement, and that a host of friends will join 
me in the hope that your new business connections will 
bring you continued abundant success. 
"With best wishes, 

"Sincerely yours, 

r 971 1 WooDROw Wilson'* 



XXII 
"WAR SAVED WILSON IN 1916"! 

McCoMBs Refuses to be a Party to the President's Violation 
OP His One-Term Pledge — "You Know I Do Not Oppose 
A Third Term", Says Wilson to McCombs, When Asked 
to Fulfil His Paramount Pre-E lection Promise — How 
McCoMBs Saved Vice President Marshall His Renomina- 
TioN — Balks Palmer and Baker, Who Seek to Supplant 

THE HOOSIER. 

[Editor's Note — This chapter is compiled by the Editor.] 

AN INSPIRED editorial in the New Yorh 
Sun of April 26, 1916, is illuminating as 
to the reason for Mr. McCombs' retirement 
as Democratic National Chairman. It read: 

"From the Democratic Text Book of 1912, pre- 'I 
pared under the direction of Mr. William F. Mc- 
Combs and widely circulated by him among the voters 
of the United States, we extract this campaign pledge, 
or promise, prominently displayed on page 14: 
"Term of President 

"Democratic Platform. 
"We favor a single Presidential term, and to that 
end we urge the adoption of an amendment to the 
Constitution making the President of the United 
States ineligible for re-election, and we pledge the f 
candidate of this convention to this principle". 

[ 272 ] 



"WAR SAVED WILSON IN 1916"! 

"The candidate pledged to the single term princi- 
ple by the Baltimore convention and pledged again 
by Mr. McCombs' committee when it exhibited the 
foregoing declaration as a reason for voting for him, 
was Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey. Mr. 
McCombs had perhaps done more than any other 
friend of Dr. Wilson (with the possible exception 
of Colonel George Harvey and ex- Senator James 
Smith, Jr.) to prepare the way for his nomination on 
this single-term platform. "W^en the campaign 
opened Mr. McCombs, in his dual capacity as chair- 
man of both the Democratic National Committee and 
the Democratic Campaign Committee, at once took 
undisputed first place among the promoters of Dr. 
Wilson's political fortunes. Mr. McKinley scarcely 
owed more to IMark Hanna. 

"In askhig the fellow citizens to vote for Woodrow 
Wilson as a candidate pledged to the one term princi- 
ple by the platform of his party, Mr. William F. 
IMcCombs took pains to make it clear to everybody 
that the candidate accepted the platform. He caused 
to be printed on page 343 of the Campaign Text 
Book this passage from Dr. Wilson's speech of accept- 
ance: 

" 'What is the meaning of our platform, and what 
is our responsibility under it? What are our duty 
and our purpose? The platform is meant to show 
that we Imow what the nation is thinkmg about ; what 
it is most concerned about, what it wishes corrected, 
and M^hat it desires to see attempted that is new and 
constructive and intended for its long future. But 

[ 273 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

for us it is a very practical document. We are now 
about to ask the people of the United States to adopt 
our platform ; we are about to ask them to intrust us 
with office and power and the guidance of their affairs. 
They will wish to know what sort of men we are and 
of what definite purpose; what translation of action 
and of policy we intend to give to the general terms 
of the platform which the convention at Baltimore put 
forth, should we be elected'. 

"Mr. McCombs went further and drew a striking 
contrast between Woodrow Wilson, pledged to the 
principle of a single term and to be depended upon 
to respect the platform and keep the pledge if elected, 
and Theodore Roosevelt, one of his competitors for 
the votes of the people. On j)ages 304 and 305 of 
the Text Book Mr. McCombs exhibited Colonel 
Roosevelt as a person willing to feed his own ambition 
even by the violation of a distinct pledge no»t to be a 
candidate again: 

" 'On March 4, next, I shall have served three and 
one-half years, constituting my first term. The wise 
custom which limits the President to two terms regards 
the substance and not the form, and under no circum- 
stances will I be a candidate for or accept another 
nomination'. 

" 'To newspaper correspondents who asked him if 
he might not be a candidate in 1912, Theodore Roose- 
velt, with his characteristic emphasis, replied that not 
in 1912, in 1916 nor in any other year would he again 
be a candidate for the Presidency; and that "under 
no circumstances" was meant for all time. 

[ 274 ] 



"WAR SAVED WILSON IN 1916"! 

" 'Theodore Roosevelt gave his solemn word that 
he would not again be a candidate for or accept another 
nomuiation for the Presidencj% and he has now broken 
that promise under circumstances created by himself 
and his hero worshiping admirers'. 

"Thus, Mr. William F. iMcCombs kept before the 
country during the campaign of four years ago the 
picture of Woodrow Wilson, pledged by his platform 
to the single term principle and squarely accepting that 
platform when he accepted the nomination; and also 
the picture of Theodore Roosevelt, shamelessly violat- 
ing a voluntary pledge of his o\mi not to be a candidate 
or accept a nomination for a third term. With this 
choice before them the people voted; and they gave 
just 2,173,538 more votes for Mv. IMcCombs' pledged 
single term candidate than the candidate pledged by 
Colonel Roosevelt not to seek or accept under any 
circumstances, a third term. 

"Now, Mr. William F. IMcCombs is an extremely 
conscientious gentleman. His sense of personal honor 
and personal responsibility for those whose promises 
he has indorsed is vigilant and alert. He is almost 
meticulous in his solicitude for the fulfilment of cam- 
paign obligations. He must perceive as clearly as 
any other man in the United States the immorality 
involved in the acceptance by President Wilson of a 
nomination for a second term. 

"Is any other explanation needed to account for 
Mr. IMcCombs' withdrawal from the active political 
support of the man for whom he has done so much? 
He conducted Governor TVilson's canvass for the 

[ 275 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Democratic nomination for President. Under con- 
ditions of enormous difficulty he put his candidate 
through Baltimore even in the presence of Mr. Bryan's 
overshadowing prestige with the delegates. He saw 
the single term pledge recorded. He used that pledge 
with skill and success to accomplish his candidate's 
election. He emphasized for the information of the 
voters the contrast between the trustworthiness of a 
man like Wilson, who could be depended upon to keep 
his party's pledges, who had at the verj'- outset of the 
campaign denounced 'the use of the organization of 
a great party to serve the personal aims and ambitions 
of any individual', and the untrustworthiness of a man 
who was running for a third term in violation of his 
pledge. 

"How could Mr. McCombs, in self-respect and 
simple decency, begin under these circumstances a 
second campaign for Dr. Wilson's election and again 
ask his fellow citizens to give credit to platform 
pledges made in Dr. Wilson's behalf? 

"We do not believe that ]Mr. McCombs could be 
influenced to become again the devoted and disinter- 
ested engineer of Dr. Wilson's political fortunes by 
any such sophistry as seems to have taken possession of 
the President's mind. It is impossible to imagine so 
level headed a person as Mr. McCombs sharing the 
delusion that the office for which Dr. Wilson is to run 
a second time is a higher and greater office than that 
of President of the United States. Nobody knows 
better than Mr. McCombs that there is no such thing 
as a Chief Executive of Humanity, any more than 

[ 276 ] 



"WAR SAVED WILSON IN 1916"! 

there is a Chief IMagistrate of Gratitude, or of Loy- 
alty, or of Sincerity, or of any other beautiful and 
desirable abstract quality." 

That ^Ir. Wilson dreamed of a third, if not a life- 
term, is demonstrated by a note Mr. ^IcCombs pre- 
pared for this book. Here it is : 

In the Summer of 1912, I suggested that Governor 
Wilson go into some of the large cities and make pleas- 
ant speeches like those of tlie pre-nomination daj^s, 
raising no particular contest with the candidates 
against him as Roosevelt and Taft. I thought they 
were doing an excellent job of chewing each other's 
ears off. I did, however, suggest that he speak on the 
Third Term in the case of Roosevelt. 

Governor Wilson turned to me and said; "Mc- 
Combs, you know I do not oppose a Third Term, and 
I do not care to discuss it". Wilson was certainly look- 
ing far ahead, as he had been at Baltimore. 

]Mr. McCombs formally retired as Chairman of the 
National Committee at the Convention of 1916. He 
knew that, controlled as it was by the \^niite House 
clique. President Wilson's renomination would be 
forced. His job was, however, to prevent the Wilson- 
IMcAdoo group from denying a similar compliment to 
Vice President Thomas R. Marshall. He succeeded. 

WHien Chairman INIcCombs reached St. Louis, he 
found the Wilson-lMcAdoo coterie split for the Vice 
Presidency between A. Mitchell Palmer, of Pennsyl- 
vania, -the— feheH— Alien -^^Hstodian, and Newton 1^. 
Baker, of Ohio, Secretary of War. He lined up 
Thomas T. Taggart, of Indiana, Charles F. INIurphy, 

[ 277 ] 




^ 



IVIAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

of New York, Roger C. Sullivan, of Illinois, and 
Governor James M. Cox, of Ohio, for ^larshall. This 
combination smashed the anti-JMarshall plot. 

In his meagre notes of the St. Louis Convention, 
Mr. McCombs wrote: Everybody was saying, "Wil- 
son kept us out of war" and "To h — 1 with the rest 
of the platform" ! 

The McAdoo cabal pushed A. Mitchell Palmer for 
the Vice Presidency, with Secretary of War Baker 
as second in the string. 

[Editob's Note — Mr. McCombs writes the following text.] 

Mr. Baker was special messenger to the Convention 
for certain things that I did not know about, and did 
not care about. That Convention was going to nomin- 
ate Wilson and IMarshall, although it was generally 
understood that President Wilson did not like IMr. 
Marshall very much. Throughout his administration, 
he gave him slight consideration. I think Mr. IMarshall 
took this too lightly. 

I had rumors, some weeks before the Convention 
that Mr. Baker was to be a candidate for Vice Presi- 
dent. The larger leaders, I know, were very much 
opposed to him. They were very much offended by 
what they thought was Mr. Wilson's idea of getting 
a candidate more to his liking as Vice President. It 
was understood that he wanted Baker because it was 
thought that Baker never made a move without Wil- 
son's direction. Furthermore, Baker used classical 
English. 

I saw the lickspittles of the White House tugging 
[ 278 ] 



f 



"WAR SAVED WILSON IN 1916"! 

at the lapels of the leaders. The Baker boom first 
came to my headquarters as Chairman. I had received 
many telegrams about it. I saw no reason for chang- 
ing the order of things. In my mind, at that very 
time INIarshall was superior to Wilson. If there were 
to be any succession by fate, we could not go very far 
wrong with INIarshall. So I said to a gentleman 
who claimed to come from the White House, that it 
was customary for the candidate for Vice Presidency 
to have the delegation from his owa state with him. 
He had better see Judge A., one of the leaders of the 
Ohio delegation, who was close by. 

Then I said: "TsTow, I suggest that you go and 
discuss this matter with Ohio and Judge A. Go in 
and see him". 

He left. I called up Judge A. and told him the 
facts. He said: "I'm glad you have given me the 
privilege of trimming our little Secretary". So 
Judge A. received the Baker envoy and told him that 
he did not think he could get Ohio. The man went 
to a number of other delegations. Judge A. knew how 
to be busier at a Convention than did this man. So 
the boom of Baker died aborning. 

President Wilson's first term had been saved from 
debacle by the declaration of the European War in 
1914. This was pretty generally conceded among all 
the Democrats. Of course, the minds of the American 
people were centered upon one question: namely, 
keeping out of that terrible conflagration. They 
thought that Wilson having been President for one 
term should be re-elected for the second. Therefore, 

[ 279 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

the successful campaign of 1916, which might have 
gone the other way, had Mr. Hughes been a bit more 
thoughtful and diplomatic in his treatment of Hiram 
Johnson in California. 

I recall going to the Republican Chicago Conven- 
tion after making arrangements for the St. Louis 
Convention. The Chicago Convention was a week 
before the Democratic Convention at St. Louis. I 
wanted to see the forces operating there. I learned 
from a very confidential source that Hughes would 
be the nominee. The rest was parade. 

I went into a hotel and met some friends among 
the Republican leaders. They, in a jocular way at 
luncheon, said: "Your convention is settled, now, 
what shall we do"? 

"Well", I replied, "I know exactly what you're 

going to do. You're going to take the man with 

whiskers from New York. Now I'm going to tell 

> you, since you're utterly tied up, what you ought to 

do. You should name Harding or Burton, of Ohio. 

"You have had a little factional trouble out there 
and Ohio will go for Wilson, unless you patch it up. 
If things go on as they are, Wilson will carry Ohio. 
If you nominate Harding or Burton, you will carry 
Ohio, and the next President will be a Republican". 

My guess was correct, as many of those disappointed 

friends whom I met there, have since told me. 

<' Mr. McCombs' prophecy was fulfilled. Neither 

' Warren G. Harding nor any other Ohio Republican 

was nominated for the Presidency in 1916. Charles 

Evans Hughes, of New York, was, but he lost Ohio 

[ 280 ] 



"WAR SAVED WILSON IN 1916"! 
and Wilson was re-elected. Four years later Mr 
Harding was nominated. He carried the country by 
the unprecedented plurality of seven millions. 



[ 281 ] 



XXIII 
DRAFTED FOR THE SENATE 

Wilson Runs Conway Against McCombs, but McCombs 
Sweeps the Primaries — Wilson's "Congratulations" — 
McCoMBs' Reply — Wrath of "Crown Prince" — Mc- 
Adoo-Wilson Handicap So Great That Calder Wins at 
THE General Election — McCombs Assails "Pap Hunt- 
ers" AND "Blank-Check Profiteers". 

[Editor's Note — This chapter is compiled from Mr. 
McCombs' notes.] 

MR. McCOMBS was "drafted" for the New 
York State United States Senate Demo- 
cratic nomination in 1916. The move- 
ment was orginally conceived by admirers who 
sincerely desired to voice their protest against the 
ungracious treatment Mr. IMcCombs received from 
President Wilson. They knew that Wilson, who had 
been renominated, could not carry New York. They 
hoped that, even if Mr. McCombs failed of election, 
he would rim so far ahead of the President that he 
could eventually claim vindication. 

An unofficial State convention was called for Sara- 
toga, August 12th. Long before that date, anti- 
Wilson leaders were apprised that the President 
planned to name William G. McAdoo for the seat 

[ 282 ] 



I 



DRAFTED FOR THE SENATE 

held by James A. O' Gorman. This provoked much 
resentment. 

The McAdoo project died of inanition. Then 
William Church Osborn and Thomas F. Conwaj'^ vied 
with one another for the indorsement of the adminis- 
tration. Both Osborn and Conway had much money. 
Osborn had been a student at Princeton and was the 
leader of Putnam County. Conway had been Lieu- 
tenant Governor and controlled the organization in 
Clinton and other northern tier counties. 

Samuel Seabury, former Justice of the Court of 
Appeals, had been picked by the President for Gov- 
ernor. Charles F. Murphy and his associates reluc- 
tantly accepted Seabury, despite his frequent and 
numerous verbal attacks upon them. They made no 
violent objection, even When Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, hurriedly came from 
Washington and announced that the President would 
insist upon Seabury's nomination as the most likely 
means of aiding the Presidential ticket to capture 
New York's electoral vote. But these leaders drew 
the line at Osborn, Conway, or any other Senatorial 
aspirant picked by Wilson. 

On the afternoon before the Convention met, there 
was an informal conference at the Saratoga Race 
Track club house. There participated. National 
Committeeman Norman E. Mack, Charles F. ^lur- 
phy, John H. McCooey, William H. Kelley, William 
H. Fitzpatrick, Mr. McCombs and others. All 
urged McCombs to take the Senatorial nomination. 

[ 283 ] 



nK 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

"Neither Wilson nor any other Democrat can carry 
this state this year"! he stated. 

"Wilson can't, but you might", the leaders replied. 
"Just think what sport you can have with Woodrow 
in the Senate", laughed one. 

"I don't mind being slaughtered for the sake of the 
party — I am used to that. But I beg to be spared for 
a while", pleaded McCombs. 

The leaders finally compelled INIcCombs to submit 
to the trial. He was the overwhelming choice of the 
convention. Osbom was eliminated as a dangerous 
rival with an exposure of his written approval of the 
late Mayor John Purroy Mitch el's "wire tapping" 
campaign, which so infuriated the Roman Catholic 
clergy. Conway received a few northern New York 
votes. 

Though the convention was all but unanimous for 
McCombs, the Wilson-McAdoo faction declined to 
accept its verdict, and got behind Conway as a Federal 
Administration candidate at the September primaries. 

The administration's attitude was expressed in the 
editorial columns of the New York Sun, August 29, 
im2, thus: 

"The Wilson-McAdoo crowd will have nothing to 
do with McCombs. They look upon his selection as a 
direct slap at the Wilson administration, which they 
will not condone". 

An answer came from the New York World, sup- 
posedly friendly to the President : 

"There is no better representative of the Young 
Democracy of New York than William F. McCombs. 

[ 284 ] 



DRAFTED FOR THE SENATE 

He is qualified in all respects for the United States 
Senatorship". 

The New York Times reproduced an editorial 
eulogy of McCombs printed a few days after he had 
secured the nomination of Wilson for the Presidency 
in 1912. Under the caption "Young Democrats" the 
Times said: 

"It is of the happiest augury for the Democratic 
Party that young men are coming to the fore to take 
part in its work and its councils. Everywhere words 
of praise are bestowed upon W. F. McCombs of this 
city, who, as an active and skilful manager of Governor 
Wilson's campaign, showed that he laiew how to make 
friends without making enemies". 

The Brooklyn Times (Republican), under date of 
August 20, 19^15, printed this tribute: ^^^C 

"The nomination of IMcCombs is one of recognition 
for the manager of the victory for Wilson in 1912. 
He shared witb Colonel Harvey and others the fate of 
most of the ladders upon which the President has 
climbed to his present eminence". 

The Philadelphia Inquirer (Republican) said Sep- 
tember 1, 1916: 

"William F. IMcCombs has decided to enter the race 
as the Democratic candidate for United States Senator 
from New York. He has had some experience work- 
ing for others, notably Woodrow Wilson. 

"Now McCombs made the grievous error of enter- 
ing the race without consulting the President, and in 
consequence has brought down upon himself the wrath 
of the crown prince" (William G. McAdoo) . 

[ 285 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Despite the bitter opposition of the Federal machine 
headed by President Wilson and JMcAdoo, his son-in- 
law and Secretary of the Treasury, JNIcCombs swej)t 
the state at the Democratic primaries, September 19, 
1916. He defeated Thomas F. Conway, the Wilson- 
McAdoo favorite, by over 40,000 plurality. Conway 
carried a few counties near the Canadian border. 

Two days after he had defeated Conway at the 
primaries, Mr. McCombs was amazed to receive this 
wire from the President: 

"Asbury Park, N. J. 

Sept. 21, 1916 
"Wm. F. McCombs: 

"I congratulate you most warmly on your nomination 
by the Democrats of New York for the United States 
Senatorship. A united body of Progressive voters will 
be behind you. 

WooDROw Wilson" 

Mr. McCombs sent this reply to the President's 
telegram : 

"President Woodrow Wilson, Shadow Lawn, Long 
Branch, N. J.: 
"I thank you sincerely for youir telegram of congratu- 
lations. Aside from my personal friendship, which 
prompts me to wish you every success in the coming 
election, I am certain that the masterly way in which you 
have administered the affairs of our Nation, keeping us 
free from war and giving us an unprecedented pros- 
perity, deserves an unmistakable vote of confidence from 
the American people. 

W. F. McCombs" 

[ 286 ] 



I 



DRAFTED FOR THE SENATE 

McCombs had that very day read this analysis of 
conditions in the Philadelphia Inquirer: 

"William F. McCombs, as the Tammany candidate 
for United States Senator for the Democratic nom- 
ination, wins in a walk. He has an enormous majority 
over Thomas F. Conway, presumed to have the sup- 
port of the Wilson Administration. It might be sup- 
posed that the President would help the man who 
managed bis successful campaign in 1912. But the 
Wilson personality is a difficult thing to understand, 
as those who have dared to think for themselves can 
testify". 

]\IcCombs found himself pitted against William M. 
Calder (Republican) of Brooklyn. Calder had for 
years been a member of the House of Representatives. 
He adopted the Samuel J. Tilden "personal contact" 
method of campaign. By sending personal auto- 
graphed signature letters and free seeds and docu- 
ments to practically every man and woman in the 
state, ]Mr. C alder's name had become a household 
word. Calder, however, antagonized many. He had 
cultivated the habit of being a "band-wagon jumper", 
and, like other great men, he too often changed his 
mind. 

Having all but pledged himself to support James 
W. Wadsworth, Jr., for the Senate in 1914, Calder 
suddenly did all he could to defeat him. 

In 1916, at the eleventh hour, a Roosevelt-Barnes, 
heretofore unheard-of combine, was formed to beat 
Calder. But ten days prior to the primaries Colonel 
Robert Bacon entered the field. Not until the day 

[ 287 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

after the primaries was it definitely known whether 
Bacon or Calder won the nomination. Calder nosed 
Bacon out by barely 8,000. But for a 25,000 Calder 
majority in Brooklyn, Bacon would have proved the 
victor. 

The Wadsworth-Calder and Bacon-Calder quarrels 
gave McCombs some hope of success. He began a 
most aggressive state-wide campaign, and was on the 
stump night and day. His speeches were brief but 
fetching, particularly to young men. 

Before the Brooklyn Young Democratic Club, 
September 21st, he made a hit with this: "The differ- 
ence between a Bepublican and a Democratic admin- 
istration is that the Republicans serve the people two 
months every four years. The remainder of the time 
they hand the country over to the management of a 
board of directors for the benefit of 'Big Business'. 
The Democrats, on the other hand, are on the job for 
the people 365 days in the year" ! 

"You said something, ^lac"! roared a group of 
admirers. 

Every Democratic newspaper in the country dis- 
played the ?»IcCombs speech and commended it edi- 
torially as a platform by itself. 

jNIr. IMcCombs was mightily pleased to find in the 
New York Sun the follo^^dng day this paragraph: 
"Mr. McCombs has experienced every phase of the 
progressive ingi'atitude v/ith which it is the President's 
custom to reward personal and political service. It is 
to ^Ir. McCombs that Woodrow Wilson happens to 
be more deeply indebted for his political and personal 

[ 288 ] 



i 



DRAFTED FOR THE SENATE 

fortune than any man living, with the possible excep- 
tion of former Senator James Smith, Jr., and, of 
course, Colonel George Harvey". 

The Sun gave a complimentary summary of Mr. 
McCombs' speech the night before. 

]\Ir. INIcCombs made Freedom of the Seas one of the 
paramount issues. Day after day, and night after 
night, he incessantly kept hammering this idea into the 
ears of voters: "We must seriously and sincerely 
insist that our commerce and communication through- 
out the world, through channels of trade, shall be main- 
tained inviolate and untranmielled. We cannot, with 
dunity, tolerate any discrimination". 

Hoping to get a few more votes for himself. Presi- 
dent Wilson said a few kind words for McCombs in a 
Madison Square Garden speech a few days before 
election. 

Mr. INIcCombs, in his final speech of the campaign, 
said: 

"I do not think that j^ou expect a very long address 
from me. I think that you came here, as I came here, 
to hear the next President of the United States, 
Woodrow Wilson. For the past tw^o and a half 
months I have gone over this state speaking about 
Democratic peace and j)rosperity. In the meantime 
I have been reading the papers carefully to see what 
issues Mr. Hughes would develop; and as an Amer- 
ican citizen I think I have a right to complain of Mr. 
Hughes. There are Republicans in the audience, and 
I want to call your attention to a few facts. 

"The immortal Abraham Lincoln had a programme. 
[ 289 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

He developed it. He argued it. And the American 
people twice made him President of the United States. 
The soldier statesman, Grant, a Republican, had a 
programme, Mr. Chaimian. He developed it. He 
argued it. And the serious thinking people of this 
American Republic made him President of the United 
States. The martyred IMcKinley had a programme. 
He presented it. He argued it. He seriously insisted 
upon it. He was elected President of these United 
States. So our Mr. Roosevelt. So our Mr. Taft. 
And however much we may have disagreed with them 
in j)rinciple, they were elected by your votes, and, I 
think, my friends, you as Americans are entitled to 
insist upon a programme being presented to you. 
They have no right to insist upon your voting for 
people who merely want to get into office. 

"Do you know what they are doing? They want 
you to fill in a blank check and let them make out the 
amount after election. Can you, my friends, can you 
Republicans be insulted in that way? This election 
involves a very homely question. Are you going to 
maintain that which j^ou have? For to hold is just as 
important as to have. Or are you going to fly to those 
agencies of which you know naught? That is your 
question to-night. Let me call your attention to the 
fact in the few brief moments that I am going to 
address you that the Democratic Party is a party of 
performance, of promise. For example, for 100 years 
the question of child labor, the question of industrial 
freedom for children, was agitated in this country; 
and a particular bill which the Democratic Party put 

[ 290 ] 



DRAFTED FOR THE SENATE 

on the statute books lay in tlic pigeonholes in the 
Senate and the House through three Republican 
Administrations. The Democratic Party has released 
little children from industrial slaver}^ 

"I call your attention to the fact that the Republi- 
can Party has taken up this issue and that issue and 
the other and dropped them with equal celerity during 
this campaign. It reminds me of the story in 'Alice in 
Wonderland', that chaniiing little book, where the girl 
mounted seven horses at the same time and simultane- 
ously rode off in seven different directions. 

"Mr. Hughes a week ago, as I sav/ in a paper, I 
think in Buffalo, where I was speaking, said he was 
going to cut loose. In these last two weeks I have 
continued to wonder, INIr. Chairman, what ]Mr. Hughes 
was going to cut loose from. Theodore Roosevelt, 
who snorts flame and preaches war and who thus far 
has made up most of the spoken opinions for jMr. 
Hughes? Xo, not yet. JMr. Taft, who has agreed 
with President Wilson in all of his foreigTi policies, in 
substance? He cannot do that. Special privilege? 
Will he cut loose from that? One rarely cuts loose 
from one's angel. Then mj^ Republican oi)ponent, 
Mr. Calder, should cut loose with something. 

"They have said a great deal about Americanism in 
this campaign. That is not an issue. Every man, no 
matter where he was born, no matter of what descent, 
if he is an American citizen, is for America. 

"I would like to address you further upon this issue 
of Americanism. I shall leave this thought with you 
as I go: Let us make Americanism practical. Let us 

[ 291 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

see that the flag is respected in every port in all the 
world. Let us see that every pound of American 
freight, every American communication, every Amer- 
ican life, is safe imder this flag". 

With all Mr. McCombs' popularity and real value, 
the handicap created by Wilson's Presidential candi- 
dacy was too great for him. He was defeated by 
Calder by 839,314 to 603,933. IMcCombs ran nearly 
20,000 ahead of Samuel Seabury and received within 
a few thousand votes as many as the entire National 
ticket. 



[ 292 ] 




XXIV 

RETRIBUTION 

Wilson's Greeting on Return from Paris — McCombs Foils 
Baruch and Chadbourne in Their Efforts to Make 
McAdoo President — Uses Edwards to Consolidate East- 
ern States — Solidifies Anti-Third Term Forces — 
Destroys Wilson Dynasty at San Francisco. 

ULY 9, 1919, President Wilson returned to 
New York from his -fest commutation trip to t-^.^^ 
Paris to api)eal to the people of the United 
States to back his policy at the Peace Conference. 
Mr. IMcCombs was ill at his room at the Waldorf- 
Astoria. He sent for the writer. I found him look- 
ing out of the window of his bed chamber. Fifth 
Avenue and Thirty-fourth Street were packed with 
a multitude of men, women and children. They 
were awaiting the arrival of the President. The 
President, standing in an auto and bowing right and 
left, soon appeared. The crowd gave him a chilly 
greeting. McCombs leaned so far out upon the 
window sill that I cautioned him to be careful. He 
answered : 

"I'm all right. But look at the Great Human- 
itarian — the man who said he was going to make the 
world safe for Democracy! He's gone! Remember 

[ 293 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

the receptions he got here in 1912 and 1916? They 
surpassed those of Bryan in 1896 and 1900. Wilson 
has shot his bolt. The people have found him out. 

"Keep your eyes and ears open and j^ou will soon 
agree with me that Wilson is done for", he continued. 
"The voters repudiated him by over a million plurality 
when they elected a Ilei)ublican Congress last Fall. 
He has become a joke and the cat's-paw of England 
and Japan at Paris. Pie will try for a renomination 
and be beaten at that. Then he will put up IMcAdoo, 
the crown prince, and he will be thrown down". 

This prophecy was recalled when both Wilson and 
McAdoo were overwhelmed at the San Francisco 
Convention. 

McCombs and his friends were very busy just about 
this time. They knew that, first of all, they had to 
defeat Wilson for a third term; second, they had to 
prevent Wilson from forcing the nomination of any 
man to "keep the Presidency in the family". That 
meant the elimination, not only of JMcAdoo, but A. 
Mitchell Palmer, Wilson's Attorney General ; IMere- 
dith, Wilson's Secretary of Agriculture, or any one of 
a half dozen dark horses the President might determine 
to groom. 

It was decided to secure a round-up at the 
Democratic National Executive Committee meet- 
ing at Atlantic City, September 24, 1919. It was 
called for the ostensible purpose of raising monej'' to 
cancel a deficit in the Committee treasury; to guar- 
antee an adequate fund for the Presidential campaign 
of 1920, and to organize the women u4io had been given 

[ 294 ] 



RETRIBUTION 

the right m many states to vote for National candi- 
dates. 

President Wilson was at the time touring the 
country, beseeching the people to swallow his League 
of Nations covenant, "wdthout the crossing of a T or 
the dotting of an I". McCombs, who was quite ill, did 
not attend the Atlantic City meeting. But as in 
1912 he worked the telephone from his sick-iroom, 
so did he in 1919 keep in touch with and manipu- 
late wires into the National Executive Committee 
meeting. 

There was hardly an hour day and night during the 
four days' session that IMcCombs was not in communi- 
cation with Executive Committeemen Fred B. Ljnich, 
of Minnesota; Wilbur W. JNIarsh, of Iowa; Nomian 
E. Mack, of New York, and other opponents of 
Wilson and McAdoo. 

Mr. McCombs scented an intrigue first to pledge the 
Committee for a Wilson third term, and second, to 
make McAdoo Wilson's legatee, and again to make 
Attorney General Palmer a third of the string of 
candidates to perpetuate the Wilson regime. 

McCombs had information that Bernard IM. Baruch 
and Thomas L. Chadboume were engineering the 
McAdoo campaign. Baruch had become convinced 
that the renomination of Wilson was impossible, and 
that McAdoo was the most available man among the 
administration cabal. INIcAdoo had been instrumental 
in placing Baruch upon the War Industries Board 
and in sending him as a special envoy to the Paris 
Peace Conference. 

[ 295 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

McCombs warned Lynch, Marsh, Mack and others 
that Baruch and Chadbourne plotted to capture the 
Committee for McAdoo. His admonition seemed 
prophetic when, September 26th, at an executive ses- 
sion, Baruch and Chadbourne, neither a member of the 
Committee, appeared and boldly urged McAdoo's 
claims. The two expressed very great sympathy that 
the Committee was bankrupt. They generously 
offered to make good the entire deficit. "And", 
announced Mr. Baruch, "we are prepared to under- 
write the next Presidential campaign for at least ten 
millions, if the proper candidate is selected". 

A majority of the Committee had practically 
pledged themselves to Attorney General Palmer for 
the Presidential nomination. He was a fellow-Com- 
mitteeman. Loyalty to a comrade influenced many to 
resent the intrusion of the McAdoo emissaries with 
offers of gold. 

The Baruch-Chadbourne tender was, therefore, 
rejected, though the Committee treasury was empty. 

McCombs 'phoned in from New York that if the 
McAdoo-Baruch-Chadbourne terms were accepted he 
would expose the whole conspiracy. This clinched the 
repudiation of the Baruch-Chadbourne offer. 

On the final day of the Committee session, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, sud- 
denly rushed to Atlantic City. He whispered that as 
a result of Wilson's physical collapse, resulting in the 
abandonment of his League of Nations speaking tour, 
the President must be considered impossible as a can- 
didate for renomination. The McAdoo and Palmer 

[ 296 ] 



RETRIBUTION 

cliques thereupon resumed their raids. But the Com- 
mittee adjourned without indorsing either candidate. 

McCombs denounced the Barucli-Chadbourne ten 
million dollar offer as a part of a conspiracy to buy 
the Presidential nomination. He saw to it that the 
endeavor was submitted to the Kenyon United States 
Senate Committee investigathig Presidential cam- 
paign expenses. Practically every member of the 
Democratic National Executive Committee was 
grilled about the tender. The Kenyon Coomiittee 
recommended the enactment of laws prohibiting the 
use of scandalously large sums of money in Presiden- 
tial primaries and elections. 

Mr. McCombs, during the Fall and Winter of 1919, 
made several country- wide tours. This object was to 
solidify the anti-Wilson and anti-McAdoo forces. 
He threw the administration into confusion in Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, Iowa, IVIinnesota, INIissouri, and other 
states. Then he returned to New York and devoted 
himself to unifying his home state against a continu- 
ance of the Wilson-lMcAdoo empire. 

In the Spring of 1920, IMr. ^IcCombs was the man 
behind the organization of the Edward I. Edwards 
Presidential League. It was fomied for the purpose 
primarily of consolidating New York, New Jersej'' 
and other Eastern State Democrats against Wilson 
and McAdoo, but ultimately to promote the candidacy 
of the Governor of New Jersey for the Presidency. 

Early in April, and again in MaJ^ IVIcCombs con- 
ferred with Charles F. Murphy, Thomas T. Taggart, 
Norman E. ^Mack, Edward H. Moore, George Bren- 

[ 297 ] 



MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

nan, and other anti-Wilson-anti-]McAdoo men, at 
French Lick Springs, Indiana. It was agreed to sup- 
port Governor James M. Cox, of Ohio, as the likeliest 
to defeat Wilson, McAdoo, or Palmer. New York, 
Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
other states represented in the group, controlled a third 
of the delegates to the National Convention. Plans 
were laid at these conferences to go after the other 
third, and thus insure the nomination of Cox. 

In July, 1920, the Wilson machine was wrecked by 
the nomination of Governor Cox at San Francisco. 
At the close of tihe convention, Mr. McCombs, a 
jubilant smile upon his face, stood upon the platform. 
Hundreds of delegates were shrieking their joy over 
the nomination of Governor James M. Cox, of Ohio, 
for the Presidency. They were all celebrating the 
defeat of the mighty machine erected to keep indefi- 
nitely the United States Government in the hands of 
the Wilson-McAdoo oligarchy. 

Mr. McCombs said: "I have lived to see Woodrow 
Wilson deprived of his ambition to be Emperor of the 
World; balked in his desire to become President a 
third time; thwarted in his plan to make his d\Tiasty 
perpetual through the nomination of his son-in-law, 
William G. McAdoo, as his heir, and thoroughly dis- 
credited at home and abroad". 

The events leading up to this political cataclysm 
came as the result of an incessant nation-wide 
manoeuvring. Publicly, the active principals were 
Charles F. Murphy and Norman E. ^lack, of New 
York; Thomas T. Taggart, of Indiana; Edmund H. 

[ 298 ] 



RETRIBUTION 

Moore, of Ohio; George Brennan, of Illinois; Gov- 
ernor Edward I. Edwards, of New Jersey, and James 
A. Reed, of Missouri. Its silent promoter was William 
F. McCombs. 



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XXV . 

WILSON'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS 
McCOMBS 

McCoMBs Made No Promises of Office — Sullivan, Wood, 
Reed and Others Suffer from President's Ill-Will — 
McCoMBs' Suggestions for Cabinet Appointments Ignored 
Because Made by Him — Denied a Seat Because "You 
Are a Politician". 

[Mr. McCombs here resumes his narrative.] 

THE REASONS for the hostile attitude taken 
by President Wilson toward me have been 
much discussed. He always gave out matters 
of this kind through the faithful Tumulty. The first 
reason assigned was that I had made many promises 
to obtain his election, and for that reason he could not 
fulfil them. I can say, however, most emphatically, 
there were no promises made. I challenge any of 
the lick-spittles who have infested Washington for the 
last few years to prove anything else. I deplore the 
innocence of INIr. Wilson, if innocence it was, that he 
should have given any credence to contrary reports. 

As I have said before, the men of the organization 
throughout the country were somewhat concerned, 
after the incident of James Smith, Jr., of New Jersey, 

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WILSON'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS McCOMBS 

with respect to what would become of them if Wilson 
were nominated and elected. 

On the night when Roger C. Sullivan, of Illinois, 
agreed to come over to Woodrow Wilson at the Balti- 
more Convention of 1912, he asked me whether his 
organization would be attacked by Wilson. I said: 
"The best way to answer that is by a direct telephone 
to Wilson himself". I called up in Mr. Sullivan's 
presence, putting the question squarely. The answer 
received was: "By no means. No. I like Sullivan". 
Mr. Sullivan was in the room at the time. Fifteen 
minutes later I asked Frederick B. Lynch, of Minne- 
sota, to ask Mr. Wilson over the telephone the same 
question. He received the same answer. 

Mr. Sullivan, I am told, was never allowed to be 
directly instrumental in the nomination of a single 
candidate for office. In 1914, when he was running 
for the Senate, Assistant Secretary of the Interior 
Vrooman made a campaign in Sullivan's state against 
him. Mr. Wilson refused to write a letter of approval, 
as he had done for other candidates in close states. 
Senator Robert L. Owen, of Oklahoma, also spoke 
unimpeded against Mr. Sullivan over Illinois. Post- 
master General Albert S. Burleson had been 
through the state and made some confidential and 
apparently pleasing utterances of the leaders, but 
never came out for ^Ir. Sullivan. Even Secretary of 
Agriculture David Houston went through the state 
expressing himself privately against Mr. Sullivan, and 
would never be interviewed by anyone. 

All this was despite the fact that but for the 58 
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MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

votes of the State of Illinois in tlie Baltimore Con- 
vention Mr. Wilson could not have been nominated ! 

Mr. Sullivan asked me to come to Illinois and make 
a speech for him. I did so. I spoke at Chicago and 
offered to speak over the southern part of the state, 
but this Mr. Sullivan believed was unnecessary. He 
thought his election was assured. 

A similar situation developed in Maryland. There 
was some support for Wilson in the Maryland delega- 
tion, but it was not very strong. Senator John W. 
Smith not only dominated the delegation completely, 
at the Baltimore Covention, but I am creditably in- 
formed, had his alliances in Virginia, West Virgina 
and Tennessee. He was powerful in these four states. 
I thought that should we get his support we could 
loosen in a way the States of Virginia, West Virginia 
and Tennessee. 

Senator Saulsbury and I called on Senator Smith 
on a Sunday afternoon before the Wilson nomination. ^ 
We stated the case for Wilson as we had so many times 
previously x^resented it. We argued the matter out 
with Senator Smith, first, on the ground of ^Mr. Wil- 
son's radicalism ; second, whether Mv. Wilson would 
be inclined to wreck the leadership of his party in any 
state. Senator Saulsbury was a very close friend of 
Senator Smith; in fact, they are related. 

After a long talk I suggested to Senator Saulsbury 
that he should call up Governor Wilson and tell him 
what he and I were discussing with Senator Smith. 
The answers from Mr. Wilson were that his record 
showed that he was not a radical, and, in so far as dis- 

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WILSON'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS McCOMBS 

rupting organizations was concerned, that had not 
been his practice and it would not be his j)ractice in 
the future. At that time he called attention to his 
appointment of organization men generally while he 
was Governor of New Jersey. On this score, how- 
ever, it may well be said that he was not Governor 
very long before his National campaign was started. 
At any rate, the right answer was given to Senator 
Smith. After the expiration of a half hour I called 
uj) Governor Wilson and propounded the same ques- 
tions which Senator Saulsbury had asked, and received 
the same answer. This was sufficient assurance to 
Senator Smith, and, in my opinion, not only gained the 
support of Maryland, but carried with it the support 
of Virginia, West Virginia and Tennessee. 

This is what happened: Senator Smith was not 
allowed to have or to pass upon a single appointment 
for two years. He became a Wilson outcast. ^Ir. 
Wilson' openly and in the press, supported the pri- 
mary candidacy of Mr. William ISIarbury for the next 
Senatorial primary against Senator Smith. It was 
not until after two years that little things from the 
White House trickled Senator Smith's way. 

The pledge made to JNIichigan was of the most harm- 
less variety. That state we expected, quite naturally, 
to be for Hannon. Mr. Wood, the National Commit- 
teeman from ;Michigan and a director somewhat in 
that state, with his state associates, decided that they 
would go to the convention without endorsing an^'^one. 
We made a brisk contest in Michigan and received a 
few votes. The whole delegation was not against us, 

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MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

except indireciiy. That was because of an attack 
made on Mr. Wood by a young man whom I unfortu- 
nately sent into Michigan. I immediately sent to Mr. 
Wood a letter of apology which smoothed out the 
situation. I remember early on the Sunday morning 
of the Baltimore Convention going to Mr. Wood at 
his apartment and covering the entire situation with 
him. He said that he had no ambition personally, but 
that Mr. Wilson's reputation for ingratitude and cast- 
ing aside those who had been useful to him was a rather 
large obstacle to overcome. I spent an hour or two in 
conversation with him. He said: "Whose recommen- 
dation do you think ought to have the greatest weight 
in JNIichigan if we should nominate and elect Wilson"? 
I said: "Naturally, the National Committeeman, the 
Chairman of the State Committee, and such Demo- 
cratic members of the lower House as there might be, 
should have first consideration". (There was no 
chance for the election of any Democratic Senator in 
Michigan.) Mr. Wood then said: "I am going to 
take your word about the man, and I am not going to 
take any chances on Clark or Bryan". There and then 
we had the entire State of Michigan. 

There was but one other statement in this connec- 
tion which I made and which I must record, but which 
had not the slightest influence on the convention. 
Charles F. Murphy asked me if I thought Wilson 
would set about to break up the organization in any 
state, including his. I said "No", on the record of the 
talk with Senator Smith and the general talks I had 
had with Mr. Wilson himself. 

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WILSON'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS McCOMBS 

Mr. Murphy had a wonderful chance when Mr. 
Champ Clark's vote grew less and less. If, after the 
attack on certain members of his delegation and on 
New York in general, he had instantly voted his dele- 
gation for Mr. Wilson, the convention would surely 
have conceived an alliance with Mr. Murphy and Mr. 
Wilson. Mr. Wilson's Western following would have 
left him in an instant, and Wilson would have found 
his chances at the bottom of the sea. 

I did not expect to have any influence on Mr. 
Murphy, nor did I ever expect him to vote his delega- 
tion except to make the nomination unanimous, which 
was done by the able and admirable John J. Fitz- 
gerald, of Brooldyn. 

There were no tradings in the convention so far as 
Wilson was concerned. There was just what I have 
told my readers : a systematic appeal not only to the 
leaders, but to the people as far as possible by mail, 
on the record of Mr. Wilson as Governor of New 
Jersey. Then there was the impinging of forces of 
each of the candidates against the other, of which we 
succeeded in taking advantage at the time. When it 
was all over the Democrats were lined up unanimously 
for the choice. They had not won in twenty years or 
more. They had been compelled to take up "ism" 
after "ism" under the unquestioned leadership of 
Bryan. They did not laiow a great deal about Wil- 
son's mind, but they had read much of him and were 
enthusiastic for victory. The results obtained did not 
proceed from pledges or promises made by me, and no 

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MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

sueh paltry excuse can serve as a justification of Mr. 
Wilson's conduct. 

While on this topic my mind naturally adverts to 
Senator James A. Reed, of Missouri. 

He was the ablest supporter that Mr. Clark had 
and the most bitter opponent of Governor Wilson 
before and at the convention. I felt after the conven- 
tion that if we took Senator Reed we would get one 
of the most valuable possible assets. With much per- 
suasion I induced Mr. Wilson to accept Senator Reed. 
I then approached the Senator and said to hmi: 
"Senator, the President and I want you to be with us. 
We want you to come into the campaign with both 
feet. Woodrow Wilson is the nominee. You are a 
Democrat and an able one. Everything before the 
nomination at Baltimore is forgotten. In fact, noth- 
ing ever happened before the adjournment at Balti- 
more". He took my hand and said : "We must win. 
I am as much for Woodrow Wilson as you are. Tell 
me where to work". 

I shall never forget Senator Reed's appearance at 
headquarters. A tall, weU-formed man, with aggres- 
siveness in every feature, I knew that when he started 
out on a principle his advocacy would never cease until 
he had completely lost or completelj^ won. There is 
no man in public life whose fearlessness and ability I 
have more admired ; at the same time, personally, with 
his friends, he has the gentleness of a lamb. During 
the campaign I cannot think of a person who did more 
for Woodrow Wilson than Senator Reed, the same 

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WILSON'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS McCOMBS 

man who has been spat upon from the White House to 
this day. 

I was anxious that the President start out with a 
Cabinet of marked ability. I had, prior to December 
29, 1912, suggested about fifty men of the highest type 
that I knew in America. I had a feeling that these 
suggestions rather bored Governor Wilson. He 
didn't ask who a single one of these men was, although 
I am sure at that time he did not know fifteen men of 
Cabinet size in America. I soon found that the men 
suggested by me were foreclosed for life, and for the 
reason that I submitted their names to the President. 
Like Senator Reed, there were many men of great 
calibre in the Democratic Party who were desirous of 
entering the public service. Mr. Wilson did not know 
them. It was an obligation of honor, on my part at 
least, to present their names. I continued doing this, 
however, up to the time of the inauguration, always 
believing that the selection of some of these men would 
certainly at the outset give confidence to the Wilson 
Administration, and always feeling that I was doing 
my duty, and that the President would eventually 
realize this. In this latter belief I was disappointed. 

In my o^\ii case, the attitude of Mr. Wilson was 
early apparent. On the 29th day of December, which 
is Mr. Wilson's birthday, he was invited to be the 
guest of Staunton, Virginia, his birthplace. An invi- 
tation to be present was also extended to me. 
Although I was in wretched physical condition, I felt 
I must go under any circumstances. I was on the 
train that went from IS'ew York and stopped at 

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MAKING WOODROW WILSON PRESIDENT 

Princeton to take on the Governor. I greeted him 
cordially and had a few moments' conversation with 
him. I then went to my own compartment to rest. 
About noon a messenger came and said that the Gov- 
ernor wanted to see me. "McCombs," he said, "I 
don't want to put you in the Cabinet because you are 
a politician. I think you would fit excellently in 
diplomacy". I said: "Mr. Wilson, I am not seeking 
a position in your Cabinet, nor can I take a position in 
diplomacy". He then asked me which of all the posts 
in the world I considered best. Innocently enough, I 
said "France". Whereupon he said: "I would like 
you to go to France, or, if you would care for it, 
London or Berlin or the Governorship of the Philip- 
pines". I told the President-elect that I had 
exhausted my personal fortune to such a degree that 
I could not afford to keep up the post of Ambassador 
to any of these coimtries for any length of time without 
financial ruin. He said: "I will put a bill through 
Congress that will give all the posts $17,800 extra for 
maintenance". I said: "Governor, that is a mere pit- 
tance for any of these posts. I cannot afford it. I 
must get back now to New York and gather my things 
together and resume my practice, which I have totally 
neglected for two years". 

The idea of my impoverishment did not impress him 
much. He resented palpably my refusal to go to any 
of these posts. I could tell this from a peculiar show- 
ing of white in his eyes and the lengthening of his jaw. 
My own feeling was to get off at Washington and go 
back to New York, but I had accepted the invitation 

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WILSON'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS McCOMBS 

to go to Staunton, and I went. Shortly after this 
Colonel House appeared and urged that I take Paris 
or London, stating there would be a great investment 
even though I spent everything I had and borrowed 
the money to go. 

I felt that I had already invested sufficiently in Mr, 
Wilson, and declined further hazard in tliat field. 



END 



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